

THE SCOTT REPORT

Nixon Will Adjust Intelligence Corps To Fit His World Plan

By PAUL SCOTT

WASHINGTON — The American intelligence community is preparing for one of the most sweeping realignments since the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established in the late 1940s. It could also become one of the most controversial.

In ordering the shake-up, President Nixon's principal objectives are to tighten White House control over the Government's vast intelligence community and to make it more responsive to changes taking place in U.S. relations with Moscow and Peking.

White House aides say the President hopes to accomplish these objectives in several ways. First, the President plans to replace Richard Helms as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with his "own man." This is expected to be James R. Schlesinger, presently chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and a member of the inner White House circle.

Second, the President plans to drastically cut the budgets of all intelligence agencies by an estimated \$500 million. This would mean big cutbacks in personnel and operational funds for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence functions of the State Department and military services.

Significantly, the proposed half-billion-dollar reduction is the same figure recommended in a study made by a panel headed by Schlesinger, when he was Assistant Director of the Bureau of Budget. When the Schlesinger recommendation was first circulated by the White House, CIA Director Helms and Defense

forces to successfully oppose it.

With both Helms and Laird now leaving government, the President has once again dusted off the Schlesinger recommendation and now wants the former Virginia University economic professor to see if he can't implement it.

The President would like to see Schlesinger test out some of the ideas he put in papers prepared while Director of Strategic Studies at the Rand Corporation, a government-financed "think tank" at Santa Monica, Calif.

These papers dealt exclusively with how systems analyses could be used to improve political, military, and intelligence decision-making, and cost-cutting in these fields. While at the Rand Corporation, Schlesinger also prepared a study on the cost of nuclear-weapons proliferation which caught the President's eye.

NEW INTELLIGENCE OUTLOOK

In discussing the need for an intelligence shakeup with aides, the President indicated that he was replacing CIA Director Helms because the latter was not aggressive enough to make the changes he believes are necessary in the intelligence community. Helms, a career CIA employee, was a holdover from the Johnson Administration.

The President's view is that the Government's intelligence roles and missions must be gradually changed to meet the new relationships which exist between the United States and Russia and the United States and Communist China. As contracts and negotiations produce new agreement with these Communist powers, the

President is convinced that much of the intelligence now gathered the hard way and at great expense may become available through mutual exchange of information.

This proposed intelligence exchange is an integral part of the risky "partnership for peace" strategy which Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's national security adviser, has succeeded in getting President Nixon to adopt. Veteran intelligence officers see the realignment as a move by the President and Kissinger to make the intelligence community more responsive to their efforts to use foreign policy to build a new world order.

Since intelligence estimates are used as a key factor in the formation and support of American foreign policy, a tighter control of the national intelligence operations by the White House would already increase Kissinger's already tremendous influence in making this policy. As one veteran intelligence aide put it:

"Kissinger wants the intelligence community to support foreign policy, not to help shape it. This could be disastrous since it would result in predetermined estimates of intentions of governments like Russia and Communist China."

Time and events should tell whether this estimate is correct.

INTELLIGENCE
FLASHES

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Sweeping Changes In The Works For CIA

By Paul Scott

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4 DEC 1972

CPYRGHT

Helms' Exit Linked To Kissinger Rift

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

The impending resignation of Richard M. Helms as the nation's top intelligence officer can in large part be traced to a serious and continuing policy disagreement with Henry A. Kissinger, according to informed sources in the intelligence community.

The disagreement reportedly began with Helms' position in 1969 on a key intelligence issue — whether the Soviet Union, with its giant SS-9 missile, was going for a "first-strike capability," Helms took the less alarmed view.

Helms' departure, which has been confirmed by authoritative sources in the administration, has not been announced publicly pending a decision by the Central Intelligence Agency head to accept another position.

It is understood the new position will involve the foreign policy field and will be presented publicly as a promotion for the 59-year-old Helms, who has been involved in intelligence work ever since World War II.

Role Was Expanded

But insiders already are voicing skepticism that any job outside the intelligence field could be anything but a comedown for Helms, who is believed to have been anxious to stay on as CIA chief.

A key element in this view is the belief within the intelligence community that Helms had lost the confidence of the White House—Kissinger especially.

"Kissinger felt that Helms wasn't so much trying to support the administration as playing politics on his own—trying to keep his constituency together in the intelligence establishment," one source explained.

In all outward respects, however, Helms appeared to have been given President Nixon's full confidence, expressed both in public statements and in Helms' assignment just a year ago to a key position of responsibility in intelligence.

As a result of a sweeping reorganization of the intelligence community in November 1971, Helms' official title, Director of Central Intelligence, was expanded to include new budgetary and organizational authority over the whole \$5 billion a year U.S. intelligence effort.

The origin of Kissinger's dissatisfaction with Helms is said to reside in an incident, early in 1969, in which Helms made an intelligence assessment involving a fundamental question of national security that was sharply at odds with the view advanced by Pentagon

intelligence experts and held privately in the White House.

The incident was one of those rare occurrences when the latent disagreements in the intelligence community surfaced publicly, in this case in the persons of two rival chieftans, Helms himself and Melvin R. Laird, secretary of Defense.

At issue were the massive Soviet SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missiles, whose existence as a new weapon in the Soviet arsenal became known to intelligence early in the administration's first year.

Laird testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the new missiles, which are capable of carrying a much heavier payload than anything deployed previously, meant that the Soviet Union was going for a "first strike capability."

About the same time, Helms let it be known that in his assessment the new missiles did not indicate a shift from the traditional emphasis on defense, and that the smaller Minuteman-style SS-11 would remain the backbone of the Soviet strategic missile arsenal.

Judgement Was Key

Later, in June 1969, both men appeared together before the committee in executive session, and their views were in some part reconciled. Helms is said to have deferred to the administration view, intelligence assessment, championed by Laird, was the

one on which to base policy.

The administration has subsequently based some of its fundamental decisions in the nuclear strategy and national security fields upon that intelligence judgement. They include: ABM, whether to go ahead with rapid development of multiple missile warheads, and basic negotiating positions in the strategic arms control talks with the Soviets.

The Soviet Union has now clearly shifted to the SS-9 as its basic strategic weapon, and in this respect Helms' assessment appears in retrospect to have been wrong.

According to insiders, there have been other incidents, similar but less spectacular, likewise involving an assessment of Soviet strategic capability in which Helms and the Pentagon were at odds. In most of these, sources say, Kissinger has sided with the Defense Department.

The leading candidate to replace Helms is authoritatively reported to be James R. Schlesinger, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and a chief architect of a study that shaped the intelligence reorganization.

Helms Is Reported Quitting

By FRANK VAN RIPER

Washington, Nov. 28 (NEWS Bureau)—Richard M. Helms, 59-year-old of the Central Intelligence Agency, will leave in January the post he has held last six years, apparently at President Nixon's request, informed sources predict.

While a large body of opinion in official Washington regards career spymaster Helms as a "professional," with good White House ties, other sources close to the intelligence community maintain that Nixon has grown increasingly unhappy with the American intelligence product and wants a more vigorous man as CIA director, one to handle better, perhaps prune, the sprawling intelligence bureaucracy.

Helms, a onetime newspaperman before he went into intelligence,

first with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II and later with the CIA, was not available for comment.

While Helms' retirement, possibly "upstairs" to a post on Nixon's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board or some other body, is not definite, there has been some speculation on his possible successor. One contender is said to be 40-year-old Donald G. Rumsfeld, former Illinois Congressman and head of the anti-poverty program, who is now chairman of Nixon's Cost of Living Council.

A man with a reputation in administration circles for tough management, Rumsfeld has no intelligence background. He is said to be under consideration for the CIA post largely because of the way he has ridden herd on Nixon's Phase II operation.

As chairman of the Cost of Living Council, Rumsfeld is a coordinator of both the Pay Board and the Price Commission. He is credited with keeping both operations, as well as his own, from growing too unwieldy.

Nearly unrestrained growth, not only in the CIA, but in the nation's other intelligence-gathering agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, has prompted the first real criticism of the nation's spy business in recent years.

In addition to former employees who have written on alleged intelligence in fighting and duplication of effort, congressional reservations over the size of the U.S. intelligence apparatus also have been surfacing, especially at budget time.

Several informed sources inde-

pendently confirmed to THE NEWS today administration concern over the growth of the approximately 150,000-member intelligence community, of which CIA is a dominant part. The sources, while hedging on when Helms would step down, all conceded that the nation's spy system has become bloated and in need of a shakeup.

Moreover, at least one government official with CIA sources maintained that Helms' accessibility to the President has diminished considerably over the last several months, a possible indication that the agency head is on the way.

Nixon, it is said, has to rely now on Henry Kissinger's staff for most of the intelligence information.

27 NOV 1972

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THE WHITE HOUSE PLAN TO PRUNE THE GOVERNMENT

Now the re-elected President is moving on domestic problems. Ahead: efforts to overhaul Government, bring the budget under control, cut down on bureaucracy and avoid tax hikes.

With a new mandate from the voters—but a Congress still controlled by the political opposition—President Nixon intends to press for far-reaching reforms in Government agencies and programs during his second term.

The President has said:

"I honestly believe that Government in Washington is too big, and it is too expensive. We can do the job better with fewer people."

On the outcome of this effort may depend the burden of federal taxes, the impact of inflation on the cost of living, the value of the American dollar, and the availability of money and credit for business expansion.

Action agenda. In the fortnight immediately following his re-election, President Nixon took these actions:

- Signaled a firm determination to shake up the organization of the executive branch of Government from the White House on down.

- Called for resignations of about 2,000 presidential appointees, including Cabinet officers and White House aides. Many will be retained. Some will be shifted to new jobs. Others will be dropped.

- Conferred with top advisers including Vice President Spiro T. Agnew at Key Biscayne, Fla., or Camp David, Md., on plans for Administration personnel, policies and programs in the new term. Mr. Agnew has been the President's liaison man with Governors, mayors and local officials around the country.

- Recalled Roy L. Ash, president of Litton Industries and former head of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, to assist in the structural planning.

- Consulted John B. Connally, former Texas Governor who led the Democrats-for-Nixon drive in the recent campaign. Mr. Connally was a key member of the Ash Council, before serving as Treasury Secretary in the first Nixon term.

- Set December 15 as a target date for announcing personnel and policy decisions in overhaul of the Government.

Associates say the President will be

guided by recommendations of the Ash Council, which conducted a two-year study of Government operations in 1969-1970.

The advisory group submitted about 16 separate reports. Many remain confidential memoranda for the President. Others were published at the time Mr. Nixon first called for wholesale Government reorganization in his 1971 state-of-the-union message.

"Most Americans fed up." The President said then that "most Americans today are simply fed up with government at all levels."

The Ash Council found that the Government has grown up in a topsy-turvy fashion, adding people and programs without any consistent pattern, and with a great deal of overlapping and duplication among agencies.

As a result, Mr. Nixon told Congress in January, 1972, "Our Federal Government today is too often a sluggish and unresponsive institution, unable to deliver a dollar's worth of service for a dollar's worth of taxes."

Here are major reforms proposed by the Ash Council, as revised by the White House in the last two years:

New super-Departments. A half dozen Departments of Cabinet rank and a score of lesser agencies would be consolidated into four new super-Departments along modern, functional lines.

A White House documentary on the subject said that "the executive branch should be organized around major purposes of Government."

The new super-Departments would deal with domestic problems in these areas: human resources, natural resources, community development and economic affairs.

Programs dealing with people—such as education, welfare, health, manpower training, social security and unemployment insurance—would come under a Human Resources Department.

Other programs—those dealing with urban renewal, rural development, city planning, hospital construction, mass-transit systems and urban highways—



—Crockett in "Washington Star-News"

"JUST WORKING ON MY GOVERNMENT-REORGANIZATION PLAN."

would be assigned to a Department of Community Development.

A Natural Resources Department would guide land use, soil conservation, energy sources and minerals, water resources and marine technology, public works, recreation and civilian atomic energy.

Under an Economic Affairs Department would come many existing functions of the Commerce, Labor and Transportation Departments, along with the Tariff Commission and Small Business Administration.

The Agriculture Department would be retained as a separate entity, but would be limited to dealing with farm-commodity production and marketing programs. Its present operations are much broader.

These Federal Departments would be abolished: Interior; Commerce; Labor; Health, Education and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation.

Originally, the Ash Council proposed to leave intact the existing Departments of State, Treasury, Defense and Justice.

Recently, President Nixon reportedly has been focusing on shaking up the State Department, leading to specula-

23 AUG 1972

Tighter Rein on Bureaucracy to Be a Major Goal if Nixon Is Reelected

BY JOHN F. LAWRENCE
Times Washington Bureau Chief

MIAMI BEACH—It is not a big vote grabber but there is one pet project that President Nixon is determined to pursue if he gets a second term: major reform in the control of the bureaucracy.

The President wants to keep the major departments of government focused more closely on White House policy, according to a top adviser. It is a long-standing concern that has been heightened by some frustration over how the bureaucrats have performed during his first term.

Just how strongly the President feels about such reform is indicated by John D. Ehrlichman, his chief adviser for domestic affairs.

Ehrlichman complained in an interview that as it is now, many Cabinet deputies are sworn in "and then the next time you see them is at the Christmas party. They go off and marry the natives."

In less colorful terms, Ehrlichman believes that there is a tendency for department officials, including Cabinet officers, to be heavily influenced by the thinking and the momentum—or lack thereof—of

the existing staff and operations of their own departments.

"There shouldn't be a lot of leeway in following the President's policies," he said. "It should be like a corporation, where the executive vice presidents (the Cabinet officers) are tied closely to the chief executive, or to put it in extreme terms, when he says jump, they only ask how high."

Goal Is Unity

Ehrlichman is not ruling out give and take. Rather, he is looking for a unity and consistency of purpose that would enable the Administration to establish more precise goals and have the various departments implement them more rapidly.

How to bring this about has not been entirely laid out.

But Ehrlichman, whose job at times has been to call in Cabinet officers and chief deputies to express presidential displeasure with actions seemingly far afield from presidential policy, will likely play a key role.

So will Caspar Weinberger, who replaced George P. Shultz as director of the Office of Management and Budget earlier this year.

Mr. Nixon last year proposed a reorganization of the executive departments that would create four new Cabinet-level agencies to replace seven existing ones.

The historic departments of State, Defense, Justice and Treasury would remain but the four new ones—dealing with national resources, community development, human resources and economic affairs—would take over responsibilities now spread through the other seven departments as well as some now allotted to independent agencies. Congress has virtually ignored this idea, however.

Power Fragmented

In proposing the plan the President complained that the federal government "promises much but it does not deliver what it promises." Power is "exceedingly fragmented and broadly scattered throughout the federal establishment . . .

"It is extremely difficult for either the Congress or the President to see their intentions carried out when lines of responsibility are as tangled and ambiguous as they are in many policy areas," he said.

Beyond his reform plan, however, Mr. Nixon wants his appointees as well as nonpolitical civil servants to respond with greater urgency to his policy decisions.

Tentatively, Ehrlichman envisions a coordination system based on the appointment of a key deputy to each department who would have the specific task of coming to the White House frequently for policy sessions.

"Right after the election there ought to be a meeting of all of the political appointees at which we lay out what our goals are, where we want to be in four years, he said. "Then some effort could be made to measure progress along the road in the intervening period."

Some new coordination already has been built into the system by the two-year-old office of Management and Budget. Regional offices now pull together

such things as the disaster relief efforts of various arms of the government. Weinberger has plans for creating a daily "domestic situation report" of the type the CIA and other groups compile on foreign and military matters.

Weinberger believes fewer persons running individual programs could be more responsive to the President and thus make the bureaucracy more flexible and able to react more quickly to meet the public's needs.

Mr. Nixon's dissatisfaction with bureaucrats, reinforced by similar sentiments of Henry A. Kissinger, his national security adviser, was reported long before he became President. He and the bureaucrats were at loggerheads almost from the start of his Washington career when, as a young congressman, he pushed for the conviction of Alger

BALTIMORE SUN
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Nixon appoints Connally to espionage advisory panel

Washington (Reuter)—President Nixon yesterday appointed John B. Connally, the former Secretary of the Treasury, as a member of his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and indicated he would soon have other missions for him.

Mr. Connally was the only Democrat in the President's Cabinet when he served as treasury secretary from February, 1971, until last June.

He is now heading a "Demo-


crats for Nixon" drive in support of the President's re-election campaign.

The 11-member board, presided over by Adm. George W. Anderson (ret.), a former chief of naval operations and ambassador to Portugal, advises the President on United States intelligence operations and how to increase their effectiveness.

Ronald L. Ziegler, Mr. Nixon's press secretary, said the President has other missions in mind for Mr. Connally.

STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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STATINTL

U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir

STATINTL

ABOUT THIRTY MILES NORTHEAST of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie factory." It's officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, headquarters of the National Security Agency.

Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses spanning the complex at regular intervals house specially-trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear iridescent I.D. badges — green for "top secret crypto," red for "secret crypto." Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor"—980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting

the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the DIRNSA building (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies—it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Operations Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and commercial codes of every nation in the world, analyze the de-crypted messages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director

STATINTL

ALL NATIONS REPORTED MONITORED

U.S. Espionage Role Detailed

SAN FRANCISCO (AP) — Government officials have declined comment on a Ramparts magazine article which says U.S. intelligence can pinpoint the location of Soviet military and spacecraft and can break all the Soviet military codes.

A White House spokesman in San Clemente, Calif., the Department of Defense in Washington and a spokesman for the National Security Agency at Ft. Meade, Md., would not respond to the article, entitled "U.S. Espionage: A Memoir."

The article, appearing in Ramparts' August issue which went on newstands today, is based on an interview with a man purported to be a former NSA analyst.

The ex-analyst, identified by a spokesman for the magazine as "Winslow Peck," — a pseudonym — is quoted as saying high-flying jets routinely make flights over Russian territory to test Soviet reactions.

Others Deny Account

While the Defense Department refused comment, as is customary in intelligence matters, other knowledgeable sources denied that U.S. planes fly over Russia gathering intelligence data.

The sources said the United States has not relied on intelligence flights over Soviet and Communist Chinese territory since the early 1960s, because it has sent aloft reconnaissance satellites, which transmit pictures and monitor radio and other communications forms.

Contacted in San Diego at a telephone number supplied by Ramparts, a man who said he was "Peck," 26, refused to give his real name but said he

was assigned to NSA for 3 years after enlisting in the Air Force in 1936. He said he lives in Washington, D.C., but now is on vacation in California.

He said he was sergeant when he quit because he was disillusioned in Vietnam.

Monitoring Cited

The Ramparts article said the United States monitors every government in the world, including its allies, and listens in on all transatlantic telephone calls to or from this country, even those by private citizens.

The monitoring includes diplomatic communications of allies — including interception of British communications through monitoring conducted at U.S. bases in England, Peck said.

"As far as the Soviet Union is concerned we know the whereabouts at any given time of all its aircraft, exclusive of small private planes, and its naval forces, including its missile-firing submarines," the former analyst said in the article.

"The fact is that we're able to break every code they've got, understand every type of communications equipment and enciphering device they've got," he added.

The magazine said NSA, established in 1952, employs about 15,000 servicemen and civilians at its Ft. Meade headquarters and about 90,000 around the world. NSA's main mission is code cracking and communications intelligence.

In the article the former analyst said that 80 percent of all "viable U.S. intelligence" comes from NSA-monitored communications.

Some who were asked to

comment about the story said Peck seemed to claim far more knowledge than he could have gained in an enlisted capacity.

The New York Times reported that a veteran of 30 years' service in intelligence said of Peck:

"He's obviously familiar with the NSA — its organization, operations and many of its techniques. But no sergeant in his early 20s would know how intelligence is handled at the White House level, what NSA material is used or discarded by the President or more than just the fringes about CIA operations."

David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers" and a leading authority on cryptanalysis, said in a telephone interview that the Ramparts article "represents much new information that rings true to me and seems correct." However, he challenged some points, specifically Peck's assertion that the agency's experts are able to "break every Soviet code with remarkable success."

Top-grade Soviet foreign ministry code systems "have been unbreakable since the 1930's," Kahn said. He added that it was "highly unlikely that they have switched to breakable codes."

Peck said in Ramparts that he briefed then-Vice President

Hubert H. Humphrey on the Soviet tactical air force in 1957 and once listened to a tearful conversation between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and a Russian cosmonaut about to be killed during re-entry.

Ramparts, a liberal monthly journal which features investigative articles, employs about 60 persons and has its editorial offices in Berkeley, Calif.

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Arms Pact Compliance

U.S. Group to Keep Eye on Russ

Washington

U.S. intelligence officials have established a committee to keep track of Soviet observance of the terms of the strategic arms limitation treaty signed in Moscow May 26.

The five-man committee is to begin functioning on July 1, the cutoff date agreed upon by the two governments for the construction of new sites for offensive missiles in the United States and the Soviet Union.

Administration officials said that the committee was set up to avoid the repetition on a broader scale of the violation of the Suez Canal truce in August 1970, when the Soviet Union and Egypt moved into position SAM-2 and SAM-3 antiaircraft missiles after the cease-fire with Israel.

At that time, U.S. intelligence services were unprepared to monitor through aerial and satellite observation, and other means, Soviet and Egyptian fulfillment of the truce terms.

This was a source of ma-

for embarrassment to the U.S., which had negotiated the truce, and the incident nearly led to the collapse of the cease-fire.

The new committee, officials said, is to be headed by Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of central intelligence.

Its members are to be Lieutenant General Donald V. Bennett, head of the defense intelligence agency; Ray S. Cline, director of the State Department's intelligence and research agency; Andrew Marshall, intelligence coordinator of the National Security Council at the White House; and a CIA official still to be designated.

The Moscow agreements on the limitation of defensive and offensive nuclear weapons formally come into force on ratification by the U.S. Senate and the Supreme Soviet.

However, both sides have agreed to abide by the treaty from the date it was signed.

- L.A. Times Service

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
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POWER OF THE PENTAGON



the creation,
control and acceptance
of defense policy by the
U.S. CONGRESS

CC

— Intelligence Oversight —

CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPENDING

Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA.

In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted.

Some members of Congress insist they should know more about the CIA and about what the CIA knows. Clandestine military operations in Laos which were run by the CIA provided Congress with an opportunity to ask questions about the intelligence operation during 1971. (*Congress and Laos*, p. 68)

Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the Senate June 7, 1971, behind closed doors on CIA involvement in Laos. He based his briefing on a staff report.

He told the Senate in that closed session: "In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war."

As a member of two key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Senate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing.

If Symington did not know what the CIA was doing, then what kind of oversight function could Congress exercise over the super-secret organization?

A Congressional Quarterly examination of the oversight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and interviews with key staff members and members of Congress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands of four powerful committee chairmen and several key members of their committees—Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

The extent to which these men exercise their power in ferreting out the details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 25 years ago.

The CIA Answers to...

As established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was accountable to the President and the National Security

Council. In the original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination.

To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intelligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organization in 1949, its budgeted funds have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a select group of ranking members of Congress.

THE SENATE

In the Senate, the system by which committees check on CIA activities and budget requests is straightforward. Nine men—on two committees—hold positions of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and not on a regular basis.

Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff said. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations.

Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA budget, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations.

No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Helms) testifies before the subcommittee. Woodruff said the material covered in the hearings was so highly classified that any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on my desk in an hour."

Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee.

The role of the Armed Services Committee is not to examine the CIA's budget, Braswell said, but rather to review the programs for which the appropriated funds pay.

Symington told Congressional Quarterly in early 1972 that the Armed Services oversight subcommittee had not met for 18 months, but that Chairman John C. Stennis (D Miss.) had been taking care of the subcommittee's business by himself primarily.

"The people who run the CIA budget are the five senior members of the Appropriations Committee," Symington said. That included both Stennis and Margaret Chase Smith (R Maine), ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee. (Box p. 19)

"I can find out anything from Mr. Helms (CIA director) that I want to find out because we're friends, but that's not the proper way to do it," Symington continued.

"As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee I am denied the details of the money being spent by the Central Intelligence Agency," Symington would not deny that he knew details of the CIA budget, only that he was denied the information when he went through proper committee channels.

"The budget is gone into more thoroughly than people (on the committee) would admit," Braswell explained. "It's just reviewed in a different way than, say, the State Department's budget is." The committee's chief counsel said the budget review was conducted by a "very select group...more select than the five-man subcommittee."

Foreign Relations. Since the CIA never has been recognized officially as an agency involved in making foreign policy, the operations of the agency have not regularly been scrutinized by the Foreign Relations Committee. The Armed Services Committee reviews the agency's program annually because threats to the United States, against which the CIA guards, traditionally have been military in nature. The Appropriations Committee checks on the CIA's budget because the committee examines all money requests of government agencies; the CIA provides valuable intelligence on Pentagon programs about which the committee has an interest. In 1967 the Foreign Relations Committee became a newcomer into the circle of CIA-knowlegeable committees.

In the spring of 1967, secret CIA aid for student activities became the cover story for *Ramparts* magazine. The national press picked up the story and soon it became widely known that the CIA had been contributing money to the National Student Association (NSA) and other tax-exempt foundations and was playing more than a casual role in jockeying CIA personnel into leadership positions in the various organizations.

The response in Congress to the NSA story was the introduction of seven bills in one month--all aimed at allowing Congress a closer look at the CIA. One proposal, sponsored by Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D Minn. 1959-71), would have involved an investigation of the CIA by a select committee armed with subpoena power. A proposal to set up a similar oversight and investigating committee had been killed in 1966 on a procedural ruling regarding committee jurisdiction. With the new series of embarrassing CIA revelations, the McCarthy proposal posed a threat to the long-standing oversight system.

'I Have Not Inquired'

The following exchange was excerpted from the Nov. 23, 1971, Senate debate over a floor amendment to place a \$4-billion annual ceiling on U.S. intelligence activities.

Allen J. Ellender (D La.), chairman of the Appropriations Committee and head of its five-man Intelligence Operations Subcommittee, discussed his knowledge of CIA-run operations in Laos with J. W. Fulbright (D Ark.) and Alan Cranston (D Calif.).

Fulbright: "Would the Senator (Ellender) say that before the creation of the army in Laos they (the CIA) came before the committee and the committee knew of it and approved it?"

Ellender: "Probably so."

Fulbright: "Did the Senator approve it?"

Ellender: "It was not—I did not know anything about it."

Fulbright: "So the whole idea of Congress declaring war is really circumvented by such a procedure, is it not?"

Ellender: "Well, Mr. President, I wish to say that—"

Fulbright: "Is it not?"

Ellender: "No, I do not think so."

Fulbright: "Well, if you can create an army and support it through the CIA, without anyone knowing about it, I do not know why it is not..."

Ellender: "I wish to say that I do not know. I never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA asked for. It never dawned on me to ask about it. I did see it publicized in the newspaper some time ago."

Cranston: "...the chairman stated that he never would have thought of even asking about CIA funds being used to conduct the war in Laos....I would like to ask the Senator if, since then, he has inquired and now knows whether that is being done?"

Ellender: "I have not inquired."

Cranston: "You do not know, in fact?"

Ellender: "No."

Cranston: "As you are one of the five men privy to this information, in fact you are the number-one man of the five men who would know, then who would know what happened to this money? The fact is, not even the five men know the facts in the situation."

Ellender: "Probably not."

Don Henderson, a Foreign Relations Committee staff member, said that in an effort to undermine support for the McCarthy bill, the Foreign Relations Committee was invited to send three members to all CIA joint briefings held by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The original members were J. W. Fulbright (D Ark.), Mike Mansfield (D Mont.) and Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R Iowa), who was replaced by George Aiken (R Vt.) when Hickenlooper retired in 1968.

Woodruff, counsel for the Appropriations Committee, said that the committee had not met jointly on CIA business with the Appropriations Committee for at least one year. "Maybe it's been two years," he said. "I'm not sure."

CIA Director Helms, however, appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee for special briefings in 1971 and 1972.

"I have known," Fulbright told the Senate during the June 7 closed session, "and several (other) Senators have known about this secret army (in Laos). Mr. Helms testified about it. He gave the impression of being more candid than most of the people we have had before the committee in this whole operation. I did not know enough to ask him everything I should have...."

THE HOUSE

Two committees in the House acknowledge that they participate in oversight of the CIA—Armed Services and Appropriations. The Armed Services Committee has a five-man subcommittee reviewing the programs of all intelligence organizations. The Appropriations Committee refused to say who on the committee reviews the CIA budget.

Armed Services. A subcommittee formed in July 1971 filled a hole on the committee that was left since F. Edward Hebert (D La.) reorganized the Armed Services Committee and abolished the CIA Oversight Subcommittee that had been run by the late L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the committee until his death Dec. 28, 1970.

Hebert's plan was to democratize the committee by allowing all to hear what the CIA was doing instead of just a select group of senior members. Freshman committee member Michael Harrington (D Mass.) said that Hebert was making an honest attempt to spread the authority, but the full committee CIA briefings were still superficial. "To say that the committee was performing any real oversight function was a fiction," Harrington said.

When Helms came before the full committee, Harrington asked what the CIA budget was. Helms said that George Mahon (D Texas), chairman of the Appropriations Committee, had instructed him not to reveal any budget figures unless Armed Services Chairman Hebert requested the information. Hebert said "no" according to Harrington and the budget figures were not disclosed.

As in the Senate, the House Armed Services Committee is responsible more for what the CIA does than how much it spends, according to the committee's chief counsel, John R. Blandford. The Armed Services Committee does not meet jointly for CIA briefings with the Appropriations Committee or with the Foreign Affairs Committee, Blandford said.

The new subcommittee, responsible for reviewing all aspects of intelligence operations, was put under the leadership of Lucien N. Nedzi (D Mich.)—a leading House opponent of the Indochina war and critic of Pentagon spending. Hebert said he chose Nedzi "because he's a good man, even though we're opposed philosophically." Hebert's predecessor as committee chairman, Mendel Rivers, regarded the oversight subcommittee as so important he named himself as subcommittee chairman. Nedzi said that Hebert had placed no restrictions on how the subcommittee should be run or what it should cover.

Appropriations. In interviews with two staff members of the House Appropriations Committee, Congressional Quarterly learned that the membership of the intelligence oversight subcommittee was confidential. When

CIA Oversight Subcommittees

Four subcommittees have the official function of monitoring Central Intelligence Agency programs and passing judgment on the agency's budget before the figures are submerged in the general budget.

Senate. Armed Services Committee, Central Intelligence Subcommittee (reviews CIA programs, not the budget)—*John C. Stennis (D Miss.), Stuart Symington (D Mo.), Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.), Peter H. Dominick (R Colo.) and Barry Goldwater (R Ariz.);

Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Operations Subcommittee comprised of the five ranking members on the Defense Subcommittee—*Allen J. Ellender (D La.), John L. McClellan (D Ark.), Stennis, Milton R. Young (R N.D.), Margaret Chase Smith (R Maine);

Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 was invited by Stennis and Ellender to send three members to any joint briefings of the Appropriations and Armed Services oversight subcommittees. The three members were J.W. Fulbright (D Ark.), George D. Aiken (R Vt.) and Mike Mansfield (D Mont.). There have been no joint meetings in at least the last year. However, CIA Director Richard Helms did appear once in March before a Foreign Relations subcommittee.

House. Armed Services Committee, Intelligence Operations Subcommittee (created in July)—*Lucien N. Nedzi (D Mich.), William G. Bray (R Ind.), Alvin E. O'Konski (R Wis.), O. C. Fisher (D Texas), Melvin Price (D Ill.), with *ex officio* members F. Edward Hebert (D La.) and Leslie C. Arends (R Ill.).

Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Operations Subcommittee—membership undisclosed. Believed to be the five ranking members of the Defense Subcommittee headed by committee chairman George Mahon (D Texas). Also would include Robert L. F. Sikes (D Fla.), Jamie L. Whitten (D Miss.), William E. Minshall (R Ohio), John J. Rhodes (R Ariz.).

* Indicates subcommittee chairman.

asked why the membership was a secret, Paul Wilson, staff director, said: "Because that's the way it's always been." *Ralph Preston, a staff man for the Defense Subcommittee, said the information was a secret, but admitted that more members than just Chairman Mahon were responsible for reviewing the agency's budget.

Rep. Harrington said he has requested the composition of the subcommittee and has been refused the information. "I'm just sure the CIA committee consists of the five ranking members of Mahon's subcommittee on defense," Harrington said. (Box this page)

Quality of Congress' Oversight

Because most members of Congress have not been aware of what the CIA was planning until long after the agency had already acted, more than one Senator or House member has made embarrassing statements out of line with fact.

Former Sen. Wayne Morse (D Ore. 1945-69), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, took the Senate floor April 20, 1961—five days after the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion—and said: "There is not a scintilla of evidence that the U.S. government has intervened in the sporadic rebellion which has occurred inside Cuba. That rebellion has been aided from outside by Cuban rebel refugees who have sought to overthrow the Castro regime."

Four days later Morse admitted: "We now know that there has been a covert program under way to be of assistance to the Cuban exiles in an invasion of Cuba and that assistance was given by the United States government. We did not know at the legislative level, through the responsible committees of the Senate, what the program and the policies of the CIA really were."

The Morse speech, delivered nine days after the Bay of Pigs invasion, was the first mention in either the House or Senate of U.S. involvement in the invasion attempt.

While explaining the details of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, former Sen. Millard E. Tydings (D Md. 1927-51) said in a May 27, 1949, floor speech: "The bill relates entirely to matters external to the United States; it has nothing to do with internal America. It relates to the gathering of facts and information beyond the borders of the United States. It has no application to the domestic scene in any manner, shape or form."

Committee investigations into tax-exempt foundations in 1964 produced an informal report issued by Rep. Wright Patman (D Texas) labeling the Kaplan Fund as a conduit for CIA money. The fund described its purposes in its charter as to "strengthen democracy at home." Patman later agreed to drop the committee investigation saying, "No matter of interest to the subcommittee relating to the CIA existed."

In the spring of 1967, another example of domestic CIA programming emerged as it became known that the National Student Association was receiving money from the CIA and that the agency had been involved in manipulating the leadership of the student organization.

Laos. Another illustration of congressional ignorance of CIA activities was in the series of revelations which came from the June 7, 1971, closed Senate session briefing on Laos requested by Symington.

Three times during the two-hour session, Symington, a member of the Armed Services subcommittee on CIA oversight, said that although he knew the CIA was conducting operations in Laos, he did not know how extensive the program was.

"Nobody knows," Symington said, "the amounts the CIA is spending while under orders from the executive branch to continue to supervise and direct this long and ravaging war (in Laos)."

Minutes after Symington said that in all of his subcommittees—which included the Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee under the chairmanship of John C. Stennis (D Miss.)—there was "no real knowledge about what is going on in Laos." Stennis took the floor and said: "The CIA has justified its budget to our subcommittee and as always they have come with expenditures right in line with what they were authorized expressly to do....They (CIA) have told us from time to time about their activities in Laos."

Intelligence Reorganization

In a move to trim costs and improve the output of the U.S. global intelligence system, President Nixon Nov. 5, 1971, disclosed details of a reorganization plan for the nation's intelligence program. The plan contained the following changes:

- It gave authority to Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, to review the budgets of the CIA, the FBI, units within the Defense and State Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. It was believed \$1-billion could be cut from the \$5-billion to \$6-billion the U.S. spends yearly to ascertain Soviet and Chinese Communist military developments.
- It created a new intelligence subcommittee under the National Security Council to tailor the results of the nation's vast overseas intelligence network closer to the needs of the President and his top staff.
- It created a "net assessment group" inside the National Security Council to compare over-all U.S.S.R. forces and capabilities with those of the U.S.
- It created an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee headed by Helms to advise on the preparation of a consolidated program budget. This would permit Helms to see the Department of Defense intelligence budget—estimated to be 80 percent of everything the U.S. spends for intelligence—and advise on it before its submission.

"It has been said that we all know about what the CIA is doing," Fulbright retorted. "I have been on the CIA oversight committee and I have never seen any detailed figures (on Laos) whatever."

Stennis said that the secret report on CIA activity in Laos, compiled by Foreign Relations Committee staff members, contained some information he was not familiar with, information he had not been told in his capacity as chairman of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee.

"I think we all know," Stennis said, "that if we are going to have a CIA, and we have to have a CIA, we cannot run it as a quilting society or something like that. But their money is in the clear and their forthrightness, I think, is in the clear."

Sen. Miller criticized Symington for saying the Congress was appropriating money blindly: "We should not leave the impression that the Senate somehow or other has been helpless in this matter. We are all mature individuals and we know what we are doing...."

"But let us not say the Senate has been hoodwinked or leave the impression we have been misled and have not known what is going on. I think we may have lacked information on the specifics, and the Senator (Symington) is pulling out information on specifics, but the Senators who voted on these appropriations for the CIA voted for them with our eyes wide open, knowing what we were doing. Maybe we should change it. It is something for future debate."

"I would be the last to say he (Miller) had been hoodwinked," Symington commented, "or that any other member of the Senate had been hoodwinked. But I have been hoodwinked, and I want the Senate to know this afternoon that that is the case."

3 APR 1972

CIA: THE PRESIDENT'S

VICTOR MARCHETTI

Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign affairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its authority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be—the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations.

In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its operational plans accord with the aims of the administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional leaders. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influential individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more careful than are administrators in other areas of the bureaucracy to inform the White House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress.

The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71), was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, nevertheless, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere.

After the Bay of Pigs, the agency had its first real sting. Because it failed in its attempt to overthrow Castro, the top of the agency committee, which had approved the operation, was dissolved. Throughout the time operations against the same target, and the agency deeply involved in overthrowing regimes in Laos.

When the Nation magazine exposed the agency's labor and cultural funding conduits, the agency tried to restrict the Senator Fulbright's control over the CIA. He was simply told by the President and got on with its business. The President formed to look into the operations of the CIA. Some of the CIA's operations because they had been longer thought worth

continued under improved cover. A few of the larger operations went on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a \$500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/assassination programs in Vietnam.

The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the financial management of the community, especially in the military intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Administration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should concentrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-

The Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, at Six Billion Dollars a Year

Edward K. DeLong
United Press International
Washington, D.C.

STATINTL

"Whenever you are working on a problem that the military is deeply interested in — because it's affecting one of their programs ... and you're not saying what they want you to say, the browbeating starts ... the pressure to get the report to read more like they want it to read." *Original DeLong*

(Based on a dispatch distributed by UPI
on October 3, 1971)

Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it — that is, dissident student groups and civil rights organizations — Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U.S. intelligence community.

"I think we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA — and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine "ops" (operations) — and there just aren't that many places any more to display that talent," Marchetti says.

Running Operations Against Domestic Groups

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in South-east Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who — if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like — are certainly considering it.

"This is going to get to be very tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, (Va.), a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'the enemy within.'"

Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself for an intelligence career, graduating in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history.

Offer of Job in CIA

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of — an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House. During this period, Marchetti says: "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

Moving Up

Then he was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, as special assistant to the CIA's executive director, and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

I Began To See Things I Did Not Like

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the national reconnaissance organization — the whole bit. And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

views about the world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen

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New Light on the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

STATINTL

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Former Hungarian Diplomat Here Reveals Some Intriguing Background

Original by
Chalmers M. Roberts

THE CUBAN missile crisis of 1962 never ceases to intrigue those who lived through it or had anything to do with it. And so two new works that add to the general knowledge are well worth reporting. One is a unique look at the crisis by a Communist diplomat then in Washington. The other is an analytical study by an associate professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

Janos Radvanyi was the Hungarian charge in Washington at the time (there was no ambassador), an affable fellow with whom I had much contact. On May 17, 1967, he defected, turning up later at Stanford where he wrote "Hungary and the Super Powers" to be published in May by the Hoover Institution. The book is largely about Hungarian-American relations. But one chapter on the missile crisis will have far wider interest. What follows is from it.

IN SEPTEMBER and October, 1962, Radvanyi reported home that the United States was overreacting to reports of Soviet activity in Cuba. He did so in part because Soviet diplomats here had told him the uproar was part of the American pre-election campaign. But one day he received a copy of a cable to Budapest from Hungarian Ambassador Janos Beck in Havana. Beck "made it a point to discount information he had received from the Chinese embassy in Havana as being provocatively anti-Soviet," Radvanyi writes. But "the Chinese ambassador had apparently told him that according to information he had received from private sources the Soviet Union was delivering surface-to-surface ballistic missiles to Cuba and that Soviet military advisers had come to Cuba not as instructors but as members of Soviet special rocket force units to operate these missiles."

Radvanyi goes on: "Ambassador Beck remarked that his Chinese friends had complained of Soviet unwillingness to disclose any details and had asked Beck whether he knew anything more about the whole affair. Beck argued that the story of the deployment of ground-to-ground missiles had been launched by 'American warmongers' and observed that neither the Soviet ambassador in Havana nor high-ranking Cuban officials had mentioned anything to him about the missile build-up."

This message apparently was sent in late July or early August. Soviet arms shipments were arriving at that time, though the first medium range missiles did not come until Sept. 8. On Aug. 22 CIA Director John McCone voiced to President Kennedy his suspicions that the Soviets were preparing to introduce offensive missiles, perhaps on the basis of information gathered in Cuba that month by French intelligence agent Philippe De Vesjoli. However, on Sept. 19 the United States Intelligence Board's estimate was that the Soviet Union would introduce offensive missiles into Cuba. October would be another story.

On Oct. 18 Radvanyi attended the first of three meetings with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin and the heads of all the Communist embassies in Washington. Dobrynin discussed the meeting the previous day between President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. After dinner at the Czech embassy Dobrynin "assured his audience that recent reports of Soviet ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba were completely without foundation." As to the Kennedy-Gromyko meeting, "nothing extraordinary had happened"; the German situation had been discussed at length along with disarmament. At this point in his account, Radvanyi states that "it seems highly unlikely to me" that Gromyko had not been "privy to the Kremlin discussions" about the missiles but that "it is altogether possible that Dobrynin may not have been informed."

THE CRISIS became public with the President's Oct. 22 speech. Next day Dobrynin called the diplomats together again, explaining that the purpose was "to collect information and to solicit opinions on the Cuban situation." Dobrynin "characterized it as serious and offered two reasons for his concern. First of all, he foresaw a possible American attack on Cuba that would almost surely result in the death of some Soviet military personnel who had been sent to handle the sophisticated new weapons. Thus by implication the Soviet ambassador was admitting the presence in Cuba of Soviet medium-range missiles. Secondly, he feared that when Soviet ships reached the announced quarantine line a confrontation was inevitable." Dobrynin "explained that any defensive weapon could be labeled offensive as well and dismissed American concern over a threat from Cuba. The Pearl Harbor attack, he suggested, might have been responsible for this unwarranted paranoia. Everybody agreed that the situation was serious and that the possibility of an American invasion of Cuba could not be discounted." Asked how Moscow intended to deal with the quarantine, "Dobrynin was forced again to reply that he simply had no information..."

On Oct. 23 at the Soviet embassy's military attache party Dobrynin told Radvanyi "that the situation was even more confused and unstable..." But, as Radvanyi notes, the Soviet envoy did not disclose that before the party he had met with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in the third floor of the embassy. It was then that Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin the President knew he had been deceived by assurances from Dobrynin and others that no offensive missiles would be placed in Cuba, as detailed in Robert Kennedy's posthumously published "Thirteen Days."

At another gathering of the Communist

diplomats on Oct. 26, this time at the Soviet embassy, they discussed Walter Lippmann's column of the previous day suggesting dismantling of American missiles in Turkey along with the Soviet missiles in Cuba. "The Soviet embassy," writes Radvanyi, "apparently considered the Lippmann article a trial balloon, launched by the U.S. administration to seek out a suitable solution. Dobrynin sought their (Communist diplomats') opinion as to whether they thought the Lippmann article should be regarded as an indirect suggestion on the part of the White House." Only the Romanian ambassador indicated he had some reason to think that it was just that; Lippmann, as far as I know, has never said whether the idea was simply his own. According to RFK's account, Adlai Stevenson on the 20th had suggested a swap involving withdrawal of American missiles from both Turkey and Italy and giving up the naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The President rejected the proposal.

AT the meeting on the 26th Dobrynin said he still had no information on how Moscow would meet the quarantine. "I told him," writes Radvanyi, "that according to my information the American buildup for an invasion of Cuba was nearly completed and that American missile bases had aimed all their missiles toward targets on the island. Only a go-ahead signal from the President was needed. The Soviet ambassador concurred with my analysis, adding that the Soviet Union found itself in a difficult position in Cuba because its supply lines were too long and the American blockade could be very effective. (Czechoslovak ambassador) Ruzek remarked grimly that if the Americans invaded, it would definitely trigger a nuclear war. At this point I lost self-control and asked whether it was not the same to die from an American missile attack as from a Soviet one. Dobrynin attempted to assure me that the situation had not reached such proportions and that a solution would no doubt be found..."

"At the close of the meeting, any last remaining ray of hope I may have had for a peaceful solution was abruptly shattered. Dobrynin now announced that the Soviet embassy was this very moment burning its archives. Shocked at this news I inquired of Dobrynin whether he planned to evacuate the families of Soviet diplomatic personnel. Dobrynin replied in the negative.

"Back once again at the Hungarian legation I rushed off to Budapest a long sum-mary of my latest meeting with Dobrynin, and informed the foreign ministry that Dobrynin had confirmed the information that the Americans were militarily prepared to invade Cuba. I emphasized that unless a quick solution were found within the next

continued

5 JAN 1972

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Marines New Chief Looks Toward Future

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

WASHINGTON, Jan. 4—Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., newly installed commandant of the Marine Corps and former Central Intelligence Agency deputy director, said today that United States intelligence can do its job for less money and probably will be obliged to.

Cushman, speaking at a Pentagon press conference, said "the mood of Congress" as he reads it is that the intelligence operations cost too much and fund cutbacks can be expected.

Must Know Stopping Point

He said he believed intelligence can do the job for less money by knowing when to stop collecting facts. He added that while those engaged in intelligence always feel they never have enough facts, they have to stop somewhere.

The big problem, he continued, is knowing where to stop and making sure that one stops there.

He said, however, that good management will insure call-

ing a halt at the right place and, he was sure Richard Helms, CIA director who recently was given expanded responsibility in the intelligence field, will make sure that the agency does not go too far.

Asked the size of the U. S. intelligence budget, Cushman said he was not free to say.

Tells Marines Roles

On the subject of the Marine Corps' role under the Nixon doctrine in which U. S. allies will be expected to provide the men for their own defense while the U. S. supplies arms and, perhaps, sea and air power, Cushman said he could foresee no situation in which Marines would be used for extended ground combat, such as Viet Nam.

However, he said, there may be occasions when Marines will have to be sent in temporarily to seize and hold strategic foreign territory or evacuate Americans from trouble spots.



[AP Wirephoto]

Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr. meeting newsmen.

THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING

By Chester L. Cooper

"The most fundamental method of work . . . is to determine our working policies according to the actual conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have made, we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation . . . and were subjective in determining our working policies."—"The Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."

IN bucolic McLean, Virginia, screened by trees and surrounded by a high fence, squats a vast expanse of concrete and glass known familiarly as the "Pickle Factory," and more formally as "Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency." Chiselled into the marble which is the only relieving feature of the building's sterile main entrance are the words, "The Truth Shall Make You Free." The quotation from St. John was personally chosen for the new building by Allen W. Dulles over the objection of several subordinates who felt that the Agency, then still reeling from the Bay of Pigs débâcle, should adopt a somewhat less lofty motto. (In those dark days of late 1961, some suggested that a more appropriate choice would be "Look Before You Leap.") But Dulles had a deeper sense of history than most. Although he was a casualty of the Bay of Pigs and never sat in the Director's office with its view over the Potomac, he left a permanent mark not only on the Agency which he had fashioned but on its building which he had planned.

Allen Dulles was famous among many and notorious among some for his consummate skill as an intelligence operative ("spook" in current parlance), but one of his greatest contributions in nurturing the frail arrangements he helped to create to provide intelligence support to Washington's top-level foreign-policy-makers.

Harry Truman, whose Administration gave birth to both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, recalls that, "Each time the National Security Council is about to consider a certain policy—let us say a policy having to do with Southeast Asia—it immediately calls upon the CIA to present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to have. . . ." President Truman painted a somewhat more cozy relationship between the NSC and the CIA than probably existed during, and certainly since, his Administration. None the less, it is fair to say that the intelligence community, and especially the CIA, played an important advisory role in high-level policy deliberations during the 1950s and early 1960s.

To provide the most informed intelligence judgments on the effects a contemplated policy might have on American national security interests, a group especially tailored for the task was organized in 1950 within the CIA. While this step would probably have been taken sooner or later, the communist victory

STATINTL

The CIA's New Cover

The Rope Dancer
by Victor Marchetti.
Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., \$6.95

Richard J. Barnett

adventurer has passed in the American the
spy business; the bureaucratic age of ingt
Richard C. Helms and his gray spe- kno
cialists has settled in." I began to have fina
an uneasy feeling that *Newsweek's* ingt
article was a cover story in more than vote
one sense. An

It has always been difficult to faile
analyze organizations that engage in A
false advertising about themselves. Part of i
of the responsibility of the CIA is to larly

spread confusion about its own work. the
The world of Richard Helms and his beca
"specialists" does indeed differ from ized
that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organ- Hel
izations, in spite of their predilection over
for what English judges used to call lige
"frolics of their own," are servants of Age
policy. When policy changes, they Bur
must eventually change too, although the
because of the atmosphere of secrecy cen
and deception in which they operate, ove
such changes are exceptionally hard to vice
control. To understand the "new Age
espionage" one must see it as part of imp
the Nixon Doctrine which, in essence, Th
is a global strategy for maintaining US
power and influence without overtly reor
involving the nation in another ground Hel
war. nev

But we cannot comprehend recent lige
developments in the "intelligence com- nev
munity" without understanding what fur
Mr. Helms and his employees actually Pre
do. In a speech before the National me
Press Club, the director discouraged w
journalists from making the attempt. de
"You've just got to trust us. We are no
honorable men." The same speech is P.
made each year to the small but
growing number of senators who want h
a closer check on the CIA. In asking, ti
on November 10, for a "Select Com- c
mittee on the Coordination of United n
States Activities Abroad to oversee p
activities of the Central Intelligence t.
Agency," Senator Stuart Symington p
noted that "the subcommittee having A
oversight of the Central Intelligence i
Agency has not met once this year." t

Symington, a former Secretary of c
the Air Force and veteran member of i
the Armed Services Committee, has t
also said that "there is no federal
agency in our government whose activ- s
ities receive less scrutiny and control
than the CIA." Moreover, soon after
Symington spoke, Senator Allen J.

I
In late November the Central Intel-
ligence Agency conducted a series of
"senior seminars" so that some of its
important bureaucrats could consider
its public image. I was invited to
attend one session and to give my
views on the proper role of the
Agency. I suggested that its legitimate
activities were limited to studying
newspapers and published statistics,
listening to the radio, thinking about
the world, interpreting data of recon-
naissance satellites, and occasionally

publishing the names of foreign spies. I
had been led by conversations with a
number of CIA officials to believe that
they were thinking along the same
lines. One CIA man after another
eagerly joined the discussion to assure
me that the days of the flamboyant
covert operations were over. The
upper-class amateurs of the OSS who
stayed to mastermind operations in
Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and else-
where—Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt,
Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert
Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald—had died
or departed.

In their place, I was assured, was a
small army of professionals devoted to
preparing intelligence "estimates" for
the President and collecting informa-
tion the clean, modern way, mostly
with sensors, computers, and sophis-
ticated reconnaissance devices. Even
Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now
be as much a museum piece as Mata
Hari. (There are about 18,000 em-
ployees in the CIA and 200,000 in the
entire "intelligence community" itself.
The cost of maintaining them is some-
where between \$5 billion and \$6
billion annually. The employment
figures do not include foreign agents or
mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-
man hired army in Laos.)

A week after my visit to the "senior
seminar" *Newsweek* ran a long story
on "the new espionage" with a picture
of CIA Director Richard Helms on the
cover. The reporter clearly had spoken
to some of the same people I had. As
Newsweek said, "The gaudy era of the

30 DEC 1971

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NEW C.I.A. DEPUTY? Maj. Gen. Vernon A. Walters is reportedly being considered for the post of deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

General May Get No. 2 Post in C.I.A.

STATINTL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29— President Nixon is reported to be considering the appointment of an Army major general, Vernon A. Walters, to be the next deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

General Walters, who is now defense attaché at the Embassy in Paris, would succeed Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr. of the Marine Corps, according to officials here. General Cushman has been named by President Nixon to be next commandant of the Marine Corps and is scheduled to take command Friday.

Spokesmen for the White House, State Department and the C.I.A. declined comment on the report concerning General Walters. Nonetheless, reliable informants said that the general, who has had extensive experience as an interpreter with

both President Eisenhower and with President Nixon, was in line to be second-ranking official at the agency.

President Nixon's reorganization of the United States Government agencies involved in foreign intelligence, announced Nov. 5, provided an "enhanced leadership role" for Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence. At the time, intelligence sources said that Mr. Helms would concentrate evaluating foreign intelligence for the President and on budget and management problems of the intelligence "community" as a whole.

Day-to-Day Control

The Deputy Director, they said, would take over more of the day-to-day operations of the C.I.A., including control of clandestine collection of intelligence through secret agents and such electronic techniques as spy satellites and code-cracking.

Informants here noted that General Walters had served as Mr. Nixon's interpreter during the recent meeting with President Pompidou of France in the Azores. General Walters also served as interpreter for President Nixon early this month during the visit of President Emilio G. Médici of Brazil.

General Walters, whose nickname is Dick, is widely known for his extraordinary linguistic gifts. He is fluent in French, German, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch and Russian. He also speaks some Arabic and Greek. Languages are his hobby.

He was born in New York March 3, 1917, and grew up in Europe, where his father, an

American businessman, lived. He attended French schools, and was graduated from Stonyhurst College in England. He enlisted in the Army on May 2, 1941.

During World War II he was commissioned and assigned as a liaison officer with the Brazilian forces fighting in the United States Fifth Army in Italy under Gen. Mark W. Clark. His language abilities brought him to General Clark's attention and ultimately to the attention of Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Fifth Army chief of staff.

As defense attaché in Paris and previously in Rio de Janeiro, General Walters is a senior officer of the Defense Department's Intelligence Agency in both rank and experience. He also has a 20-year knowledge of North Atlantic Treaty Organization problems.

Under the National Security Act of 1947, which created the C.I.A. the positions of director and deputy director cannot be held simultaneously by military officers on active duty.

Richard Helms, who was named Director of Central Intelligence in 1966, is the first career civilian intelligence officer to have risen to the nation's top intelligence position. The tradition, however, is to name a military deputy when the director is a civilian — and vice versa.

ROANOKE, VA.

TIMES

DEC 27 1971

M - 62,597

S - 106,111

Why Didn't Somebody Listen?

President Nixon's reorganization of the machinery for defense and diplomatic intelligence is in order. One of the revelations of the Pentagon Papers was that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) called the shots correctly all along. The American people may have been sold a bill of goods about the domino theory, the marvelous effects of bombing and other justifications for continuing this miserable disaster, but the CIA was not.

Writing in the January, 1972, issue of Foreign Affairs, Chester L. Cooper pays a compliment and asks a question: "Confronting one of the most passion-laden, persistent and dangerous foreign crises the United States has confronted since World War II, they (the CIA's estimators and analysts) consistently seem to have kept their cool, they remained impeccably objective, and they have been right. But if the record was so good, why wasn't anyone Up There listening?"

Possibilities are that the men Up There didn't want to hear and began to neglect the CIA's advice. They may have been overwhelmed by the successes of the United States, principally in Europe, and convinced of American might and right. President Johnson, specifically, didn't want to be the first President to lose a war. President Nixon's present policy is open to the criticism of being tuned to domestic politics and the November election.

Whatever the possibilities, Mr. Nixon's plan puts the director of the CIA in a position where he can be heard more easily. The director has

been relieved of day-to-day responsibilities and has been given more authority over all the government's intelligence authorities. He can always be overruled; the CIA does not make policy. There may be occasions when he should be overruled. But he cannot be ignored quite so easily as was the CIA during the late and continuing tragedy.

Despite Its Being in the Telephone Book

CIA Is an Unlisted Number When Congress Dials

By Flora Lewis

SO FAR as I've found in a lot of traveling, the United States is the only country in the world which lists its central intelligence agency in the telephone book, and enables anyone to call up and speak to the director's office.

But an extraordinary exchange on the floor of the Senate recently made clear how little else the people who put up the money for intelligence know about how it's spent. The debate took place on the day the military appropriations bill was finally passed so it attracted little attention, but it was revealing.

It was provoked by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) who offered an amendment providing that not more than \$4 billion in the defense budget could go for the intelligence services, including the CIA, the National Security Agency and the intelligence branches of the various armed services. Symington's point was not only to set a limit, but to set a precedent.

CONGRESS does appropriate all the money that goes to intelligence, but it doesn't know how much, or even when and how. That's because it is hidden in the defense budget, with the result that Congress doesn't really know just what it is appropriating any military money for because it never knows which items have been selected for padding to hide extra funds for intelligence.

Evidently, Symington believes that the actual amount spent is a little over \$4 billion, instead of the \$6 billion reported in the press, because he wasn't trying to cut intelligence funds except for CIA payments to Thai soldiers in Laos. He is one of the nine senators entitled to go to meetings of the Appropriations Subcommittee on the CIA, supposedly the confidential watchdog over the agency. As he pointed out though, there hasn't been a full meeting all this year.

What he wanted to do was to establish that Congress does have some rights to monitor the intelligence empire which it created by law, and he was driven to the attempt because of exasperation at President Nixon's recent intelligence reorganization. It was an-

nounced to the public as an upgrading of CIA Director Richard Helms and a better method to avoid waste and establish political control.

Senator Symington and many other well-informed CIA watchers in Washington, are convinced that Helms has been kicked upstairs. The result, they believe, will be an increase in military influence over intelligence—which has been recognized as a danger throughout the history of intelligence because it tends to become self-serving, the doctor diagnosing himself according to the therapy he likes.

There is also a concern that the reorganization, which makes the President's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger top dog over intelligence, will centralize the system so much that it will become a tool for White House aims, not an outside source of technical expertise.

Responsible political control over the intelligence community's actions, as distinct from its factual and analytical reports, is necessary and desirable. But despite the public impression, in the last few years the CIA has been the most honest source of information for Congress on sensitive issues such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, while the Pentagon, State and White House have dealt in obfuscations. Whatever his Department of Dirty Tricks might be doing, Helms has been more straightforward with his secret session testimony on what is really happening in these unhappy places than the people who do have to explain and justify their funding to Congress.

BUT, as the Senate debate showed, that isn't saying very much. Sen. Allen Ellender (D-La.), who heads the CIA subcommittee, pointed out that 20 years ago only two senators and two congressmen were allowed to know what the CIA was spending, and now there are five on each side of the Capitol.

He implied that they also knew what the CIA was spending its money for. Sen. Wil-

liam Fulbright (D-Ark.), had the wit to ask if that mean Ellender knew, before the CIA set up its secret army in Laos, that this was the purpose of the appropriation. Ellender said, "It was not, I did not know anything about it . . . it never dawned on me to ask about it."

Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), had the humor to point out that there has been a lot in the press about the CIA Laotian army in the past couple of years, and asked whether Ellender has now inquired about it. Ellender said, "I have not inquired." Cranston pointed out that since nobody else in Congress has Ellender's right to check the CIA, that meant nobody in Congress knows. Ellender replied, "Probably not."

Symington's amendment was defeated. But at least the record is now clear. A recent Newsweek article quoted a former CIA official as saying, "There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive closer scrutiny and 'control' than the CIA."

"The reverse of that statement is true," said Symington, "and it is shameful for the American people to be misled." The record proves him right.

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STATINTL

1 2 DEC 1971

News Around the Dials

Two Specials on the White House

By GEORGE MAKSIAN

The White House will be the subject of two major television specials this month, one on CBS dealing with the Christmas season and the other on NBC covering a day in the life of the President.

NBC's special, titled "Dec. 6, 1971: A Day in the Presidency," will be presented next Tuesday, from 7:30 to 8:30 p.m., with John Chancellor as host. It will cover President Nixon through an entire work day, focusing on every meeting on his schedule, including the first part of a top-level session of the Washington Special Action Group of the National Security Council.

This segment will show the President discussing the Indian-Pakistani war with Secretary of

dent Agnew; presentation of diplomatic credentials by ambassadors from Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan and Portugal, and a meeting of the Quadriad, the President's four major economic advisers.

Chancellor said that for security reasons NBC cameras were excluded from a part of every meeting. "Among the unscheduled events that occurred during the day," he said, "was a visit from Nixon's daughter, Julie Eisenhower."

CBS' special "Christmas at the White House," will be televised on Christmas Eve, from 10:30 to 11 p.m. It will follow the First Family through its various activities preparing for the Yuletide season. Julie Eisenhower will join Charles Kuralt

and Marya McLaughlin for the report.

Filming for the telecast began last weekend.



John
Chancellor

Lucille
Ball

State William Rogers, presidential aid Henry Kissinger, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Gen. William Westmoreland and Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Reuven Frank, president of NBC News, said this is the first time the White House has given permission to film a program of this type. "We have been asking to do a show on the Presidency since 1948," he said. "We got the go-ahead in mid-November after several meetings with John Scali, a special consultant to the President."

The President's work day on the day of filming (Dec. 6) began at 7:45 a.m., with a breakfast for congressional leaders, and ended shortly before 11 p.m., following a dinner for Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

Other events on Nixon's schedule that will be seen on the telecast included: a domestic council meeting chaired by Vice Presi-

PHOENIX, ARIZ.

REPUBLIC

DEC 9 1974

M - 166,541

S - 252,975

STATINIL

Englishman, after 8½ years in U.S., misses amenities of life

By RICHARD SCOTT
Manchester Guardian Service

(Scott, who has just moved from Washington to Paris, reflects on 8½ years as the Guardian's correspondent in the U.S. capital.)

Looking back over the past 8½ years in which I have lived in the United States, I find that my strongest impressions are largely critical. This is perhaps somewhat surprising since I leave the country with a good deal of affection and admiration for its people. They are certainly very different from ourselves. More different than one assumes on arrival. The fact that we have a roughly common language and have been taught to regard each other as cousins induces false assumptions of similarities.

After a few years' residence in the United States, one realizes, if one had not done so before, that there is — for want of a better phrase — a "European Way of Life," compounded from things both spiritual and material, which is important to one. This is absent in North America, and exists as much in England as in France or in Italy. An Englishman might conceivably be homesick in France, but he could not languish for the same reason as he may in America — for nostalgia for that indefinable quality that is Europe.

The question most frequently put by Europeans to their compatriots living in the United States confirms the real existence of violence in that country. How great, really, is the danger of being beaten up on the street, of being killed or robbed? The statistics, of

course, show that there is indeed a far higher incidence of crime and violence in the United States than in any European country. But just how much is one conscious of this in one's daily life?

Violence on streets

One can speak only for oneself. A French friend says that he never knew real fear before coming to live in New York, even during the years fighting in the Maquis. That was not my own experience in Washington. Yet Washington is the only city in which I have lived where my own friends and acquaintances were among those who had been beaten, raped, yes, even murdered. It would be wrong, however, to say that I was daily, or more than occasionally, conscious of the need for caution and even more rarely of actual fear.

It was not something that preoccupied one. Subconsciously, no doubt, the anxiety was there. One learned to take precautions — normally of a negative character — almost without realizing it. There were streets, even areas, where one did not loiter after dark; some where one would not dream of passing through on foot — scarcely even in daytime — nor readily in a car at night. So one didn't.

It was only when one was out of the country that one realized in sudden flashes the extent to which one's personal freedom was curtailed by the extent of violence in the United States. I recall walking back to my hotel with a former colleague after the Guardian's 50th anniversary dinner in London this year,

well after midnight. It suddenly came to me that this was something I would never have done in Washington.

Complex government

In the area of politics, perhaps my outstanding impression is of the infinite complexity of the American system. This complexity seems to arise partly from the vast size and variety of the country and its population; partly because of the checks and balances established by the founding fathers in the written constitution, and the paramouncy which these give to the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, each within its own sphere.

The federal character of the Constitution, the fairly wide powers remaining to the individual states, the division of government into three equal branches, tends to complicate and to weaken the central administration in Washington. This is particularly so when the President's party does not control Congress, as has been the case since Nixon came to the White House. The American president's need for caution, compromise, and consensus is normally far greater than that of the British prime minister. His potential power is far greater than that of the British prime minister. His potential power is far greater, but his actual power to act assertively often may be less.

Government in the United States is complicated not only because of the complete separation of the executive and the legislative branches with

dures followed by the latter, and the massive, cumbersome size of the former. Jealousies between the Congress and the White House, exist also between the various government departments. This results in widespread overlapping and duplication of functions.

In the field of intelligence and security, for example, the area of responsibility remains substantially undefined as between the CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, State Department, Pentagon, and White House. They each maintain their own sources and lines of communications. The proliferation of civil servants is so great that most of them seem to spend most of their time in committee telling each other what they have been doing or plan to do.

In London, if you wanted to know what the British government's policy is on any given subject, you can be fairly sure of getting it from the department concerned — if they will talk at all. In Washington, almost everyone is ready to talk — but you are apt to receive several different and often conflicting answers to your questions, but from within the same department.

Legal system creaks

The passage of a bill through Congress is devious and slow, and subject to innumerable pitfalls. A committee chairman like Rep. Wilbur Mills, D-Ark., has more real power than have most members of the Cabinet. And in the Senate there is almost limitless scope for delaying tactics by strongwilled minorities.

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
DESERT NEWS

E - 84,855

DEC 8 1971

Is Pentagon Crying 'Wolf' In Cutbacks?

Government bureaus when faced with a budget cut have a way of raising an alarm by predicting all sorts of dire consequences.

For example, the Pentagon warned this week that some parts of the world may be left uncovered by its military intelligence apparatus — spies, if you will — because of a projected cut of 5,000 jobs.

That sounds ominous, until one realizes the Pentagon now has 139,000 persons working for it in its intelligence organizations alone.

One place the Pentagon could safely cut back is in its surveillance of civilians. Americans were properly shocked not long ago at disclosures that the military was actually spying on civilians — a practice generally reserved for totalitarian countries.

So it's hard to accept at face value Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Froehke's prediction that "we are going to have to accept the risk of not having complete information on some parts of the world."

Senator John Stennis, chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, raised a strenuous objection when he declared: "At the present time, it is almost as though the dropping of a leaf in the far Pacific elicits a report." Stennis says he doubts that the Pentagon can make effective use of all the intelligence it now receives.

No one disputes the fact that the U.S. needs a large enough intelligence apparatus to keep it informed of potential dangers. Anything less would be unthinkable.

How much the Pentagon's activities duplicate those of the Central Intelligence Agency is difficult to know, since both operations are top-secret. But certainly Congress should probe overlapping activities and cut out useless duplication.

At the same time the Pentagon cannot escape the responsibility of using its forces efficiently. And bigness, particularly in a bureaucracy, has seldom been known for its efficiency.

The Federal Diary

By
Mike
Causey

Intelligence Shakeups; the authoritative Armed Forces Journal says reorganizations that have taken place in the intelligence community will mean "a better deal, not less authority . . . for members of the defense intelligence community."

An article in the December issue of the Journal speculates that Defense Intelligence Agency will get more super-grade (GS 16-18) jobs, and that better caliber military personnel will be assigned to the Pentagon unit.

Nevertheless, the Journal reports, the military spy agency is now outgunned in the bureaucratic struggle for top grade personnel. It says DIA has only 15 supergraders to run an agency of 3,088 civil service workers, a ratio of 1 chief for each 206 Indians.

Waste and duplicity in intelligence gathering?

STATINTL

Former CIA 'spy' comes in from the cold—into hot water

STATINTL

By Joanne Leedom

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Boston

In the basement of his home in Oakton, Va., with dogs and children running havoc around him, Victor Marchetti wrote a spy novel last year. Today Mr. Marchetti and his new book "The Rope Dancer" are stirring up havoc of another kind just a few miles from his home, at Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters where Mr. Marchetti was an official just two years ago.

Today Mr. Marchetti is the spy "who came in from the cold—into hot water," to quote one of his friends. Now an outspoken critic of the agency, Mr. Marchetti has been traveling around the country promoting his exposé of the spy's world and crusading for reform in the CIA.

Mr. Marchetti left the CIA after a 14-year career in protest over what he asserts is its waste and duplicity in intelligence gathering, its increasing involvement with the military, its amorality, and what he says now is its subtle shifts to "domestic spying."

Reform, he says, in the entire intelligence network should be three-pronged: (1) reorganizing responsibilities, (2) reducing size ordered by President Nixon. Placing CIA director Richard Helms as overall coordinator of national intelligence recently was in part aimed at eliminating the waste in the nation's \$8 billion/200,000-man intelligence operation which spans a dozen governments and funding, and (3) exposing the intelligence community to more public control and scrutiny.

Silence maintained

The CIA, in its turn, has remained customarily silent to the public attack. However, one former top CIA official, who asked to remain anonymous, agreed with some of Mr. Marchetti's points but disputed his main arguments.

Since Mr. Marchetti began speaking out several months ago, a major restructuring in the intelligence community has been ordered. It was also aimed at tailoring intelligence output more closely to White House needs.

This reform and Mr. Marchetti's own criticism come at a time when Congress, too, is demanding more knowledge and control over the intelligence networks. For the first time Congress has ordered public hearings on the CIA next year, and Mr. Marchetti plans to testify.

Military in focus

In Boston Mr. Marchetti explained his own "defection": "My discontent with the

agency was hard for me to identify at first. I began first to criticize the waste. This is ridiculous, I thought. We could be doing the job for \$2 billion less.

"The second thing that was most annoying to me was the military influence. This is very pervasive. When the Secretary of Defense controls 85 percent of the assets, he [the CIA director] doesn't have the muscle to make changes. The military influence in many ways is the greatest single factor of waste. They want to know more and more and are responsible for collection overkill."

To these two criticisms, the former CIA official who worked close to the director and who responded for The Christian Science Monitor, partly agreed. "There is unfortunately an awful lot of duplication," he said, but added, "What is needed is tighter control over the military [not the CIA]. It's not a question of the CIA duplicating the military, but of the military duplicating what the CIA does. The President's reorganization is a strong move in the right direction."

Another one of Mr. Marchetti's complaints is that the traditional intelligence work of gathering and assessing information has been "contaminated" with paramilitary activity.

A prime example is Laos where the CIA recruited and armed thousands of natives, says Mr. Marchetti, who worked in the CIA as an intelligence analyst, as special assistant to the chief of plans, programs, and budgets, to the executive director, and finally as executive assistant to the agency's deputy director.

"[At the time] perhaps a handful of key congressmen and senators might have known about this activity in Laos. The public knew nothing," he declared.

According to the former CIA administrator, however, paramilitary activity is shifting out of the CIA now and into the Army. "But in any case," he said, "the CIA doesn't decide on this activity; they are directed by the President and the National Security Council." If there is to be reform in the use of the CIA, he argues, it must come from the President's direction.

While Mr. Marchetti is highly critical of the CIA's paramilitary and clandestine interventions in other countries, he insists that the real threat of the CIA today is that it may "unleash" itself on this country.

Concern noticed

"In recent years as domestic unrest increased, I've noticed the CIA is concerned about the FBI's apparent inability to handle subversion in this country. I think there's an effort to convince the nation that the CIA should get into domestic intelligence."

"Ridiculous," snapped the former CIA administrator, and left this charge at that.

To reform the intelligence network, Mr. Marchetti says there should be a reorganization to limit the Defense Department to the routine intelligence needs of various departments—Army, Navy, etc.

"Then I'd put the National Security Agency under the control of the President and Congress," elaborated Mr. Marchetti. "Congress has very little knowledge about what goes on. The Pentagon papers and the way the Supreme Court acted strips away the shield intelligence has always had. We need to let a little sunshine in; that's the best safeguard."

Laos example cited

The former administrator insists, however, that there are already adequate controls through special congressional committees which control appropriations and military affairs. "If you had the whole Congress and Senate debating these issues in executive session, you might as well do away with it [secret intelligence operations]. Inevitably there would be leaks."

"Of course there would be leaks," admitted Mr. Marchetti. "What I'm really saying is that in the final analysis if we made the President walk through it [his decision to use covert forces in foreign countries], the President would see it's all not worth it. Then if we deny ourselves these alternatives we'd have to act in a diplomatic fashion."

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES
3 DEC 1972

Kissinger widens influence: AEC boss due to head CIA



JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

By Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — President Nixon plans to name Atomic Energy Commission Chairman James R. Schlesinger as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, reliable sources reported Saturday.

Schlesinger, a 43-year-old management and budget expert, is scheduled to replace career CIA operative Richard M. Helms early in Mr. Nixon's second term, which begins Jan. 20.

Like several of the President's recent high-level appointees, Schlesinger reportedly has indicated a desire to remain in his present

secretary of state and the President retained William P. Rogers rather than choosing a more assertive secretary of state.

Kissinger's influence may similarly be extended at the Pentagon where Helmut G. Sonnenfeldt, a long-time associate and current member of his White House staff, is under consideration as assistant Defense secretary for international security affairs.

At the CIA, Schlesinger could be expected at least initially to concentrate on managing the huge budget and bureaucracy with Kissinger overseeing the flow of intelligence. The CIA director has charge not only of the CIA but also of all the civilian and military intelligence branches, which employ more than

250,000 persons and spend approximately \$3 billion a year.

Kissinger reportedly has directed a series of complaints against the CIA. In particular, he is said to have accused Helms and the agency of failing to give adequate advance warning of the massive North Vietnamese offensive last spring.

CIA officials insist that their reports were complete and accurate and that Kissinger should have drawn the proper warning from the reports. Other officials who followed the reports agree but Kissinger's assessment evidently was persuasive to the President.

CIA sources said they were unaware of any presidential displeasure with Helms. They related to his age and financial problems than his performance on the job. They said Helms, as a professional intelligence officer for 20

years with the OSS and the CIA, has inspired a high level of morale among the career officials at the top of the agency.

But they reported Helms has set a rule that leading CIA officials should retire at 60 and he will reach that age next March. In addition, friends said a divorce settlement and remarriage four years ago left him in difficult financial straits.

A motive in leaving the CIA, they suggested, was to get a job in private business drawing a salary higher than his current \$42,500 a year.

Schlesinger's departure from the AEC is sure to be well received by the oil industry which has been wary of his plans to move forcefully into the energy crisis with atomic power plants. It is also likely to be pleasing to environmental groups which have opposed him on licensing standards.

Schlesinger came into office in July, 1971, with a declaration that the AEC would no longer serve as a defender and promoter of nuclear power but rather as a protector of public safety and the environment.

He has subsequently pushed atomic development, however, arguing that environmental opponents failed to prove their case.

Officials at the AEC and the White House give him high marks for efficiency, intelligence, public relations and political awareness. Those are qualities which could serve him well at the CIA which, in addition to Kissinger's private criticism, has come under public attack for its controversial operations in foreign countries.

Prior to his appointment to the AEC,

Schlesinger served as assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget under George Shultz, who was reappointed Friday as secretary of the Treasury and given the expanded job of chief economic manager for

the President. Schlesinger's close relations with Shultz should give him leverage in the inner circles of the White House.

Schlesinger is a native of New York City and a summa cum laude graduate of Harvard where he also took his PhD. He is married and has eight children.

STATINTL

ST. PETERSBURG, FLA.
TIMES DEC 2 1979

M - 154,532
S - 169,686

Nixon's Finesse

Faced with Senate concern that CIA control was slipping to a military man and with the need for a new Marine Corps commandant, President Nixon solved both problems with one move.

His nomination of Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, deputy CIA chief, to become Marine commandant gives him a qualified replacement for retiring Gen. Leonard Chapman and simultaneously removes any threat to Director Richard Helms' leadership of the intelligence agency.

It was a neat way to finesse a controversy.

PENTAGON/SERVICES

Better Deal for Service Spooks?

WHITE HOUSE SOURCES tell The JOURNAL that the intelligence reorganization announced last month by the President means a better deal, not less authority—as the country's press has been reporting—for members of the defense intelligence community.

Among the specifics cited:

- More "supergrades" (GS-16 to GS-18 civilian billets) for Defense Intelligence Agency.

- Assignment of top-caliber military personnel to DIA (which in past years has had trouble getting the most qualified military personnel assigned to it and proper recognition for their work in intelligence fields);

- Better promotion opportunities for intelligence analysts (who in the past have seldom been able to advance to top management levels without first breaking out into administrative posts that make little use of their analytical capabilities).

This last point stems from a major White House concern with the nation's intelligence product: "95% of the emphasis has been on collection, only 5% on analysis and production," as one White House staffer describes it. Yet good analysts, he points out, have faced major hurdles in getting recognition and advancement. Moreover, they have been "overwhelmed" by the amount of raw data collected by their counterparts in the more glamorous, more powerful, and better rewarded collection fields.

The supergrade problem has been of special concern to the White House. A high Administration official, who asked not to be named, told The JOURNAL that the "White House [has] pledged to get Civil Service Commission approval" for a GS-18 billet which had been urgently requested by DIA Director LGen Donald V. Bennett. Bennett, he said, first requested the billet more than a year ago. Even though DIA has not

had any authorization for a GS-18, it took almost 10 months for the papers needed to justify the single high-level slot to filter through lower echelon administrative channels in the Pentagon before they could be forwarded, with a "strong endorsement" from Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, to the Civil Service Commission.

Ironically, just one day after The JOURNAL was told of the White House's determination to help get the billet approved, it was learned that the Civil Service Commission had nevertheless denied the request. Instead, it offered DIA a choice of having an additional GS-17 slot or of having a Public Law 313 post (which would require that DIA first recruit an individual highly qualified enough to justify the appointment).

DIA's supergrade structure, nevertheless, is going to improve dramatically. For at least three years, the agency has been authorized only 15 supergrades, but will get 24 more under a plan just endorsed by Dr. Albert C. Hall, DoD's new Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. The posts are known to be endorsed strongly by both Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, and apparently enjoy strong backing from the White House as well.

By going from 15 to a total of 39 supergrade billets, DIA will be able not only to recruit higher caliber civilian personnel but to promote more of its own qualified analysts into these coveted, higher paying posts.

Press Misses the Point

Press reports on the intelligence reorganization convey a much different picture than the above highlights and White House sources suggest. In a 22 November feature, *U.S. News & World Report* noted in a lead paragraph that "The Pentagon appears to be a loser in the latest reshuffle." Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard is probably the man most responsible for such interpretations. In a 4 November meeting with Pentagon reporters, just one day before the White House announced that CIA Director Richard Helms was being given new, community-wide responsibilities with authority over all intelligence budgets, Packard said: "There have been people thinking if we just had someone over in the White House to ride herd on this overall intelligence that things would be improved. I don't really support that view. . . . I think if anything we need a little less coordination from that point than more. . . ."

The White House's determination to make the defense intelligence field more military (as well as civilian) personnel parallels steps taken earlier this year by LGen John Norton, Commanding General of the Army's

Our Outgunned Spies

A QUICK JOURNAL SURVEY of government-wide supergrade authorizations shows clearly that the Service side of the intelligence community, and DIA in particular, has been "low man on the supergrade totem pole" and makes clear why the White House Intelligence reorganization is aimed, in part at least, at giving Service "spooks" better recognition and more attractive career opportunities. Here are typical (in some cases, ludicrous) comparisons that can be drawn from Part II of the Appendix to the *Fiscal Year 1972 Budget of the United States*, a 1,112-page tome which gives, by federal agency, a detailed schedule of all permanent Civil Service positions:

- DIA has 3,088 Civil Service employees, but only 15 supergrades—roughly one for every 200 spooks.

- DoD's Office of Civil Defense has 721 Civil Service personnel, but 27 supergrades—one for every 27 employees, a ratio eight-to-one better than DIA's.

- The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, with only 776 civil servants, has 36 supergrades—one out of every 22, nine times better than DIA. The Peace Corps also outguns DIA nine to one, with 52 Foreign Service billets in the GS-16 to GS-18 salary brackets for only 1,188 permanent federal positions.

- The National Security Council staff has a 23-to-one advantage, 73 staffers and nine supergrade (or higher) billets. Even NSC's one-to-nine supergrade-to-staff ratio, however, pales by comparison with the President's Office of Science and Technology, which has 23 superposts but only 60 people!

Here's how the supergrade-to-people bean count for key federal agencies compares with DIA's (where authorized, executive level I through V posts are included in supergrade count):

| | |
|--------------------------------|-------|
| Defense Intelligence Agency | 1-206 |
| Office, Secretary of Defense | 1- 95 |
| Library of Congress | 1- 51 |
| Office of Management & Budget | 1- 78 |
| Office of Economic Opportunity | 1- 54 |
| General Accounting Office | 1- 68 |
| Smithsonian Institution | 1-103 |
| Civil Service Commission | 1-14 |
| Federal Maritime Commission | 1-14 |

1 DEC 1971

BALTIMORE SUN

STATIST



GEN. ROBERT CUSHMAN

... new top Marine

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Lt. Gen. Robert Everton Cushman, Jr., a World War II hero and commander in Vietnam of one of the largest forces ever to serve under a Marine officer, was tagged by President Nixon in a surprise move yesterday to become commandant of the Marine Corps January 1.

General Cushman, a longtime friend and aide of Mr. Nixon, has been deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency since March, 1969.

He served as Mr. Nixon's assistant for national security affairs for four years when Mr. Nixon was Vice President.

If General Cushman's nomination is approved by the Senate, he will become the Corps' 25th commandant, succeeding Gen. Leonard F. Chapman for a four-year term.

Though his record in combat command and staff work is long and distinguished, General Cushman's appointment was a surprise to many Marine officers and military observers on several counts.

He will have been away from the Corps for almost three years in the deputy's job at CIA, where he is responsible for day-to-day operations.

The importance of his CIA job was enhanced under the recent reorganization of government in-

telligence activities, and speculation had been that Mr. Nixon would retain him in that major post, traditionally occupied by a military man.

(At the White House, Ronald L. Ziegler, the presidential press secretary, said he did not know who Mr. Nixon would name to succeed General Cushman.)

Also, observers noted, General Cushman graduated from the Naval Academy in 1935, in the same class as the retiring commandant, General Chapman, and will be 57 when he takes office.

Thus, a whole generation of top Marine officers is being passed over, those generally of the 1939 class. The next commandant almost certainly will be chosen four years from now from the ranks of today's brigadier or very junior major generals, the 1942-1943 classes.

Nixon picks CIA deputy for top Marine job

Gen. Cushman Due for Top Marine Job

BY FRED FARRAR

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

WASHINGTON, Nov. 30—President Nixon announced today that he will nominate Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to become the next commandant of the Marine Corps.

Cushman, 54, will replace Gen. Leonard F. Chapman Jr. who is retiring Dec. 31 after completing the four-year term in the commandant post.

Cushman's selection came as a surprise to some observers here who had speculated that

of the Marine Corps, or Lt. Gen. John Chaisson, chief of staff, to be selected as commandant.

Cushman, a native of St. Paul and a U. S. Naval Academy graduate, was the Marine commander in Viet Nam for 18 months prior to his appointment to the CIA in April, 1969.

Before his assignment to Viet Nam, he was commander of the 3d Marine Division. From 1957 to 1961, he was special assistant for national security affairs to then Vice President Nixon.


As a battalion commander in World War II, Cushman won a Navy Cross during the battle for Guam and a Legion of Merit during the Iwo Jima campaign.

Once Served in China

Cushman served in China before World War II and was commander of the Marine Corps complement aboard the battleship Pennsylvania when the Japanese attacked it and other ships of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Cushman will take over a Marine Corps which is down to a total of 204,000 men from the 318,000 it had at the height of the war in Viet Nam. At that time, the Marine Corps had 86,000 men in Viet Nam. Now, 500 Marines are stationed there.

Ronald Ziegler, White House press secretary, said he did not know who would be Cushman's replacement at the CIA, or whether the job would be filled by a civilian or a military officer. Traditionally, a military man has been deputy CIA director.



Lt. Gen. Cushman

the President would want Cushman to continue in the No. 2 job in the CIA—particularly in view of the recent reorganization of the United States intelligence apparatus which gave broader responsibilities to the deputy director of the agency.

Commander in Viet Nam

These observers had expected either Gen. Raymond G. Davis, assistant commandant

DAYTON, OHIO
JOURNAL HERALD

DEC 1 1978
M - 111,867

Intelligence Priorities

... Congress must monitor CIA operations

President Nixon's irritation at the quality of information coming to him from the nation's fragmented intelligence apparatus is understandable. However, his efforts to streamline operations, while welcome, are not without hazard to the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government.

The President has given to Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinating responsibility and some budgeting authority over the diverse intelligence community. Coordination and economy both seem desirable. The various intelligence agencies employ about 200,000 persons and spend about \$6 billion annually.

To the extent that the President has made the intelligence operation more efficient and responsive—as indeed it should be — he has increased the security of the United States. But he will also have further eroded Congress' role in formulating national policy if the legislative branch of government does not balance executive access to unlimited intelligence data with more intensive congressional scrutiny of and control over the nature and scope of intelligence activities.

A special congressional watchdog com-

mittee is supposed to review CIA operations and funding. Unfortunately, it seldom meets except to confer congressional blessings on CIA affairs. This congressional abdication of its responsibility for exercising a positive role in the formation of national policy reduces it to a rubber stamp for an omniscient executive. This has virtually been the case in foreign affairs since the National Security Act of 1947 unified the services and created the National Security Council and the CIA.

An efficient intelligence operation is vital to the interests of the American people. But the operation does not always serve the interests of the people when it strays into political and military activities such as the formation of coups d'etat, direction of clandestine wars and the practice of political assassination.

President Nixon's changes appear to offer increased efficiency, and in Helms the President seems to have a supervisor who is pre-eminently concerned with gathering and evaluating intelligence data. But only a vigilant and responsible Congress can serve to restrain the executive branch of government from abusing the vast power and influence available to it through these necessarily covert intelligence activities.

EDITORIALS

THE SUBVERSIVE C.F.R.

When President Nixon appointed Henry Kissinger as his assistant for national security affairs we pointed out that he was hardly qualified for his job because he was a security risk himself. And we proved it.

Many people thought that we were crazy, or "extremists," to say such nasty things about a man appointed to such a high position by an allegedly "conservative" Republican.

HENRY KISSINGER

is the architect of President Nixon's pro-Red China policy, which has already caused our most massive foreign policy defeat since the recognition of the U.S.S.R. by Roosevelt. He was hand-picked for his job by the subversive Council on Foreign Relations.

The CFR is a private organization which controls our foreign policy. It is itself run for the benefit of the multi-billionaire internationalists who profit from our continuing sellout to communism. They picked Kissinger for Nixon and had Nixon put him in control of our foreign policy because they wanted to be certain that "American" policy continues to be made for their benefit, rather than the benefit of America.

Kissinger has been so successful in doing a job for his bosses in the CFR that on Nov. 6 Nixon signed an order putting him in charge of all intelligence operations—the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence, Departments of Treasury, Defense, and State, and Atomic Energy intelligence. Now, through Kissinger's National Security Council, the CFR can plug in to meetings of patriots who may be planning to overthrow at the polls the internationalist regime in Washington. Soon, it will be a "crime" to read an editorial like this unless the people wake up. But

THE PEOPLE ARE CATCHING ON

to the fact that the government is in the hands of ruthless pressure group bosses who wish to run our country for their exclusive benefit. They want to steal all your wealth "legally," through confiscatory taxes (the super-rich very seldom pay any taxes at all), inflation and interest on their Federal Reserve Notes, which they force us to use as "money."

A poll reports that in 1964, 62% of the people believed that the government was run for the benefit of all. After Johnson and Nixon that figure is now down to 37%. Which proves that you can't fool all of the people all of the time.

There is only one answer to this. It is to organize a political counter-force and we don't mean the Republican or Democratic party. Both of these are part of the problem and any politician who calls himself either is in some degree controlled. If he's honest, he will admit it.

LIBERTY LOBBY

is the answer—a political force which is completely independent of all pressure groups and parties.

And when we say LIBERTY LOBBY, we don't mean an imitation, such as "Common Cause" or some other phoney organization which has been set up by the CFR to lead you down the road a little further. The CFR-Zionist cabal is expert at setting up this sort of thing to confuse its opposition.

There is plenty of evidence that Nixon's fiasco in the UN and forced busing of kids to integrated schools are waking up the voters as nothing else ever has. Public apathy is giving way to alarm. The people are looking up from their boob tubes and wondering what is going on.

Let's tell them—and let's tell them that there is only one way to fight effectively—LIBERTY LOBBY.

Gen. Cushman Picked to Lead Marine Corp

WASHINGTON — (UPI) — President Nixon Tuesday named Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., a personal friend and the No. 2 man at the CIA, to be the new Marine Corps commandant. Cushman vowed to keep the Leathernecks "lean and mean."

A native of St. Paul, Minn., the 56-year-old Cushman will get a fourth star and assume command of the Corps on Jan. 1, succeeding Gen. Leonard F. Chapman Jr., who is retiring. Cushman's pay will rise from \$31,400 to \$36,000 a year.

His selection came without the rancor of the ferocious campaigning that had surrounded the selection of Chapman four years ago. Cushman was considered the front-runner among the three candidates for the job. The others were Lt. Gen. John R. Chaisson, Marine chief of staff, and Gen. Raymond Davis, assistant commandant.

THERE had been speculation that Nixon might want to keep Cushman in the more important, if less prestigious, post at the Central Intelligence Agency.

This speculation increased after Nixon reorganized the U.S. intelligence-gathering apparatus a few weeks ago, making CIA Director Richard A. Helms overseer of all such operations and increasing Cushman's responsibilities in day-to-day CIA activities.

Cushman, who worked for Nixon as his assistant for national security affairs throughout Nixon's second term as vice president, was named deputy director of the CIA just two months after Nixon entered the White House.

become even more distinct as the other, larger services have gone "mod" to attract higher enlistments. The 200,000-man Corps has stood by its tradition of toughness and strict discipline — or "lean and mean" in Cushman's words.

"It is my opinion that the present course charted for our Corps is a correct one," Cushman said in a statement released on the announcement of his appointment. "I look forward with enthusiasm to taking over the task of maintaining our highly professional standards."

Cushman won the Navy Cross — the second highest award for valor after the Medal of Honor — during World War II as a lieutenant colonel who led a battalion in the recapture of Guam.

CIA Deputy Chief Cushman

Named to Head Marines

STATINTL

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency who was military aide to President Nixon, when he was Vice President, was nominated yesterday to become commandant of the Marine Corps.

Cushman will become the 25th commandant in the Marine's 196-year history, and will succeed Gen. Leonard F. Chapman whose four-year term as commandant expires Dec. 31.

Yesterday's announcement of the nomination by the President provided a surprise ending two months of speculation within the Defense Department and the military services.

Though Cushman was one of three senior Marine generals known to have been under White House consideration, a number of high-ranking officers expected the job to go to the Lt. Gen. John R. Chaisson or to Gen. Raymond G. Davis, Chaisson was the most frequently mentioned candidate.

Davis, a Medal of Honor winner in Korea, is currently the assistant commandant and, aside from Chapman, the only other four-star general in the corps.

Chaisson, a Harvard-educated officer with a reputation as a top combat commander and a "defense intellectual," is currently the Marine Corps chief of staff.

Speculation that Cushman might be out of the running increased last month when the White House announced a shake-up of the entire intelligence apparatus. In that action, CIA Director Richard Helms was given broader powers over all government intelligence operation, and Cushman was designated to take on even more of the CIA load as second in command to Helms.

In making the announcement on Cushman yesterday, presidential press secretary Ronald L. Zeigler said he did not know who would replace Cushman at CIA or whether the No. 2 intelligence job would go to a civilian or another military officer. Customarily, the deputy director has been filled from the military.

Cushman, 56, won the Navy Cross in 1944 for his role in the recapture of Guam and was commanding the Third Marine Amphibious Force on Vietnam in March, 1969, when he was nominated for the CIA

post shortly after the Nixon administration took office.

The general, according to his associates, is a close personal friend of the President, a relationship stemming from the four years in the late 1950s in which Cushman served as a special assistant for national security affairs to then Vice President Nixon.

Cushman, who joined the Marines in 1933, is the senior

three-star general in the corps.

With his new post, once approved by the Senate, will go a four-star rank and a spot along with the heads of the other three services on the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the nation's top military council that argues the military's case on budgetary and operational matters before the White House.

While the White House took longer to name its choice for the new commandant than many high-ranking Marines expected, these officers say that the selection process this time was carried out with none of the campaigning that marred that process four years ago. Chapman, who stayed out of that jockeying four years ago, emerged with the prestigious commandant's job.

Cushman, a native of St. Paul, takes over the Marine Corps at a critical time in the service's history.

The Marines have emerged from Vietnam in comparatively better shape than some of the other services, with its leaders anxious to get back to the smaller, more elite force that it was prior to Vietnam. But with the administration



LT. GEN. R. E. CUSHMAN

... named to 4-star post

hoping to end the draft by mid-1973, the Marines are faced with attracting men voluntarily into a tough, combat-ready military environment at a time when the other services are seeking to make service life less rigid.

Thus far, the Marines are optimistic about the allure that the corps' spartan ways still holds for a number of young people.

In other announcements yesterday, the president nominated assistant attorney general Shiro Kashiwa of Honolulu to become an associate judge of the U.S. Court of Claims.

Nominated to become a member of the Federal Communications Commission was Richard E. Wiley, currently the commission's general counsel.

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
TRIBUNE

NOV 29 1970
M - 108,270
S - 188,699

A Many Splintered Thing

The American intelligence community since long before World War II has been, and remains to a large degree, a many splintered thing. Every agency needing fresh, accurate and secret information on which to formulate its plans and actions has developed its own set of spies. This lack of coordination and cohesiveness has become apparent with some disasters, most notably the Pearl Harbor attack of Dec. 7, 1941, and a lot of embarrassments such as the Bay of Pigs debacle and more recently the abortive commando raid on the deserted prisoner of war camp on Sontay, 23 miles west of Hanoi, on Nov. 21, 1970.

In 1947 the Central Intelligence Agency was established with the aim of coordinating all this nation's intelligence efforts. Besides the CIA, the U.S. intelligence network today includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and nuclear intelligence operations of the Atomic Energy Commission. The counter-intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation must also be included.

President Nixon, following what has almost become a presidential tradition after public disclosure of an intelligence failure, has shaken up the top levels of the American spy network. In an apparent hope of overcoming the shortcomings of the present system, Mr. Nixon has given Richard Helms, the CIA director, "an enhanced leadership role in planning, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence operations." Theoretically this is the authority that director of intelligence has had for years. But according to one official because of bureaucratic rivalry among competing intelligence agencies this has not always worked out.

Sens. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., and William J. Fulbright, D-Ark., have seen

Mr. Helms' new job more of a "demotion upstairs" than any enhanced leadership role. Their suspicions are understandable, considering the Sontay raid failure and the inability of the intelligence community to forecast the reaction of North Vietnam to the invasion of South Laos last February and March.

Bolstering the senator's suspicions must be the lack of concrete knowledge about the apparent leadership crisis in mainland China. This development comes at a time of delicate negotiations preceding Mr. Nixon's planned trip to Peking. It would be foolish for Mr. Nixon to make the journey without accurate knowledge of the power structure in Peking.

However, the concern of Sens. Symington and Fulbright that Mr. Helms has been "kicked upstairs" sounds more like the political reactions of two men who have consistently disagreed with the President, than the genuine concern of persons fearful the nation might be losing the needed talents of a highly competent intelligence administrator.

Instead the senators should be applauding the President for his efforts to bring greater coordination and cohesiveness to an intelligence effort that has become famous for Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs and Sontay.

DALLAS, TEX.

NEWS NOV 28 1971

E - 242,928

S - 284,097

STATINTL



Letter From Paris

Web Grows in French Drug Tangle

By MARGOT LYON

PARIS — "It's like a Shakespeare play," said a leading Frenchman this week. "It's an infernal cauldron where ambitions, grudges, big money and blackmail are all simmering — an explosive mixture that will probably spare nobody when it boils over, as it must."

He was talking of the latest revelations in the scandal that links French counter-espionage services with the \$12 million sale of heroin in the United States.

The story began last April when French agriculturist and one-time spy Roger Delouette was arrested in New Jersey as he went to claim a Volkswagen minibus in which 96 pounds of heroin were hidden. He told American authorities that the man behind the smuggling attempt was a Colonel Fournier — later said to be Paul Ferrer — a high-ranking officer of the Service de Documentation Exterleure et Contre-Espionage or SDECE, roughly the French equivalent of the CIA.

Action Urged

New Jersey attorney Herbert Stern has been demanding that Fournier-Ferrer come and defend himself against the charges, but since last April nothing has moved, except for a visit to Paris from Mr. Stern himself earlier this month, when he saw the director of the cabinet of the Interior Minister, Raymond Marcellin, in the presence of U.S. Ambassador Watson and other officials. The ambassador seemingly tried to smooth the rough edges of a somewhat stormy meeting, but as one of the participants said later, "Dr. Watson did not manage to soothe Sherlock Holmes."

Last February Minister Marcellin signed a cooperation pact on dope-hunting with Attorney General John Mitch-

ell and it looks as if Washington does not wish to sacrifice the restored cooperation between the two for the skin of a crook. But Attorney Stern is seen to be in a hurry to build his own political career, and is impatient with the slow and exceedingly formalistic style of French justice.

In turn the French criticize him for keeping their official from contact with Delouette. Mr. Stern says that Delouette's lawyer will only allow him to meet with them after Delouette himself has been granted immunity — a long long way from French traditions of judicial procedure.

With little understanding of each other's methods, legally what is going on is a dialogue of the deaf.

BUT THE FRENCH public sat up and paid attention last weekend when Colonel Roger Barberot, a gaullist former ambassador, a well known businessman, and very probably an ex-spy himself, revealed in a radio interview that the entire affair had probably less to do with international drug traffic than with East-West spying.

Before De Gaulle returned to power, he said, the French intelligence service had virtually become a subsidiary of the CIA. But after 1958 De Gaulle restored its independence. Later in his term of office he oriented it toward counter-espionage against the United States.

Two years ago when President Pompidou took over, he ordered the service changed back to its former task of spying on Communist activities. By that time it contained so many anti-American agents that according to Colonel Barberot, when new broom Alexandre de Marenches began his clean-up, he found he had to fire all the top brass.

Since then SDECE (pronounced Zdek) agents have used their inside knowledge to settle scores with new-

comers, old-timers and any other faction they disliked. The former head of the Research Service of the Zdek, said Barberot, was himself fired on suspicion of working closely with Communist agents.

EARLY THIS WEEK the man in question, a Colonel Beaumont alias Bertrand, while admitting the whole service was infested with factional rivalries, sued Barberot for one million francs for slander. Said Barberot: "I didn't make my statement lightly." However, both colonels take the line that no serious link exists between the Zdek and drugs, but that rivals clumsily placed the heroin in the minibus knowing that Delouette would implicate anybody to get himself off the hook.

However, the staunchest defenders of France have been pushing the line that a link indeed exists between spying and drugs — only it concerns the CIA and not French intelligence.

Everybody knows, say these hard-liners, that the CIA manipulates the selling of Laotian opium because it is more than a source of profit, it is a tactical necessity. So the CIA has used the existing networks to wipe out political adversaries — which in that part of the world were French, France having retained a good deal of her influence since Laos and the rest formed part of the French Empire.

A Hidden War

Since General de Gaulle's anti-American speech at Phnom Penh in 1966, a hidden but merciless war has gone on — and the Delouette case is only one aspect of a French-American settlement. Nobody would know who emerged the winner, say the gaullists, if President Nixon had not recently demanded a reorganization of the CIA for misleading him — especially on Laotian and Cambodian affairs.

CIA Revamping

How the Administration Is Trying to Improve Intelligence

STATINTL

Behind the scenes President Nixon's confidence in Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms has taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nixon believes (correctly) that our nation's intelligence setup is a sick elephant. He has quietly assigned Mr. Helms to correct it.

A sick elephant is a formidable danger. And secrecy keeps our public from knowing even the size of this elephant, to say nothing of how sick it is.

Incredibly, we spend close to \$6 billion a year for intelligence. Just the CIA alone is larger in scope than the State Department and spends more than twice as much money.

Legendary Gen. William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic Services conducted our entire World War II espionage throughout four years and throughout the world for a total of \$135 million. The budget of the CIA (secret) is at least \$1.5 billion a year.

Next to the Pentagon with its 25 miles of corridors, the world's largest office building, the CIA's headquarters in suburban Langley, Va., is the largest building in the Washington area. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United States. But the CIA maintains secret offices in most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the public.

About 10,000 people work at Langley and another 5,000 are scattered across the world, burrowing everywhere for intelligence. These include many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their lives for our country in the dark and unknown battles of espionage and treachery. I could name many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own clandestine communications system with Washington and the world.

The Pentagon spends \$3 billion a year on intelligence, twice as much as the CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence arms operate worldwide, of course, and—largely unknown—they also have an immense adjunct called the National Security Agency which rivals the CIA in size and cost.

Then there exists the important Intelligence Section of the State Department, likewise worldwide. Its chief re-

ports directly to Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II, it is understandably jealous of its prerogatives, and traditionally it plays its findings very close to its vest.

Additional intelligence agencies—all growing, all sprawling, all costly—spread out into the world from the office of the secretary of defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and even the Department of Commerce.

In fact, there are so many additional hush-hush agencies that recently in West and East Berlin alone there were at least 40 known U.S. intelligence agencies and their branches—most of them competing with one another.

Mr. Helms himself defines intelligence as "all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." The acquisition of intelligence is one thing; the interpretation of it is another; and the use of it is a third. The 1947 statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. It also makes the CIA directly responsible to the President. But it is simply not true that the CIA is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widely believed.

Again and again, no one and everyone is responsible.

The function of intelligence is to protect us from surprises. It's not working that way. The sick elephant is threatening our national security by surprise, surprise, surprise.

Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms new and sweeping intelligence reorganization authority on an over-all basis. He has given him the first authority ever given anyone to review, and thus affect, all our foreign intelligence agencies' budgets. The President believes Mr. Helms, this undercover world's most experienced pro, can cut at least \$1 billion out of the morass.

The President confided that he is totally fed up with the intelligence com-

self-protective vagueness and dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he wants its output brought closer to the needs of the President's so-called 40 Committee (actually six men), which serves the National Security Council and the President himself.

In amputating much of the sick elephant, Mr. Helms' directive is to cut down on the surprises. And the President could not have picked a more knowing, no-nonsense man to do it.



CIA Director Richard Helms heads up the 15,000-man intelligence operation that is now being streamlined.

Congress and the CIA

President Nixon has issued an executive order which invests Richard Helms, director of the CIA, with authority to oversee all the intelligence agencies (the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, etc.) and to cut "bureaucratic fat" and professional overlapping wherever possible. There may be merit in this new order, but there is incontestable merit in Sen. Stuart Symington's reaction to it. The Senator notes that the CIA was brought into existence in 1947 by an act of Congress. Its powers and duties are defined by legislation adopted by the Congress. The director and deputy director are subject to confirmation by the Senate. Last year the Congress appropriated between \$5 billion and \$6 billion for the intelligence establishment; no one knows the exact amount, since part of the CIA's budget is artfully concealed. Yet the Senate was not consulted about the proposed reorganization. Senator Symington serves on the CIA subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. To his knowledge, the subcommittee was not consulted about, nor did it approve, the reorganization ordered by the President. As a matter of fact the subcommittee has not met once during the current year. This is an amazing state of affairs. Surely the Congress has a right to be consulted about the reorganization of an agency which owes its existence to an Act of Congress and is sustained by annual appropriations voted by the Congress.

The fact is that the CIA enjoys an autonomy almost as complete as that enjoyed by the FBI. Whatever the original intention of the Congress, the CIA functions today as an adjunct of the White House. The intelligence it gathers is available to the President; it is not available to the Congress. Under the proposed reorganization, it will be even more directly responsible to the President, and by its oversight control over the other agencies will be supplying him with a unified appraisal. An agency that gathers information for the President may be tempted to provide him with the estimates it thinks he wants (as the Pentagon Papers have shown, intelligence reports that do not coincide with White House opinion are apt to be ignored), and as Joseph Kraft pointed out in a recent column, there is much to be said for diverging, even conflicting, reports in the highly subjective area of intelligence evaluation.

The CIA is closed off from scrutiny by the press, public and the Congress; like the FBI, it functions in splendid bureaucratic isolation. Mr. Helms is such a gray eminence that a private elevator takes him to and from his office in the CIA structure in Langley, Va. Like Mr. Hoover, he is usually not "available," except at budget time. Recently, however, he has been trying to give the agency a new, or at least a brighter image, since he is well aware of a growing restiveness in the Congress and of the need to slash budgets. A *Nation* editorial of May 3 called attention to the way in which Mr. Helms was "breaking cover" to talk about the brilliant achievements of the

agency and to assure us that it is staffed by dedicated friends of the democratic ideal. Now he is up to the same antics again. This week he is the "cover boy" on *Newsweek*, with the predictable feature telling of gallant CIA capers of a kind that could have been made known only by the agency that is so super-secret it feels compelled to conceal its activities from the Congress.

Congress should not take any more of this guff from the agency or its director. It has authority to insist that its authority be respected and it has a clear responsibility to act in that spirit. In an editorial last August 2, we remarked on a measure, introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, which would require the CIA to make its intelligence reports available to the chairman of the germane committees of the Congress (Armed Services and Foreign Relations) and also require the agency to prepare reports at the request of the Congress. There is precedent for such legislation in the instructions given the AEC. After all, the CIA often gives to foreign governments information and reports which it will not make available to the Senate or the House. This is selective secrecy carried to a grotesque extreme.

Hearings will be held on Senator Cooper's bill (S. 2224) during the first week of February. It is a wise and sensible proposal. We hope it is adopted. We hope too that the CIA subcommittee will come alive and begin to exercise a real degree of oversight over the agency. Better still, the Senate should adopt the resolution offered by Senator Symington (S. 192, November 13) to create a select committee which would oversee the CIA. But there is really only one way to deal with the problem of the CIA and that is to make it directly responsible to the Congress. If it is engaged in activities of such a character that they cannot be reported to the Congress, then it should be told to abandon those activities. There is no place for a secret agency of the CIA type within the framework of a constitutional democracy, which is how Justice Stanley Reed once characterized our form of government. As long as the CIA can plead secrecy, Congress will be unable to exercise effective oversight. The time has come to make both the FBI and the CIA subject to close and continuing Congressional supervision and control.

Spies get together

There is one secret that the intelligence fraternity in Washington has not been able to keep under cover : its own lines of communication have become badly scrambled. In an attempt to get rid of the worst discrepancies and overlaps President Nixon has announced a reorganisation of the multiple branches of the secret service under the direction of Mr Richard Helms, the present and very able head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr Helms will now head the new United States Intelligence Board and will co-ordinate the activities and the budgets of the various intelligence networks—the first time that anyone has had power to do this.

The board will be directly responsible to the National Security Council. At the same time two new panels will be set up within the NSC. One, under the direction of Mr Henry Kissinger, the chief of the council, will analyse all the intelligence reports. (In the rush to collect raw facts their interpretation has often been neglected.) The other will compare the strength of the Soviet forces as a whole with those of the United States.

The tangles within the intelligence world go back beyond the crisis over missiles in Cuba. On numerous occasions the many military spies—the three services have their own intelligence networks and then the Department of Defence has still another—have come up with assessments that differ from those of the civilian agencies such as the CIA and the intelligence division of the State Department. Although the CIA has a hawkish image in foreign eyes, it is generally the military men who have over-estimated the resources available to the other side, partly in an effort to boost support in Congress for their own defence budget. Furthermore, relations have been strained recently between the CIA, which gathers information from abroad, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which manages surveillance at home.

This year the confusion has been more noticeable than most. The abortive commando raid a year ago to free prisoners of war from the deserted camp at Son Tay in North Vietnam caused acute embarrassment. Then the Pentagon papers revealed that there had earlier been some serious discrepancies between military and civilian



Richard Helms : master-spy

information on the war in Vietnam. And now there is a struggle brewing over the extent of the reported build-up of missiles by the Soviet Union at a time when the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms are reaching a crucial stage.

Congress, which has always been suspicious of the secrecy surrounding the intelligence world, has also been prodding the President. The conservatives in the Senate, led, rather surprisingly, by Senator Ellender, who used to be the spies' best friend, want to cut the money that goes on military intelligence ; in the age of expensive satellite spies about \$5 billion a year is spent on this out of an annual intelligence budget of around \$6 billion. The liberals, on the other hand, claim that Congress has too little control over the intelligence networks ; in particular they feel that the CIA has too great an influence on foreign policy. What, they

ask, is the CIA doing in Laos ? It will be no consolation to these critics that Mr Kissinger will now have greater authority over spying. As a presidential aide he is not responsible to Congress.

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Senators Fear Helms Has Lost CIA Control

Reshuffling, With More Positions Going to Military Men, Worries Key Lawmakers

WASHINGTON (UPI)—Key senators are concerned that CIA Director Richard Helms might have been "kicked upstairs" in the reshuffle of America's intelligence community, with more influence in spy activities going to military men.

Helms has assured inquiring senators that he had no reason to believe he had been shuffled aside in the nation's intelligence hierarchy.

But there is concern on Capitol Hill that Helms has lost out in the shakeup of the intelligence network ordered by President Nixon last month.

Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) and J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) are concerned that the shakeup has increased Pentagon predominance in the intelligence field, and Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.) is conducting an investigation to find out what happened.

What has disturbed Helms' friends in the Senate is that the day-to-day control of the CIA apparently has been relinquished to a military man, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., in order to free Helms for his new duties as overall director of the CIA and all other intelligence units. Cushman, a marine, is deputy director of the CIA.

Also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the deputy secretary of defense have been given a new voice in the intelligence command through membership on a committee, which, under the direction of presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger, will oversee intelligence.

Helms, in a closed-door meeting with the Senate Armed Services Committee this week, said he did not think he was being shoved out of the way.

Stennis, the committee chairman, said Helms "assured me that his dominance over it (the CIA), his effectiveness, his powers over it will not be diminished one bit."

But Stennis indicated he still was not satisfied and "we are going into it and we are going to analyze it and study it and have an investigation — if one wants to use that word—if necessary. We do not take these things lightly. The stakes are too high."

No one in the Senate really knows what has happened at the CIA. Not even senators like Stennis, who are let in on the nation's intelligence secrets, were told in advance.

26 NOV. 1971

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Capital Bulletin

Dateline

Washington

Q "Was Richard Helms promoted or fired?" was the question most being asked around Washington last week. The CIA Director's new post as coordinator of all U.S. intelligence activities was interpreted by some observers as a kick upstairs and by others as a promotion of Helms to "intelligence czar." In fact, the change represents a move to bring U.S. intelligence activities more directly under White House control.

Helms will work under the close supervision of Henry Kissinger, who is now running the newly created National Security Council Intelligence Committee. Like the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, the new Intelligence Committee is designed to eliminate procedural difficulties and to consolidate information—thus avoiding interagency conflicts. Under Kissinger, Helms will work as a high-level administrator, not so much formulating policy as providing information upon which policy will be based. Implicitly, the new post will put Helms over FBI head J. Edgar Hoover, though relations with Hoover will continue to be handled through Hoover's titular superior Attorney General John Mitchell. Mitchell is a member of the Committee because Justice probably handles more interagency intelligence questions than any other department in the government, including Defense.

Besides consolidating intelligence activities under the White House, the President also is trying to avoid the horrendous duplication that has ensued from the proliferation of intelligence operations. Some of the overlap presumably will be trimmed away by Helms, though some observers believe this is, for the most part, wishful thinking on the President's part. They note that the individual service branches, the Treasury Department, the FBI, the Bureau of Narcotics, the CIA and even the White House police force are so jealous of their prerogatives that reform would take major surgery—more than either the President or Helms is willing to undertake at this time.

—WINSTON

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NOV 26 1971

Spy Budget Secrecy May End

By TAYLOR PENSONEAU

A Staff Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 26.

THE BELEAGUERED CONGRESSIONAL minority that has fought to pry loose the Government's secret figures on intelligence expenditures mounted a challenge this week, that though unsuccessful, may make the objective more attainable.

Although an attempt by Senator Symington (Dem.), Missouri, to limit intelligence outlays was rebuffed by the Senate as expected, an increasing number of members—including some of Symington's opponents—predicted that the day would come when Congress was no longer in the dark on the country's undercover activities.

Possibly most significant, the debate on Symington's proposal brought out that the seemingly broad war being organized and financed in Laos by the Central Intelligence Agency may finally persuade some previously hesitant members of Congress to assert themselves more in this ticklish field.

THE MOST SUCCINCT appraisal of Symington's effort came from one of the opponents, Senator Charles Mathias Jr. (Rep.), Maryland, who remarked moments before the vote that the Missourian had focused "our attention on water that is not only muddy, but actually murky."

"Many members may be reluctant to stir this water for fear of what they may find," Mathias said. "I think we cannot delay much longer in turning our attention in this direction for fear that what is there may evade our examination and our concern."

This feeling may be realized sooner than expected because a number of Senators, in the wake of the Symington matter, said they would push for an executive session by the Senate to consider the intelligence question. It could mean a major breakthrough for those of Symington's persuasion—especially if a censored transcript was made public later.

SYMINGTON sought to amend the Department of Defense appropriations bill for fiscal 1972 to place a 4-billion-dollar ceiling on intelligence outlays. Most estimates put this yearly expenditure currently at more than 5 billion dollars.

The proposed limit, which the Senate rejected Tuesday 53 to 31, would have applied to the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency

and undercover endeavors by the armed forces.

Many observers regard Symington's move as the most determined attempt yet to force Congress to account at least somewhat for the activities of these agencies.

Although waste and duplication in many of the intelligence operations were given as the most obvious reasons for the amendment, the greater intent was to provide Congress, and the American public, with more insight into both the domestic and foreign activities of these agencies.

USING HIMSELF as an example, Symington contended that he had been unable to determine the appropriations this year for intelligence, even though he is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee as well as an ex-officio member of the Appropriations Committee.

Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, asserted in the debate Tuesday that the Missourian should not feel incited because nobody had discovered where the intelligence funds were in the defense appropriations measure.

"When they read a line item and find that there is so much for aircraft, or for a carrier, these may or may not be the real amounts," Fulbright said.

REPLYING Senator Allen J. Ellender (Dem.), Louisiana, chairman of the Appropriations Committee and a main opponent of Symington's amendment said that there was no specific appropriations for intelligence activities. "They are funded from many different appropriations included in the bill," he said.

Much of the argument this week centered on the CIA, which came under congressional scrutiny earlier this year for its clandestine role in the fusions of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. In his support, Ellender was particularly critical of the CIA.

"One of the things that worries me most of all is that I do not see any reason why we should pass appropriations for the CIA to organize an army, pay the troops and conduct a full-scale war in Laos," Fulbright said.

"Yet people of this country think we have a democracy in which a war, if one is to be fought, has to be declared by Congress. Yet Congress did not know about the war in Laos until it was well under way."

When prodded by fellow Senators, Ellender conceded that he did not know in advance about CIA financing of any army in Laos. He said further that he had "never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA has asked for."

"It never dawned on me, to ask about it," Ellender said. "I did see it publicized in the newspapers some time ago."

Fulbright and his allies pointed to Ellender's statement as a prime example of the necessity for greater congressional awareness of undercover activities.

Ellender became a prime target of the Symington side, because of an occurrence last week that the Missourian related to the Senate Tuesday. Symington, when asking staff members of the Appropriations Committee about intelligence figures, was told that they could discuss the matter only with Ellender and four other senior members of the panel.

"THIS MEANS that these billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money are being authorized and appropriated by the Senate with the knowledge and approval of just five of its members," Symington contended. The other four are Senators John L. McClelland (Dem.), Arkansas; John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi; Milton R. Young (Rep.), North Dakota; and Margaret Chase Smith (Rep.), Maine.

Symington's mention of this matter constituted an attack on the system and, therefore, possibly his strongest job of the day. As the argument ensued, one of the few who fear Symington's proposal was Ellender. "If I did not trust, I quit," he said. "You're to be trusted," Symington answered, but why aren't the rest of us to be trusted, too?"

Ellender was not lushed in his rebuttal as he told the Senate that "this method of appropriating funds for these intelligence activities has been in effect for at least 20 years that I know of, since I have been on the committee."

Only a few persons consider these funding requests because of the sensitivity of the subject, Ellender said. In addition, he expressed an opinion of many of Symington's opponents in saying that the intelligence field was too much of a hot potato to "discuss in the open."

THIS APPROACH was adopted by Young also, who asserted that proper defense of the CIA in the debate would require documentation of activities that could not be done.

"Spying is a dirty business, but it is a business every nation in the world engages in," Young said. "Russia does a bigger job of it than we do. You can not disclose secret information."

In an action earlier this year against the use of intelligence funds, the Senate passed a bill that would provide \$35,000,000 in fiscal 1972 for financing the operations of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty through the Secretary of State.

The measure, sponsored by Senator Clifford P. Case (Rep.), New Jersey, is intended to divorce the CIA from the funding of the stations. Radio Free Europe, beamed to eastern Europe, and Radio Liberty, beamed to the Soviet Union, operate in West Germany, ostensibly on private contributions.

However, Case said in January that funds had been expended from secret CIA budgets to pay almost totally for the costs of the stations.

The House has approved a bill providing for a commission to conduct a two-year study of the stations. Continued funding of them would be channeled through the commission. A compromise between the two bills will have to be worked out in a conference between the two houses of Congress.

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Military Role in Spying Too Great, Some Fear

United Press International

Some key senators fear that the military has gained excessive influence in the U.S. intelligence network even though a civilian has been named its top director.

They are concerned about the possibility that Richard Helms, popular director of the Central Intelligence Agency, might have given up considerable influence to his military assistants when he was named over-all czar of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies.

With his added duties, they fear, Helms will have to turn over many of his CIA responsibilities to Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., a Marine.

Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the deputy secretary of Defense have been given a new voice in the intelligence comm. through membership on a committee under the direction of Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security, to oversee U.S. intelligence activity.

Sens. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., and J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., fear this reorganization means that the Pentagon is taking an increasingly larger role in intelligence activity.

Helms this week told a closed session of the Senate Armed Services Committee that this was not so, but chairman John C. Stennis is conducting an investigation to find out just what the situation is.

Stennis said Helms "assured me that his dominance over it (the CIA), his effectiveness, his power over it will not be diminished one bit."

No one in the Senate actually knows if there has been any lessening of Helms' influence within (the CIA), his effectiveness, his access to CIA secrets.

Only five members of the Senate and five from the House even are given information on the intelligence budget and detailed briefings on the operations of the various other intelligence services.

MONROE, LA.
NEWS-STAR
NOV 24 1971
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'Decision Memorandum'

The White House is not pleased at all with the record posted by the American intelligence community. The displeasure doesn't apparently extend to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because its director, Richard Helms, has been placed in charge of all intelligence agencies. Further, the President added to Henry Kissinger's authority by giving him the power to evaluate intelligence reports.

The public is advised of this turn of events through the efforts of a government worker who leaked a secret "decision memorandum" to Newsweek magazine.

In the memorandum, Nixon singled out five instances in which American agents were not up to snuff. He complained not only of faulty intelligence, but also runaway budgets and a disparity between a glut of facts and a poverty of analysis.

Specifically, he found five areas of defective snooping, to-wit:

-- Failure to predict the extent of North Vietnamese resistance in the Laotian campaign early this year.

-- Misinformation leading to the Son Tay prisoner of war camp which turned out to be empty.

-- Incorrect estimates of Viet Cong supplies flowing through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville.

-- Lateness in detecting Russian built surface to air missiles in the Midcast cease-fire zone.

-- An eighth month delay in the strategic arms limitation talks while the White House checked

varying intelligence reports on how well the United States could detect possible Soviet violations of the arms control agreement.

The magazine article suggested that some of the gripes might conceal mistakes more properly laid at the Administration's door. However, it went on to credit Nixon with efforts to remove all possible bugs from the intelligence system as it faces what is likely its most critical test of recent years: solving the mystery of the apparent Soviet missile build-up.

The Pentagon Papers showed rather conclusively that U.S. military intelligence in Vietnam did not compare very well with its civilian counterpart. Time and time again the CIA and the State Department intelligence arm proved to be correct in their appraisals of the enemy situation and optimistic forecasts by military agents and their superiors wrong.

There's no telling how many tragedies or near-tragedies could have been avoided had those charged with keeping track of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong had had more up-to-date information. My Lai was supposed to be a hotbed of Vietcong. It had been, of course, but when Charlie Company struck, there was no resistance. The VC had fled.

Within the last 24 hours, those in charge of Firebase Mary Ann where 33 GIs lost their lives in a VC sapper raid have been told they will be demoted or reprimanded for a lax defense perimeter and lack of troop preparedness. Those

to be punished include a two-star general and four other high-ranking officers.

American intelligence cannot, of course, maintain an unblemished record. The Communist enemy, wherever he is, spends a great deal of time trying to outwit free world agents. He has notched some notable successes. Credit President Nixon with trying to streamline the U.S. intelligence system so that doomsday won't arrive due to secret agents asleep at the switch.

Symington Wants Cut In Intelligence Spending

STATINTL

By a Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 23—Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, in a major attack on secrecy in government, proposed today that Congress cut intelligence expenditures from more than 5 billion dollars to a mandatory ceiling of 4 billions.

He charged, in a speech prepared for delivery, that present intelligence operations were wasteful, overlapping and inadequately supervised by Congress.

In a reference to the Indochina war, he said that he believed "at least one war" could have been avoided if it had not been for "pressures, combined with unwarranted secrecy," on the part of the intelligence agencies.

Symington's proposed ceiling would apply to the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and all other intelligence units, including those within the branches of the armed services.

He said that he had not been able to determine how much was being appropriated this year for intelligence operations, although he is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee and an exofficio member of the Appropriations Committee.

When the final draft of the military appropriations bill was before the defense appropriations subcommittee last week, he said, no mention was made of the multibillion-dollar appropriation requests that it contained for much of the 15 intelligence operating or advisory operations.

After the meeting, he said, he asked the committee staff

"in general about intelligence appropriations." He said he was told that the staff had been instructed to talk about those appropriations only with five senior members of the committee—chairman Allen J. Ellender (Dem.), Louisiana, and Senators John L. McClellan (Dem.), Arkansas; John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi; Milton R. Young (Rep.), North Dakota, and Margaret Chase Smith (Rep.), Maine.

Symington said he had the greatest respect for the five members, "but I do not believe that they, and they alone, should render final decision on both said authorizations and appropriations without the knowledge, let alone the approval, of any other Senators, including those on the Armed Services Committee who are not on this five-member subcommittee of appropriations, and all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee."

Symington quoted press estimates that put intelligence expenditures at 5 to 6 billion dollars a year. He said that despite his committee assignments he had been unable to say whether these estimates were accurate. Another Senate source termed them fairly accurate.

The Senator renewed his criticism of a reorganization of the intelligence machinery announced earlier this month by President Richard M. Nixon.

He said it could mean turning intelligence operations over to the military, thus leading to billions of dollars in additional and often unnecessary defense expenditures, because military estimates of enemy plans, programs and production tend to be higher than civilian estimates.

He objected also that the reorganization put policy control of intelligence in a new committee in the White House,

headed by Henry A. Kissinger, presidential assistant for national security affairs.

"This gives executive privilege to the final policymakers and therefore, except for the power of the purse, enables the policymakers to, in effect, take the entire question of intelligence out of the hands of Congress," he said.

Symington had charged earlier this year that Kissinger, rather than Secretary of State William P. Rogers, had become the President chief adviser on foreign policy and, unlike Rogers was not available for questioning by Senate committees.

He complained recently that the change in intelligence arrangements had not been discussed with anyone in the Senate. He said today that Kissinger had called him and said that Symington was correct and that the change should have been discussed with the proper committees of Congress.

Symington said it was nonsense for anyone to think that a high degree of secrecy was necessary for intelligence operations.

He pointed out that congressional and public discussions constantly referred to the costs of such new weapons as the nuclear aircraft carrier, the C-5A transport plane or the main battle tank. These discussions do not go into how these weapons would be used in a war, he said.

"By the same token, knowledge of the over-all cost of intelligence does not in any way entail the release of knowledge about how the various intelligence groups function or plan to function," he said.

"Why should there be greater danger to the national security in making public over-all intelligence costs than in making public other over-all security costs?"

Capitol Punishment

Administration Job Hunts

By Art Buchwald

The news that the FBI has been investigating CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr caused some trepidation among Washington journalists early last week.

But then the White House explained it all. Mr. Schorr was being investigated, a spokesman said, because he was being considered for a high government job, and the White House wanted to run a check on him before they offered him the position.

Well, all of us relaxed when we heard the explanation, not only because it made sense, but also because it showed that the administration harbored no ill feelings. Mr. Schorr has been a consistent critic of administration policies and if he was being considered for a high government job, that meant any of us could be tapped for public service.

A group of correspondents were sitting in the White House press room the other day, chuckling over the latest White House press release, when Clyde Mothballer of the "Kinzu Telegram Ledger" was called to the phone.

He came back whitefaced and said: "That was my mother. The FBI was just at her house and wanted to know what library books I borrowed when I was a kid."

"Congratulations, Mothballer," the AP man said, "that means you're up for an important government job."

"I don't know," Clyde said. "The administration got awfully mad at me about my articles on the Supreme Court appointments. As a matter of fact someone from the White House called my editor and suggested I be sent to Moscow where I understood the government better."

"Don't be silly, Mothballer," the Boston Globe man said, "the administration doesn't hold grudges. I wouldn't be surprised if they made you Secretary of the Treasury."

"You would think they would ask me if I wanted a job first," Mothballer said.

"They wanted to surprise you," The Washington Post correspondent assured him. "To think, one of our boys will be in the Cabinet!"

"The FBI man didn't say anything to my mother about a Cabinet appointment. But he did want to know if I ever played with Daniel Ellsberg as a kid," Mothballer said.

"It's just a smokescreen, Clyde," the Los Angeles Times man said. "They always ask that when they're considering somebody for Secretary of Defense."

"My mother said they also went around to the neighbors and asked them if I had ever had any strong feelings about Cuba."

"That means you're being put up for head of the CIA," a UPI photographer said. "With Dick Helms being moved upstairs, they're probably looking for a new chief of operations."

"It's possible," Mothballer said, "but my mother said she caught two of the FBI men going through her trash basket last night."

"That means you're up for an environment job," the NBC man shouted.

"I wish I could be as optimistic as you guys," Mothballer said. "Suppose the FBI was asking questions to intimidate me?"

The Chicago Sun-Times man was shocked. "Bite your tongue, Mothballer," he cried. "The Nixon administration would never stoop to a trick like that, even if they disagreed with every word you wrote."

"He's correct, Clyde," the Newsweek correspondent said. "Attorney General Mitchell would resign before he'd allow the White House to intimidate a newspaperman."

"J. Edgar Hoover wouldn't stand for it," the New York Post man put in.

"I guess you're right," Mothballer nodded. "I'd better call my mother back and reassure her. She just doesn't understand how Nixon's people operate."

Myriaden von Daten

200 000 Menschen arbeiten in den Geheim- und Spionagediensten der USA, aber sie arbeiten oft nicht zur Zufriedenheit des Präsidenten. Deshalb wurden die Dienste jetzt Nixons Chefberater Kissinger unterstellt.

Jeden Morgen, kurz nach Anbruch der Dämmerung, bringt eine schwarze Limousine brisante Fracht ins Weiße Haus. Es ist eine Mappe mit den geheimsten Geheimberichten der letzten 24 Stunden. Titel: „The President's Daily Brief“ — Tägliches Kompendium für den Präsidenten.

Zunächst studiert Nixons außen- und sicherheitspolitischer Chefberater Henry Kissinger das Papier. Von ihm läßt sich der amerikanische Präsident dann die Top-Nachrichten referieren. Er selbst liest das von der Zentralen Geheimdienstbehörde (CIA) zubereitete Dokument allenfalls abends — und eher lustlos.

Denn Polit-Routinier Nixon, so erkannte „Newsweek“, „ist an Geheimnissen um ihrer selbst willen nicht interessiert“. Er wünscht weniger Daten, dafür aber gründliche Analysen, die ihm als Grundlage für politische Entscheidungen dienen können.

Bisher lieferten die Geheimdienste — neben der CIA vor allem die „Intelligence“-Stäbe bei Heer, Marine, Luftwaffe — zu wenige Analysen nach Nixons Geschmack. Die Folge: Unzufriedenheit im Weißen Haus.

Falsche Informationen durch Amerikas Militärspäher und die kletternden Kosten des aufgeblähten Spionage-Apparates verstärkten den Unmut der Regierung noch, von der harschen Kritik liberaler Volksvertreter an den Geheimnissen zu schweigen.

Law-and-Order-Präsident Nixon reorganisierte daher jetzt die Nachrichtendienste. Zwar bleiben alle bestehenden, weitverzweigten Behörden am Leben. Doch praktisch sollen nunmehr alle Geheimdienstfäden bei zwei Männern zusammenlaufen:

- ▷ CIA-Direktor Richard Helms überwacht und koordiniert sämtliche Programme. Obendrein leitet er einen neugeschaffenen Spar-Ausschuß, der die Budgets trimmen soll.
- ▷ Präsidentenberater Henry Kissinger dirigiert das neue „Intelligence Committee“ im Rahmen des Nationalen Sicherheitsrates. Dieses Komitee erteilt Spionage-Aufträge und siebt die Resultate für Richard Nixons Gebrauch.

Sogar dem CIA-Chef Helms soll Ex-Harvard-Prof.



Geheimdienst-Chef Helms
Interview mit Hitler und Richtung“ geben. Washingtoner Beamte werten die neue Informations-Schleuse unter Führung Kissingers als wichtiges „Bindeglied zwischen Produzenten und Konsumenten“.

Kissingers Machtzuwachs hat im Kongreß sogleich Widerspruch hervorgerufen. Senator William Fulbright sieht die erweiterten Befugnisse als neuen Beweis dafür, daß die Regierung dem Kongreß die Kontrolle über die Nachrichtendienste entziehen wolle.

Daß bei den Geheimdiensten gespart werden soll, ist freilich auch den Parlamentariern nur recht. Insgesamt verschlingen die Nachrichten- und Spionagebehörden mit ihren 200 000 Beschäftigten etwa sechs Milliarden Dollar pro Jahr. Allein fünf Milliarden gehen auf

das Konto der drei militärischen Geheimdienste, wobei der größte Anteil auf die Luftwaffe entfällt: Ihr gehören jene teuren Flugzeuge und Satelliten wie der zehn Tonnen schwere „Big Bird“, die militärischen Anlagen in China oder der Sowjet-Union ausspionieren.


Profi Helms, 58, dürfte darum wohl vor allem versuchen, bei den militärischen Geheimdiensten Kosten zu kap-pen. Er gilt als tüchtiger Verwalter, als ein Bürokrat von kühler Kompetenz.

Der CIA-Boß (Hobby: Umweltschutz) ist ein Nachfahre deutscher US-Einwanderer. Er verbrachte einige Schuljahre in Freiburg sowie in der Schweiz — seit damals spricht er Französisch und Deutsch.

Jagd auf Nachrichten machte der spätere „Intelligence“-Fachmann erstmals als UP-Korrespondent — 1937 interviewte er Hitler. Bei Kriegsende arbeitete Helms in der US-Abwehr. Und seit 1947, dem Gründungsjahr der CIA, diente er sich im Geheimdienst hoch.

Berühmt, aber mehr noch berüchtigt wurde die CIA durch Beteiligung an Polit-Greueln und Coups in vielen Ländern der Dritten Welt. CIA-Agenten leiteten die Mörder Che Guevaras an; CIA-Männer trugen 1970 zum Sturz des kambodscha-Premiers Sihanouk bei. Falsche CIA-Informationen führten 1961 zum Fiasko der Invasion in der kubanischen Schweinebucht. Und die CIA ist es, die in Laos eine 30 000 Mann starke Armee von Stammeskriegern unterhält — zum Kampf gegen die Kommunisten. Insider des Geheimdienstes betonen freilich, die CIA ziehe sich aus dem Coup-Geschäft zurück.

So viel ist richtig: Die CIA hat sich von einem kleinen Trupp patriotischer



Draufgänger zu einer 15 000 Mitarbeiter zählenden Behörde entwickelt, in der akademische Spezialisten den Ton angeben.

Beim zivilen wie beim militärischen Geheimdienst zeigt sich der wachsende Einfluß der Technologie. Mit Hilfe elektronischer Spionage sammeln die Nachrichtendienstler Myriaden von Daten. Die Analyse kommt zu kurz.

Ob Helms, der neue Supernann unter den amerikanischen Geheimdienstchefs, den Sammelwahn der Datenfans bremsen kann, steht dahin. Und ebenso fraglich bleibt, ob die rivalisierenden Geheimdienstler -- vom Code-Büro bis zur Abwehr-Abteilung der Bundeskripo FBI -- künftig besser zusammen arbeiten werden. Das FBI zum Beispiel, despotisch regiert von dem Denkmal J. Edgar Hoover, 76, wurde bei der Reorganisation der Sicherheitsdienste kaum angetastet: Nixon will mit Rücksicht auf die Wahlen 1972 die konservativen Freunde des bärbeißigen Direktors nicht vergraulen.

Das FBI aber hütet seine Informationen, so die „New York Times“, „mit der Eifersucht eines mißtrauischen Liebhabers“.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES REPORTED

/Article; Hamburg, Der Spiegel, German; 22 Nov 71, p 121-122_7

U.S. Intelligence Services

Myriads of Data

A total of 200,000 persons are employed by the U.S. intelligence and espionage services, but often they do not work to the President's satisfaction. Therefore the services have now been placed under Nixon's chief adviser Kissinger.

Every morning, shortly after the break of dawn, a black limousine brings highly explosive material to the White House. It is a briefcase with the most secret reports of the past 24 hours. Title: "The President's Daily Brief."

First Henry Kissinger, the President's chief adviser on foreign policy and security matters, studies the paper. Then the President lets the adviser brief him on the most important news. If need be he himself reads the document, prepared by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), in the evening, -- and rather unenthusiastically.

The practiced politician Nixon, according to Newsweek, "is not interested in secrets for their own sake." He wants fewer data but more thorough analysis, which can serve as

basis for his political decisions.

Up to now the intelligence services -- besides CIA above all the intelligence staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force -- have produced too few analyses which were to Nixon's taste. The consequence: Dissatisfaction in the White House.

False information through America's military reconnaissance and the climbing cost of the overblown espionage apparatus have added to the government's displeasure, not to mention the harsh criticism by liberal congressmen.

Therefore law-and-order-President Nixon now has reorganized the intelligence services. It is true that all existing agencies will be continued. But for practical purposes two men will now pull all the strings of the intelligence services:

CIA director Richard Helms supervises and coordinates all programs. Besides, he heads a newly organized Economizing Committee /Resources Advisory Committee_7, which is to trim the budgets.

Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger directs the new "Intelligence Committee" within the framework of the National Security Council. This committee assigns espionage missions and screens the results for Richard Nixon's use.

Ex-Harvard professor Kissinger is supposed to give direction and guidance even to CIA boss Helms in the future, in keeping with the wishes of the top leadership. Washington officials

classify the new information channel under Kissinger's leadership as an important "link between producers and consumers."

At the same time Kissinger's increased power has aroused opposition in Congress. Senator William Fulbright regards the increased authority as new evidence that the government wants to remove the control of the intelligence services from Congress.

That the intelligence services are to economize is of course agreeable also to the parliamentarians. The intelligence and espionage agencies with their 200,000 employees devour a total of about 6 billion dollars per year. Five billion dollars go to the three military intelligence services alone, with the Air Force receiving the largest share. It possesses the expensive aircraft and satellites such as the 10-ton "Big Bird", which is spying on military installations in China or the Soviet Union.

Helms, the professional, 58 years old, will therefore probably above all attempt to cut the cost within the military intelligence services. He is regarded as a capable administrator, as a bureaucrat with cool competence.

The CIA boss (hobby: ecology) is a descendant of German immigrants. He studied a few years in Freiburg and in Switzerland, since then he speaks German and French.

The later intelligence specialist was first hunting for information as a UP correspondent, -- in 1937 he interviewed

Hitler. By the end of the war he was working with U.S. counter-intelligence. And since 1947, when the CIA was founded, he has been advancing in the intelligence service.

CIA became famous or rather ~~more~~ notorious through its participation in political atrocities and coups in third world countries. CIA agents instructed Che Guevara's murderers. CIA contributed to the fall of the Cambodian premier Sihanouk in 1970. Incorrect CIA information led to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. And the CIA maintains an army of 30,000 tribesmen in Laos in the fight against the communists. Intelligence Service insiders of course declare emphatically that the CIA is getting out of the coup business.

This much is true: CIA has changed from a small body of patriotic dare-devils to a real bureaucracy with 15,000 employees, where academic specialists dominate.

The increasing influence of technology is noticeable both in the civilian and military intelligence services. With the aid of electronic espionage the intelligence officers gather myriads of data. Analysis is neglected.

Whether Helms, the new superman among the American intelligence service chiefs, can curb the collection mania of the data fans remains to be seen. And it remains just as questionable whether the competing intelligence officers -- from the code bureau to the FBI counter-intelligence department -- will

cooperate better in the future. The FBI, for example, which is despotically ruled by the national monument, J. Edgar Hoover, was hardly touched in the reorganization of the security services: With an eye to the elections in 1972 Nixon does not want to antagonize the conservative friends of the bearish director.

But the FBI guards its information, according to the New York Times, "with the jealousy of a suspicious lover."

/Article also includes an organizational chart entitled "Organizational Chart of the U.S. Intelligence Services," which was extracted from Newsweek, 22 Nov 71, p 122._7

MACON, GA.

NEWS

E - 22,382

TELEGRAPH & NEWS

S - 69,214

NOV 22 1971

It's Still Opaque

President Nixon's reshuffling of the nation's intelligence network is sort of like pouring a bucket of ink on a Picasso painting: it's hardly calculated to make the picture any clearer.

Intelligence operations are cloaked in such secrecy that few people know what's going on anyway. So to the average American, Mr. Nixon's announcement that Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, would be given an "enhanced lead-

ership role" was meaningless. As was the statement that presidential adviser Henry Kissinger would head a special National Security Council committee working with Helms.

Some congressmen, however, would like to know a little more about what's going on. And we think they're entitled to. After all, the intelligence service couldn't operate if Congress didn't put up the money. The lawmakers should get at least some small return on their investment.

STATINTL

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November 22 1971 / 50 3616

News

STATINTL

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PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN

E - 634,371

S - 701,743

NOV 22 1977

Toning up U.S. intelligence

At a time when President Nixon is making crucial decisions on maintaining a strategic balance with the Soviet Union and opening doors to China, the need for accurate, objective intelligence has never been greater.

The reorganization the President has announced of the U.S. intelligence community should help him get the bare bones, unembellished information he requires.

The President has placed Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in overall command of the intelligence establishment, including the security arms of the Defense, State and Treasury departments, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. Helms is noted for sticking to his professional business of digging up solid, sound information on which policy decisions can be based, but shunning any role as a policy-maker himself.

With Mr. Helms as chairman of a revived, consolidated U.S. Intelligence Board, there will be less risk of getting tainted data, information that has been filtered through a source agency's as-

essment of its own interests or specialized mission.

The job of making overall assessments of the U.S. strategic position, and evaluating the information Mr. Helms supplies, has been given to a new intelligence committee of the National Security Council headed by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's special assistant for foreign affairs.

This will move intelligence appraisals closer to the White House than in previous Administrations, which relied heavily on the Pentagon as an intelligence screen, sometimes with unfortunate results.

Under President Nixon, the White House is seeking a more direct means of sizing up the U.S. position against adversary nations. Care will have to be exercised that the Kissinger unit doesn't wittingly or unwittingly seek data primarily to bolster predetermined policies, and that it doesn't close off sources of valuable information.

If such care is taken, the new machinery should produce information of improved quality for the President and the country.

STATINTL



SPRINGFIELD, MASS.
NEWS NOV 22 1974
E - 95,055
REPUBLICAN
S - 113,754

How to Reform U.S. Spy System

President Nixon's plan to overhaul the government's intelligence system sounds impressive on paper.

But reform and coordination of intelligence gathering systems will have few practical benefits for the American public if the old system of super secrecy is perpetuated under new names.

The main complaint about the Central Intelligence Agency is that it has become almost a law unto itself. Congress, certainly, has been poorly informed about what the CIA is doing. And it sometimes appears that even the White House is kept in the dark.

To be meaningful, intelligence reform should be based on greater public disclosure. This should be a primary objective of the President's restructuring of our global spy system.

Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-016

WHY THE SHAKE-UP IN INTELLIGENCE

STATINTL

STATINTL

An urgent need for faster and more accurate information underlies latest moves by the President. Upshot: more say for civilians, less for military.

Once again, the vast U. S. intelligence establishment is being reshaped by the White House. As a result:

- Presidential reins on the 5-billion-dollar-a-year "intelligence community" are to be tightened even more. Primary goal is to avoid repetition of recent disappointments in the quality of American intelligence.

- Fresh effort will be made to reduce costly duplication, overlapping and competition among the military intelligence agencies. The Pentagon appears to be a loser in the latest reshuffle.

- The civilian head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, is being given broader authority over the entire U. S. intelligence network—civilian and military.

Key man in the reorganization is Mr. Helms, a veteran of nearly 30 years in his field, who took over in June, 1966, the dual job of heading the CIA plus his role as the President's principal adviser on all intelligence.

Now, under a presidential order of November 5, Mr. Helms has the biggest say on how to allocate men, money and machines in the gathering of foreign intelligence for the U. S.

At the same time, the President assigned Henry Kissinger, the top White House adviser and Director of the National Security Council staff, new powers which give Mr. Kissinger a larger voice in determining the direction U. S. intelligence will take and in assessing the final results.

Behind it all. According to Government insiders, a major reason for the President's action was growing "consumer" dissatisfaction with the intelligence product, particularly with interpretation of the secret data collected.

Too often, these sources say, the President has been inundated with information he does not need, or fails to receive in sufficient quality or quantity the data he considers vital for decisions.

The most recent example, one White House aide disclosed, was unhappiness over the length of time it took to get reliable intelligence on current developments in Red China. The Communist Government had been undergoing a lead-

ership crisis just at the time of delicate Washington-Peking negotiations on the President's forthcoming trip to the Chinese mainland, but weeks went by before the U. S. was able to sift through a welter of conflicting reports.

Officials say that another big reason behind revamping of the intelligence command was the daring—but unsuccessful—attempt by the Army and Air Force on Nov. 21, 1970, to rescue U. S. prisoners of war from the North Vietnamese prison camp at Sontay, 23 miles west of Hanoi. American commandos landed at the camp by helicopter in a well-planned and executed raid. But intelligence had lagged, and the camp was empty. The prisoners had been moved.


One official in a position to know explains that after the White House made the initial decision to rescue the POW's, the CIA supplied a model of the camp and details of Sontay's daily operations as they were known at that time. The actual rescue assignment was given to the Army and Air Force, which had to select, train and rehearse the commando team. By the time the operation was launched, intelligence was out of date.

According to this official: "If Helms had been responsible for the operation—as he would be now under the reorganization—he could have kept current, probably would have learned that the prisoners were moved, and probably would have scrubbed the operation."

Government sources say the President also was irritated by failure of his intelligence agencies to forecast accurately North Vietnamese reaction to the South Vietnamese invasion of Southern Laos last February and March.

Congress has had harsh words for the military. The House Appropriations Committee on November 11 declared that "the upward trend in total intelligence expenditures must be arrested" and recommended a 181-million-dollar cut in the Defense Department's military-intelligence appropriations.

The Committee took aim at duplication of effort. "The same information is sought and obtained by various means and by various organizations," it said.



The President hopes to overcome these shortcomings by giving Mr. Helms what Mr. Nixon termed "an enhanced leadership role" in planning, co-ordinating and evaluating all intelligence operations.

The Central Intelligence Director has had for years, on paper, the responsibility of co-ordinating military and civilian intelligence. But this has not always worked in practice. The reason, according to one U. S. official: bureaucratic rivalry among competing intelligence agencies.

Mr. Helms also becomes chairman of a newly formed committee which will advise on formulation of a consolidated foreign-intelligence budget for the entire Government. This committee will decide which intelligence service has the people and assets to do a particular job efficiently and cheaply.

Reshaping the network. The President took these actions to strengthen the American intelligence system:

- Reorganized the U. S. Intelligence Board, which sets intelligence requirements and priorities. The Board, headed by Mr. Helms, includes representatives of the CIA, FBI, Treasury, Atomic Energy Commission and Defense and State Department intelligence agencies.

- Established a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, with Mr. Kissinger as chairman. It will include, besides Mr. Helms, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of

LOS ANGELES, CAL.

HERALD-Examiner Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00130

E - 540,793

S - 529,466

NOV 21 1971

LAWMAKERS PRESSURE NIXON TO OVERHAUL SPY AGENCY

By PATRICK J. SLOYAN

Special to The Herald-Examiner

WASHINGTON—A driving force behind President Nixon's reshuffling of the nation's intelligence apparatus is a handful of key congressmen who think the spy system has

grown fat and wasteful with taxpayer dollars.

White House officials did not mention the intensive pressure from members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in announcing changes Nov. 6.

One of the most important steps Nixon took was to give Director Richard Helms, of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) authority to trim budgets of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the intelligence branches of the FBI,

State Department, Treasury and Atomic Energy Commission.

While Helms remains the (CIA) authority to trim budgets, operations will be turned over to his deputy, Martin

Li Gen. Robert E. Cushman.

"I'm responsible for the move, I engineered it," said Chairman Allen Ellender, D-La., of the Senate Appropriations Committee. "It's about time, too. We've been spending too much on the military

intelligence that we didn't need."

Although he disagrees with Ellender's viewpoint, the ranking GOP member of the committee gives credit to Ellender for Nixon's move. "He's been riding the CIA

and the administration real hard about cutting the intelligence budgets," said Sen. Milton Young, R-N.D.

Although there is some debate in Congress over the real meaning of Nixon's move, most agree that under Helms, the Pentagon's intelligence operations will suffer most.

Revelations that the Army

intelligence system had strayed into amassing files on civil rights and anti-war activists; even some congressmen have increased congressional pressure for a crack-down on Pentagon operatives. And, it was faulty DIA information that turned the Sontag American prisoners rescue mission in 1970 into a fiasco.

STATINTL

STATINTL

NOV 21 1971

Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440

E -- 48,419

S -- 85,704

Gen. Eaker: Military Affairs

Dangers Seen in the U.S. Intelligence Reorganization

By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER, USAF (Ret.)

A release from the White House Nov. 5 announced a drastic reorganization of the whole U.S. intelligence community.

The reasons given for the big shake-up were "to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. foreign intelligence community."

The reorganization provides four new boards or committees including a director of central intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency director, Richard Helms, takes on this job in addition to his

Gen. Eaker

duties as CIA director.

There is a National Security Council intelligence committee with Henry Kissinger, the President's principal national security adviser, as chairman. There is a net assessment group within the National Security Council (Kissinger shop) and an intelligence resources advisory board which Helms also heads.

The U.S. intelligence board is "re-constituted," according to the White House release, and Helms' deputy at CIA is chairman.

It is generally believed that the White House was unhappy with the sometimes conflicting estimates of enemy military strength supplied by the U.S. intelligence community. There were also charges that the military deliberately overestimated enemy strength to get increased defense appropriations, and that intelligence was costing too much, about \$5 to \$6 billion annually. The intelligence apparatus needed therefore to be streamlined, reduced in size and cost and military influence curtailed, according to this view.

There is no doubt but that the reorganization does greatly reduce military influence in the intelligence apparatus. Of the 30-odd members of the four new layers, boards or committees at the highest levels on the intelligence totem pole, only three are military men.

The two men who now are clearly dom-

inant in the intelligence community are and make intelligence less responsive to the decision makers.

Richard Helms and Henry Kissinger. The former wears three hats in the new setup and the latter two hats plus the all-important responsibility of personally determining what the President sees.

No defense leader, civilian or military, active or retired, so far as I know, questions the ability or loyalty of either Helms or Kissinger, but sound organization should not be based on personalities since they are always transient and sometimes fallible.

Strangely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who by law are designated as the principal military advisers to the President, are eliminated, for all practical purposes, from intelligence evaluation.

The whole purpose of foreign intelligence is to observe adequately and assess accurately the military strength of other nations and thus evaluate the hazards to our own security. The U.S. Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the intelligence agencies of the armed services are best qualified by education and experience for sound advice in these areas.

The intelligence apparatus has not been streamlined and reduced in size and cost. Instead, all the new layers, boards and committees now will have to be manned. A minimum of 500 top-level intelligence people eventually will be found in or serving these new echelons, considerably increasing the overall cost of intelligence. These new agencies, if used, also will create delays

Rather than streamlining the apparatus, the new organization further fragments the intelligence community by adding the four additional advisory or administrative echelons.

The new system also increases the possibility that intelligence estimates and foreign assessments can be doctored to support decisions previously made rather than the other way around.

It would be safer and sounder for presidents to get, as they did in earlier times, the daily intelligence summaries from the defense department, the state department and the CIA uncensored by any intermediary. The President's principal national security adviser might well digest these estimates and assessments but he never should delay their presentation nor alter their meaning.

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ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376

S - 541,868

NOV 21 1971

Chart Plant Move Unlikely In New Plan

By JEROME P. CURRY
Of the Post-Dispatch Staff
Creation of the Defense Map Agency, consolidating Army, Navy and Air Force map units, does not mean that the Air Force's Aeronautical Chart and Information Center will be moved from St. Louis, Pentagon sources said yesterday.

President Richard M. Nixon announced establishment of a combined map agency on Nov. 5. That was the same statement in which Mr. Nixon announced that Richard H. Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, would reorganize America's spy networks.

The President did not offer details of the new map agency. Presently, the Navy Oceanographic Office and the Army Topographic Command are located in Washington.

Pentagon sources told the Post-Dispatch that some of the functions of the Air Force Center here may be moved. The development of the new agency, the sources said, apparently is being interpreted to mean that a physical consolidation might not occur.

A Defense Department spokesman in Washington said "Secretary (of Defense Melvin) Laird has directed that a study be made and that recommenda-

tions be made to him for implementation of the President's directive creating a consolidated map agency."

The spokesman said that the method of consolidation and the location of the new agency would be part of the study. It is expected to be finished in one month and sent to Laird. A decision should be made by the first half of next year.

The map agency was one of three changes in Mr. Nixon's announced reorganization of intelligence units. The others were reconstitution of the U.S. Intelligence Board and formation of a National Cryptological Command under the National Security Agency. The President said the defense map agency would combine all military mapping, charting and geodetic groups.

The chart plant here, the oceanographic office and the topographic command are the major military chart organizations. Sources said that officers in the commands were not informed about the new agency before the announcement was made.

The statement had resulted in apprehension among some employees of the St. Louis Chart CENTER. They feared the possibility of transfer of a part or

all of the operation to Washington.

The Air Force TIMES HAS reported that staff work is moving ahead on establishment of the new agency.

"If reorganization is happening they haven't given us any idea about what is going on," said one high ranking officer at the Chart Center here. "There are lots of rumors but nothing substantial."

The facility has about 3500 employees in St. Louis. The annual budget is about \$6,000,000 — most of which is payroll. The center provides all navigational charts and maps for the Air Force AND PREPARES LUNAR charts and flight plans for the Apollo moon travelers. It fears that there would be cuts in personnel and other economic moves, although the Defense Department says that no decision has been made.

5
ALBANY, GA.

HERALD

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E - 30,407

S - 31,092

NOV 20 1971

Reorganizing U.S. Intelligence

President Nixon has reorganized the Federal Government's intelligence operations which, in essence, gives Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms a broader mandate to coordinate all of the various activities in this field. In the meantime Mr. Nixon also created a National Security Council Intelligence Committee to be chaired by his national security affairs adviser, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

These steps have drawn immediate objections from Senators J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Stuart Symington on the grounds that Congress was not consulted in advance about them, and that what Mr. Nixon evidently is trying to accomplish is a removal of Congressional overseeing of any intelligence activities by vesting the area almost wholly with Executive immunity. But the fact of the matter is that the President has dealt solely with the Executive Branch in taking this action, as he is unquestionably authorized to do. What irks the Senators is that they cannot, under the new setup, bring Doctor Kissinger before their committee to be interrogated in this area of Government.

What may have prompted Mr. Nixon's action was recent history. That details how President Kennedy got some bad intelligence from the military on the Bay of Pigs, and Lyndon Johnson some even worse intelligence from his White House people and some of the military on Vietnam. The story is that the CIA was not responsible for these bum steers. Consequently, President Nixon now wants the bulk of his intelligence to come through the hands of a polished professional, CIA Director Helms — who was most impressive in an unprecedented appearance before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington last April, and

a trusted adviser, Doctor Kissinger. Certainly that is his privilege, however the Senators may fret.

As Director Helms told the editors: "We (the CIA) not only have no stake in policy debate, but we can not and must not take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts — the agreed facts — and the whole known range of facts — relevant to the problem under consideration. Our role extends to the estimative function — the projection of likely developments from the facts — but not to advocacy, or recommendations for one course of action or another.

"As the President's principal intelligence officer, I am an adviser to the National Security Council, not a member, and when there is debate over alternative policy options, I do not and must not line up with either side.

"If I should take sides and recommend one solution, the other side is going to suspect — if not believe — that the intelligence presentation has been stacked to support my position, and the credibility of the CIA goes out the window."

To the journalistic profession, whose watchword is objectivity, which equates with a presentation of balanced facts as free from personal emotionalism, bias or bent as it is humanly possible to record, these words of Richard Helms are heartening. He is, in a strong sense, one of us. Indeed, as he himself put it, "objectivity puts me on familiar ground as an old wire service hand, but it is even more important to an intelligence organization serving the policymaker."

It is reassuring to realize that a man of this singular dedication and rational approach has been empowered by the President to serve the nation's foremost intelligence officer. He has our best wishes in an

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Spy Versus Spy

As recently as April 14 Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, assured the world that "the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States Government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before." That's all right, the administration has now said, but it costs too much and the overlapping and competition among agencies is wasteful and inefficient. The revelations of former CIA official Victor Marchetti (at one time an aide to the deputy director of CIA) that the combined intelligence budget is \$6 billion puts it a billion or so higher than previous estimates. Over 200,000 employees are involved. Hence the President's new reorganization order. Mr. Helms is to have "enhanced leadership" to bring all the fiefdoms under control.

The White House announcement produced two principal reorganizational tools: (a) a new joint intelligence budget and (b) a new evaluation group, which theoretically will affect the missions in Defense, State, the National Security Agency, and the CIA, to name the most prominent. All intelligence agencies will submit their budgets to Helms instead of to the Bureau of the Budget, and he is to sort out the wheat from the chaff. This is not really a new grant of authority. The National Security Act of 1947 gave two jobs to the CIA director - command of the agency itself, and coordinating responsibility as director of Central Intelligence, chairing the United States Intelligence Board. He also sits on the National Security Council. The idea of central supervision has been there from the start. But the idea has foundered on the realities of power; that is to say, the Pentagon. That outfit is run by the Secretary of a department, while the CIA director is still just the head of an agency. For large overseas operations, as in Vietnam and Laos, CIA is completely beholden to the Pentagon.

Bureaucratically, Helms is also in an unfavorable position, although this may not have been the President's intention. Helms will make his combined budget recommendations not directly to the National Security Council, but to a new National Security Intelligence Committee, headed by Henry Kissinger. The reorganization scheme struck Senators Symington and Fulbright as an attempt to wrest from Congress its oversight responsibilities in intelligence matters. Kissinger is inaccessible in the White House, protected from congressional questioning by executive privilege.

Kissinger gains more power through the other presidential innovation, the Net Assessment Group headed by Anthony Marshall in Kissinger's office. This group's task is to define the situation for the United States vis-à-vis the great powers, or any other problem it wants to designate as a crisis. Vigorously pur-

sued, this concept obviously will change the mission and emphasis of the various intelligence agencies. Some will wax, other wane. But they'll still compete. Rep. Nedzi, head of the subcommittee on intelligence oversight for the House Armed Services Committee, has been looking up and down the well-shaded streets of the Intelligence Community and finds that, "There is indeed real competition among the various agencies." He is not certain Helms' budget authority will do anything more than feed interagency suspicions. There will be the argument that intelligence requires compartmentalization at the cost of efficiency, that budget control will mean a monolithic intelligence voice instead of healthy if costly rivalry. Nedzi is concerned but philosophical, gearing up for his duties by going back to the basics set forth in Compton McKenzie's spoof on British intelligence, *Water on the Brain*. In that classic the fictitious Sir William Westmacott, head of the Security of the Realm, is addressing a new recruit. "After all, the whole point of the secret service is that it should be secret."

STATINTL

WASHINGTON, D.C.
NATIONAL OBSERVER

WEEKLY - 524,212

NOV 20 1971

Stirring Up the Intelligence Alphabet Soup

The U.S. Government's various foreign-intelligence agencies employ some 200,000 persons, spend about \$5 billion a year, and make up a murky caldron of Federally brewed alphabet soup.

There's the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the State Department's Intelligence & Research (I & R), the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA).

All the agencies have needed to be corralled under co-ordinated administrative control, some observers have said, and last week President Nixon announced such a plan. The President's key lieutenants in the intelligence organization will be Henry Kissinger, Presidential adviser for national-security affairs, and George P. Shultz, director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Sontay Blooper

Particular targets of the reorganization plan appear to be the military intelligence agencies. During the years since World War II they have expanded beyond their demonstrated usefulness, say some Administration critics. Bloopers such as the Sontay prison raid in Vietnam, in which Americans "liberated" an empty prisoner-of-war camp, may have added to the urgency of reorganization.

CIA Director Richard Helms will assume the top leadership job of "planning, reviewing, co-ordinating, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence," the President's announcement said. Helms will relinquish the main operating responsibilities for the CIA to his deputy director, Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

Helms will become chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board, a group that is to meet weekly to co-ordinate operations and planning. Other agencies to be represented on the board are the State Department, the National Security Agency, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Also to be included is the Treasury Department, a move designed to upgrade foreign economic-intelligence reporting.

In addition, Helms will head a new co-ordinating unit called the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, which will include representatives from State, Defense, the CIA, and the Office of Management and Budget. This committee will draft budgets and apportion funds.

Grumbling in Congress

Kissinger, will head another new intelligence committee under the National Security Council. It is to assess over-all intelligence needs and evaluate intelligence output on a daily basis. Its members are to include Helms, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Undersecretary of State John N. Irwin II, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Other consolidations slated in the reorganization: strategic-balance assessments to go under the National Security Council and a new unit called the Net Assessment Group (NAG); and cryptology, map making, and personnel security checks to be administered by Defense. The proposed organization changes are to take effect in a month unless Congress opposes them.

By week's end there was some Congressional grumbling. Democrat Stuart Symington of Missouri, the only senator to sit on both the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations committees, called for hearings to examine the President's proposals. He said access to U.S. intelligence activities is "already severely restricted," and that placing more power in the hands of Henry Kissinger would make it harder for Congress to supervise the intelligence community. Kissinger, as the President's national security affairs adviser, enjoys the protection of executive privilege and so may ignore congressional questioning.

EAST BERLIN

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19 Nov 1971

Präsident Nixon erweitert Macht des CIA-Geheimdienstes

New York. ADN/BZ

USA-Präsident Nixon hat seinem Sonderbeauftragten Henry Kissinger die Reorganisation des Geheimdienstes CIA übertragen. Die CIA ist für zahlreiche politische Intrigen und Putsche insbesondere in jungen Nationalstaaten verantwortlich. Sie erhielt absoluten Vorrang vor allen anderen USA-Geheimdiensten. Es wird erwartet, daß das bereits sieben Milliarden Dollar betragende Spionagebudget weiter erhöht wird. Außerdem soll dem Kongreß jede Kontrollmöglichkeit über den Geheimdienst entzogen werden.

LANCASTER, PA.

NEW ERA

E - 56,523

NEWS

S - 110,874

NOV 19 1971

Improving Intelligence Services

It is constantly necessary for the United States to keep informed of what is going on in the world, and the intelligence services are assigned the function of finding and bringing in the data which is so vitally important.

To improve the calibre of the work being done, and to reassess the costs, President Richard M. Nixon has stepped up the authority of Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to do a thorough job of reorganizing.

Helms is excellently suited to do this. He is highly regarded on all sides in Washington. He can handle the mission assigned him.

The average citizen sometimes finds it hard to see why intelligence services are needed. He does not cotton to the idea of "spying." But once he stops to think about it, he can understand it. So many things are happening in the world today — actions, events, battles of opinion within nations, and policy decisions to name only a few—that a free nation needs all the information it can get if it is to chart its own course.

Obtaining such information is not easy, nor is it conventional. Intelligence can include such diverse operations as posting a sentry on a hill in South Vietnam, to cracking codes, to sending satellites flying around the globe in space.

We hope that Helms, in studying all the intelligence agencies of the nation, will find ways to step up their ability to perform, plus the facilitating of analysis that leads to conclusions from facts and appearances assembled.

We hope also that diversity of services will not be lost, in the course of increasing of coordination.

Helms has called intelligence "all the things which should be known in advance of initiating action." There are three major steps involved—acquiring the information; analyzing it, and using it. Helms has the job of improving at least the first two.

President Nixon figures Helms can cut \$1 billion from the cost. The appointment fits in with proper government purpose—to improve service, while cutting down on bureaucracy, and lessening cost to the taxpayer.

COLUMBUS, OHIO
DISPATCH

NOV 18 1978
E - 225,673
S - 318,040

Ex-Spy Removes Cloak From CIA

By MELANIE CROKER
Of The Dispatch Staff

The powerfully built male who drives around in extravagant cars and is surrounded by beautiful women isn't likely to be a spy. Look for "a married man with children who goes to PTA meetings and dresses and looks like a normal diplomat." Marchetti said.

The description of the real-life spy was provided by a man who should know. Victor Marchetti served with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for 14 years, resigning in 1969 as executive assistant to the CIA deputy director.

MARCHETTI, who was fed up with bureaucracy, resigned to write and help the public understand intelligence work.

He was in Columbus Wednesday to publicize his new book, "The Rope Dancer," which details many real-life experiences. Such experiences, along with some fictional ones, would set his book apart from spy novels, he said.

UNLESS THE CIA has changed things drastically in the last two years, Marchetti said, in an interview, it still spends two-thirds of its money on clandestine activities — "playing games for games sake."

One such game, he said, was played in Vietnam.

"We knew Vietnam was wrong — a disaster," he said. But he said, there was nothing that could be done to convince government officials of the findings.

"WE THE (CIA) only had 100 Vietnamese analysts, and thousands were working on operations such as counter-terror efforts," he said. He explained the CIA has two responsibilities, to gather intelligence and to conduct operations. He said the two operations do not fit together.

"Besides, the military was telling the President all was hunky-dory. So the President took the military's advice and the CIA continued the operations," he said.

He said operations often used enemy terror tactics. If the Viet Cong brutally killed a village chief who would not comply, the operators would utilize the same tactics in another village, he said.

MARCHETTI characterized much CIA activity as "designed to make themselves look as innocent as possible."

He said the CIA has been refuting everything he has said. But he believes his conferences with U.S. senators and representatives may be helping. He said President Nixon last week called for CIA reform, including a study of outside control, finances and military influence.

DAYTON, OHIO
NEWS

E - 161,249
S - 215,360

NOV 18 1971

Spy vs. Spies

President Nixon has chosen a worthy champion to dispatch on the task of coordinating the gangling U.S. intelligence agencies. Mr. Nixon tapped Richard Helms, the head of the Central Intelligence

agency. The purpose is laudable but, for the record, every recent president has tried it and has failed.

The spook agencies relentlessly compete with, and often undercut, one another.

In addition to the CIA, there are the Defense Intelligence agency and the National Security agency. The State department has a research bureau that is close cousin to a spy shop. The FBI is supposed to be confined to domestic counterintelligence, but it poaches. The Atomic Energy commission has operated a specialized intelligence bureau.

The result sometimes has been a cacophony of findings and reports that overwhelm analysts and which backlog into irrelevancy. Further, Americans end up spending unspecified multimillions more than necessary for their cloaks and daggers.

Mr. Helms apparently has managed to put his own CIA in order, itself a major accomplishment. Perhaps taking cues from its director, the CIA has been cool, accurate and inconspicuous lately. It seems to have overcome the bad case of butterfingers it suffered before Mr. Helms took over.

There's little doubt that the President has defined the problem accurately and has picked the right problem-solver. The question remaining is whether the various agencies will let the problem be solved.



Helms

Rep. Nedzi Probing U.S. Probers

BY SAUL FRIEDMAN
Free Press Washington Staff

WASHINGTON—One of the more determined watchdogs of the Pentagon has begun a quiet but intensive investigation into the alphabetical wonderland of American intelligence operations.

During the last several weeks, Rep. Lucien Nedzi, a Michigan Democrat and the now chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence, has visited the places where the cloak and daggers are issued.

On each occasion, for several hours Nedzi and members of his subcommittee have questioned officials of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (I&R) and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

FRIDAY NEDZI is to take a closer look at DIA. And in coming weeks he has scheduled official, though informal, quiz sessions at the super-secret National Security Agency (NSA), the FBI and the intelligence offices of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The subcommittee was organized years ago to keep watch over American intelligence activities. But as with its Senate counterpart, which has not even met this year, the House subcommittee generally has allowed intelligence agencies to roam rather freely into the internal affairs of other countries—as well as of this one.

Nedzi's inquiries are aimed at putting some limits on the things our spooks can do. And although his visits are a modest beginning, they indicate the changes that may be coming. The four other subcommittee members, all of whom served on it for years until Nedzi took it over, had not visited the agencies until their new chairman took them.

Soon after Nedzi was given the subcommittee last July, he immersed himself in what has been written about American intelligence. He talked privately with former top-ranking intelligence and Pentagon officials. And he set himself the chore of learning more about intelligence operations than any member of Congress, the better to return some control over such activities to Congress.

In short, Nedzi has become the only member of Congress to devote most of his time to gathering intelligence on American intelligence.

HE HAS FOUND the agencies bristling with personality problems, empire-building and jealousies. They keep secrets from each other.

At the moment Nedzi said, military and the State Department intelligence types are angry over a White House reorganization of intelligence operations because it puts CIA Director Richard Helms in a position to oversee every other agency's budget. Opponents of the plan charge that Helms will favor his own agency.

Nedzi is more concerned that the reorganization will put the entire intelligence community too close to the White House, where intelligence could be perverted for political use or be forced to conform with White House policy.

Because of the nature of the business, Nedzi has found a spook competes with and spies on his fellow

spook, and where secrets are kept from even his highest ranking agency officials.

As a critic of the defense budget, Nedzi on occasion has had the rug pulled from under him by sudden, new intelligence estimates which show Soviet strength far greater than it really is.

Nedzi intends to expose this annual exercise, if he can. And he is aiming at those agencies which have deliberately twisted intelligence data to conform to their clandestine operations, however doomed they may be.

EVENTUALLY, NEDZI intends to hold formal hearings on American intelligence operations, and he wants to open at least some of them to the public for the first time. Former and present foreign and defense policy officials and intelligence officers will be invited to testify.

Nedzi, who has a reputation as a dove, was appointed subcommittee chairman by Rep. F. Edward Hebert, of Louisiana, Democrat, a hawk, because Nedzi has a careful style and because even the military's best friends were disturbed that the intelligence community got us where we are in Vietnam.

But Hebert made certain to put four conservatives on the subcommittee—Democrats Melvin Price of Illinois and O. C. Fisher of Texas, and Republicans William Bray of Indiana and Alvin O'Konski of Wisconsin—to keep an eye on their chairman.

Nedzi, a dogged and workmanlike prober, is not a man to be conned or dissuaded. But with Hebert above him, and four hawks on the subcommittee below him, Nedzi has yet to find out how far he can go.

STATINTL

'Rope Dancer' Author Raps 'Cold-War' Mentality

CIA Needs Modernizing, Ex-Offi

A former agent who walked out of an executive position with the Central Intelligence Agency sees the need for vast revisions in the U.S. intelligence system.

Victor Marchetti, after 14 years with the CIA, said his attitude began to change when he was special assistant to the deputy director.

"I saw a country and a world that was changing," he said, "but the agency was not. Since the end of World War II they have been clinging to a cold-war mentality, an Us against Them attitude... the belief that we should be in every rinkydink country to protect them against communism."

HE TOLD HIS bosses how he felt, quit his job, and, to pass along his views to the public, wrote a book.

"The Rope Dancer", published Sept. 9 by Grosset & Dunlap, is a spy novel. But Marchetti's fictional characters say everything he would say himself. The message was incisive enough, according to Marchetti, to evoke a series of phone calls that carried "thinly veiled warnings" from CIA brass.

The book caused little stir, he said, until newspaper and magazine reporters discovered it. It received national attention when U. S. News and World Report devoted a cover story to espionage last month. Since then, many newspapers have discussed the subject.

"I tried to get the message across with a nonfiction book," he said, "but I

gave it up. I said it all in the novel and it turned out to be a better idea."

THE RECENT NEWS that Richard Helms, CIA director, would be given expanded responsibility, pleases Marchetti.

"The consolidation of intelligence agencies will be a money saver," he said, "and military influence should be lessened."

The presidential reorganization plan is aimed in the right direction, but he believes Congress should have more representation.

Marchetti feels the Nixon administration was embarrassed by military counter-intelligence failures—specifically the erroneous information on which it tried a dramatic helicopter rescue of U.S. prisoners of war in North Vietnam.

"The system is too big, unwieldy and poorly organized," he said. "It must be constantly reviewed and controlled."

TOTAL FREEDOM of decision, Marchetti believes, might lead to covert CIA involvement with dissident groups in the United States. He said he has heard discussions in CIA halls on proposals to infiltrate various "fringe" organizations.

The ideal arrangement, he said, would be for the CIA to handle foreign espionage, for the military to handle military problems only, and for domestic problems to be left to the FBI.

The agency has no need for such extreme secrecy, he says, and no reason to refuse examination of its \$6-billion budget.

Marchetti's spy thriller is scheduled for movie production. The author was in Cleveland on the final leg of a 16-day book promotional tour.

Continued Here

U.S. INTELLIGENCE: CONSPIRACIES, SUBVERSION, ESPIONAGE

PART II

To be sure, the CIA concentrates first and foremost on actions against the countries of the socialist community and the progressive regimes in young national states. Another major target of its subversive activity is the Communist and Left organizations in the capitalist countries, which the monopolies and hence intelligence regard as a force potentially dangerous to the very existence of imperialism and its mainstay the United States. Furthermore, it is a task of the CIA to counteract the national liberation movement in the colonial countries, where the United States still hopes to step into the shoes of the outgoing old colonial powers, to retain these countries within the capitalist system. Finally, much attention is paid to the states of Latin America. Regarding this continent as its strategic rear, the United States employs the combined forces of diplomacy, intelligence, the police apparatus and the Pentagon to stabilize the reactionary regimes there and thereby to preserve the domination of its monopolies.

Suffice it to enumerate some of the aggressive foreign policy actions of the United States in the past two decades to see that the CIA is working precisely in this direction: the intrigues of U.S. intelligence in Iran; the military putsch in Guatemala; the deposition of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos in 1958, the armed intervention against people's Cuba; the coup d'etat in the Dominican Republic; the anti-government conspiracy in Iraq; the military coup in Brazil; the preparation of armed intervention against Vietnam; the coup in Cambodia and this is a far from complete list.

PENTAGON INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Pursuing their aggressive ends, the U.S. ruling circles are seeking as much information as possible about the socialist countries and above all the Soviet Union. The intelligence services of the Western powers are sparing no effort to obtain information about the military-economic potential of the USSR and its Armed Forces, about the internal situation in the Soviet Union and the

latest achievements of Soviet science and technology.

Speaking of the position of military intelligence, i.e. of the Pentagon's organ, in the intricate system of U.S. intelligence services, it should be noted that immediately after the end of World War II, referring to the experience accumulated, it started laying claims to the leading role among all the intelligence organizations of the country. Inasmuch as after the establishment of the CIA Allen Dulles strove to "politicize" the entire strategic intelligence and turn the CIA into an organ not merely co-ordinating intelligence activities but making "big policy", the Pentagon openly voiced its resentment of this line. For some time the struggle among the different intelligence organs was waged "in camera", within the bounds of the Intelligence Community, but before long it emerged to the surface. The military had the upper hand: in August 1961 the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was

States was accompanied by the expansion and consolidation of military intelligence.

THE "BRAIN TRUST"

The DIA is the supreme organ, the "brain trust" of U.S. military intelligence. Just as the intelligence organs of the three armed services, the DIA sees its principal task in obtaining information about the military-economic potential and armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty states. According to the DIA statute endorsed by the Secretary of Defense, the chief of the DIA is subordinated only to him personally and to the Intelligence Board. It is to supply intelligence information to military institutions (through the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and to the Secretary of Defense (through the latter's secretariat).

Although the DIA is vested with certain rights in regard to the military intelligence services, the latter have retained independence in the fields of direct interest to them (except the collection of information through the system of military attachés, which in 1965 passed to the jurisdiction of the DIA.

Evidently this is in large measure due to the increased role of the American military, naval and air attachés and military missions, who together with their official personnel make up the basis of the modern legal foreign apparatus of U.S. military intelligence. This function of military attachés has been particularly widely developed in the practice of the U.S. diplomatic service.

The department directing the work of military attachés forms a part of the DIA apparatus. It works out its instructions and gives assistance to the attaché system in close contact with State Department offices. At present attachés of the Defence Department are

accredited to 92 countries, with larger states having attachés of all three armed services. For instance, air attachés are to be found in 67 countries, and in 24 of them they are senior attachés. The question of which attaché is to be senior is decided by the secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, depending on which armed service in a given country is of greater interest to the United States. As General MacCloskey writes, since Russia's air power is of the greatest interest to the United States, the U.S. air attaché holds seniority there.

The DIA widely applies data processing techniques. At the beginning of 1963 a special centre for the automatic processing of intelligence data was set up. Attached to the DIA is the military intelligence school es-

established in 1962 in keeping with the directive of the Secretary of Defense envisaging large-scale training of professional cadres.

Having secured for itself considerable elbow-room at the expense of the intelligence organs of all armed services, the DIA is becoming an ever more dangerous rival of the CIA. Aware of its strength, it has more than once violated the established order of presentation of intelligence reports and, by-passing the Intelligence Board, submitted information directly to the President.

The oldest organ of American military intelligence is the U.S. Army Intelligence Command (G-2), which engages primarily in the collection of data about the military potential, deployment and armaments of foreign land forces, the Soviet Army in the first place, about nuclear and missile weapons manufacture and topography. It directs the activities of the military intelligence men serving with U.S. embassies and missions as well as with U.S. Army units abroad, and maintains official communication with the foreign military representatives in Washington. An important aspect of the activities of "G-2" is to ensure "security in the Army", which is the duty of its counter-intelligence service.

The Department of the Navy has the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). It collects, processes and evaluates information on foreign navies, the armament of warships and other weapons and prospects for their development, ship-building, naval aviation, coastal fortifications, as well as harbours and seaports, their location and capacity. It strives to keep under special surveillance the Soviet Navy and above all its submarine fleet.

The youngest among the traditional organizations of American military intelligence is the Air Force Office of Intelligence (A-2). After the U.S. Air Force became, in 1947, an independent armed service, the importance of A-2 grew and so did the scale of its activities. Today it is said to be technically the best equipped among the intelligence services of the military

link of the U.S. intelligence system in such an important field as electronic espionage. Its electronic observation posts are scattered all over the world. A-2 has 20 air squadrons for technical intelligence.

The most far-flung at present, after the CIA and the DIA, is the military intelligence apparatus of the U.S. troops in South Vietnam-MACV-which has, according to incomplete data, 1,100 operatives (Americans and South Vietnamese). It incorporates four centres: the Combined Intelligence Centre, the Combined Military Interrogation Centre, the Combined Document Exploration Centre, and the Combined Military Exploration Centre. Each has a joint group consisting of American and South Vietnamese, equipped to conduct intelligence in combat conditions. MACV workers interrogate prisoners and suspects, train spies and wreckers and plant them in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. One of the principal tasks of the MACV is to fight the guerilla movement. This is also the task of the CIA mission in South Vietnam.

"PHOENIX" OPERATION

"Phoenix" is the code name of one of the secret operations conducted by the American intelligence service which Senator Fulbright called a programme of mass physical destruction of political opposition in South Vietnam. The idea of "Phoenix" had been long nurtured by U.S. intelligence men. This large-scale operation was the first attempt, as it were, to find organizational forms and methods in addition to those envisaged in the plan for "accelerated pacification" which was to help destroy revolutionary bases and affirm American control. The U.S. ruling circles, naturally, pinned great hopes to it. The idea was to launch repressions, simultaneously throughout South Vietnam, against all persons connected with the forces of the National Liberation Front and thereby deal a staggering blow at the resistance of the Vietnamese people. Operation "Phoenix" (just as many other "accelerated pacification" measures conducted by the Americans) came up against the unbending will of the Vietnamese patriots and, in the opinion

not produce the expected results. Coming back from South Vietnam, experts of a Senate commission reported that in the course of that operation more than 15,000 most active political leaders of the forces opposed to the Saigon regime had been "neutralized". Most of them were shot and the rest thrown into concentration camps.

IN THE JUNGLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Adjoining military intelligence, is one more important, top-secret organ officially belonging to the system of the Department of Defence — the National Security Agency. Set up in 1952, it specializes in communications intelligence and code cracking. Martin and Mitchell, former NSA workers who received political asylum in the USSR, wrote that, as they knew from their own experience, the United States successfully reads the secret correspondence of more than forty countries, including its allies. One of the departments of the agency studies the codes and ciphering systems of U.S. allies in neutral countries. This was confirmed by V. Hamilton, a former worker of this department. But the main efforts of the NSA are concentrated on cracking codes of the socialist countries and above all the USSR.

The agency's headquarters is located at Fort Meade, Maryland, not far from Washington, in a nine-storey complex not smaller than the CIA building. It is surrounded by a double three-metre barbed wire fence through which electric current is passed. Guard service is provided by the Marines. The NSA employs more than 10,000 people, including many specialists in mathematics and communications. It possesses the most up-to-date technical means, fast computers and other sophisticated electronic equipment. According to of

ficial data, the maintenance of the central institutions of the NSA costs more than £100 million annually, and the annual budget of the agency as a whole amounts to £1,000 million.

The NSA collects primary intelligence information with the help of more than 2,000 radio listening stations serviced by 8,000 military operators. The stations have been built to intercept and take the bearings of radio transmissions and radio conversations in all the countries of the world, in the first place the USSR, and register any electronic radiation.

1967 ISRAELI AGGRESSION

There exist floating stations — military and merchant ships laden with highly-sensitive equip-

ment which cruise in the high seas. How they function can be seen from two examples. On June 8, 1967 the Israeli attacked the American radio intelligence ship Liberty which they took for an Egyptian vessel. It developed that the Liberty had been joined to the world-wide electronic listening network back in 1965. She is one of five ships which conduct "scientific experiments in the field of communications and electromagnetic waves". Stationed 15 miles off the Sinai Peninsula, the "Liberty" intercepted on a wide range of frequencies short waves included, action reports and other secret radiograms of the belligerents. She had aboard, in addition to the operators and technical personnel, three members of the central staff of the NSA. Among them was Allen Blue, who was killed together with other 34 people during the Israeli attack. Using complex machinery, including small-size electronic computers, mathematicians and linguists deciphered and translated combat reports and other radio messages. The data obtained by them were transmitted to Washington and to U.S. diplomatic missions in the Middle East.

continued

On January 23, 1968, in the Sea of Japan, the Korean People's Democratic Republic detained the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo (of the same class as the Liberty) which had invaded its territorial waters. The ship was equipped with the latest electronic intelligence devices. Alarmed by the unfavorable turn events were taking for the United States and intending to undertake some counter-measures, President John-

son called a consultative conference with military and civilian experts. Asked how secret the ship's electronic equipment was, the experts said that the Pueblo carried highly secret equipment. As the ship's commander Lloyd M. Bucher testified, the Pueblo had only one task: to conduct intelligence. He said they had been carrying out this task in the coastal waters of Korea and other regions of Asia. They had also penetrated into the coastal waters of the Soviet Union and China and repeatedly committed acts of espionage there.

The NSA installs listening devices also in planes, making special reconnaissance flights. Thus, the high-altitude reconnaissance plane U-2 shot down by a Soviet rocket on May 1, 1960, near Sverdlovsk, conducted not only aerial photography but also radio reconnaissance of ground radio-electronic means, including radio communication means, radar stations of the air defence system, and rocket guidance systems. A similar assignment was being performed by the RB-47 plane of a U.S. military strategic intelligence unit which was shot down on June 1, 1960 over Soviet territorial waters near the city of Arkhangelsk. The Soviet air defence troops cut short all attempts of spy planes to invade the country's air space. This has compelled the United States to give up radio intelligence conducted from planes. To locate radiotechnical means situated deep within Soviet territory it now sends electronic spies to outer space — such, for instance, as the reconnaissance satellite "Ferret".

(To be continued)

17 NOV 1971

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HENRY J. TAYLOR

Our Spy Elephant Is Sick

Behind the scenes President Nixon's confidence in Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms has taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nixon believes (correctly) that our nation's intelligence setup is a sick elephant. He has quietly assigned Mr. Helms to correct it.

A sick elephant is a formidable danger. And secrecy keeps our public from knowing even the size of this elephant, to say nothing of how sick it is.

Incredibly, we spend close to \$6 billion a year for intelligence. Just the CIA alone is larger in scope than the State Department and spends more than twice as much money. Legendary Gen. William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic Services conducted our entire World War II espionage throughout four years and throughout the world for a total \$135 million. The budget of the CIA (secret) is at least \$1.5 billion a year.

NEXT TO THE PENTAGON with its 25 miles of corridors, the world's largest office building, the CIA's headquarters in suburban Langley, Va., is the largest building in the Washington area. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United States. But the CIA maintains secret offices in most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the public.

About 10,000 people work at Langley and another 5,000 are scattered across the world, burrowing everywhere for intelligence. These include many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their lives for our country in the dark and unknown battles of espionage and treachery. I could name many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own clandestine communications system with Washington and the world.

The Pentagon spends \$3 billion a year on intelligence, twice as much as the CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence arms operate worldwide, of course, and — largely unknown — they also have an immense adjunct called the National Security Agency which rivals the CIA in size and cost.

Then there exists the important Intelligence Section of the State Department, likewise worldwide. Its chief reports directly to Under Secretary

of State John N. Irwin 2nd, it is understandably very close to its vest.

ADDITIONAL intelligence agencies — all growing, all sprawling, all costly — spread out into the world from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) and even the Department of Commerce.

In fact, there are so many additional hush-hush agencies that recently in West and East Berlin alone there were at least 40 known U.S. intelligence agencies and their branches — most of them competing with one another.

Mr. Helms himself defines intelligence as "all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." The acquisition of intelligence is one thing; the interpretation of it is another; and the use of it is a third. The 1947 statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. It also makes the CIA directly responsible to the President. But it is simply not true that the CIA is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widely believed.

Again and again, no one and everyone is responsible.

THE FUNCTION of intelligence is to protect us from surprises. It's not working that way. The sick elephant is threatening our national security by surprise, surprise, surprise.

Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms new and sweeping intelligence reorganization authority on an over-all basis. He has given him the first authority ever given anyone to review, and thus effect, all our foreign intelligence agencies' budgets. The President believes Mr. Helms, this undercover world's most experienced pro, can cut at least \$1 billion out of the morass.

The President confided that he is totally fed up with the intelligence community's duplications, contradictions, self-protective vagueness and dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he wants its output brought closer to the needs of the President's so-called 40 Committee (actually six men), which serves the National Security Council, and the President himself.

In amputating much of the sick elephant, Mr. Helms' directive is to cut down on the surprises. And the President could not have picked a more knowing, no-nonsense man to do it.

STATINTL

LITTLE POLITICKING

Marines Wait Calmly For New Commandant

The Marine Corps is waiting calmly -- or at least much more calmly than it did four years ago -- to learn who its new commandant will be.

Gen. Leonard F. Chapman Jr. will end his four-year term at the end of this year and the President is expected to announce soon who will become the next president of the gracious old commandant's home at the Marine Barracks here.

In contrast to the situation four years ago, when factions within the Corps maneuvered -- sometimes with considerable acrimony -- to push their man into the top spot, there has been little outward evidence of politicking this time.

Three Mentioned

Three top officers are thought to be in strong contention for the job, although presidents have been known to reach far down in the ranks in choosing a commandant.

Perhaps at the top of the list is Lt. Gen. Robert Everton

Cushman Jr., 56, who served from 1957 to 1961 on the staff of then-Vice President Richard M. Nixon as his assistant for national security affairs. The two men reportedly have been close since that time.

However, Cushman has been deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency since April 1969 and that post has just been upgraded as part of a reorganization of the nation's intelligence operations ordered by the President. Whether the President would want to pull Cushman away from that job at this time -- or whether Cushman would want to leave such an important and challenging assignment -- is open to question.

Earned Highest Medals

The highest ranking candidate for the post is Gen. Raymond G. Davis, 56, a four-star officer who earned the Medal of Honor during the Korean war and who has been assistant commandant of the Corps since March of this year.

The third officer frequently mentioned as a possible commandant is Lt. Gen. John R. Chaisson, 55, now chief of staff in Marine headquarters here. A superb staff officer, Chaisson went to Vietnam in 1966 and quickly attracted the attention of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who called him to Saigon to become the director of his combat operations center.

With the selection of a successor to Chapman, Nixon will have named all but one of the five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Westmoreland was selected as Army chief of staff by President Johnson. His four-year term will expire in mid-summer, giving Nixon the opportunity to fill that slot too during his current term of office.

compulsion to make decisions and commit billions of dollars on new weapons systems that exist only on paper. All of us have agonized over whether it would be less costly to go ahead or to retreat and start anew on the billion-dollar bungles still haunting us from the McNamara days. The point is, the awful mistakes that have resulted from decisions reached on the basis of paper studies should have pounded home the lesson, "fly before you buy."

I am proud to say that this administration has adopted the "fly before you buy" concept. It is not truly "fly before you buy," but at least during the beginning of the transition period they are starting out on the right track.

Our committee most strongly and emphatically gives its endorsement to the concept of prototype development in the acquisition of new weaponry. Ten years' sour experience and the wasteful expenditure of billions of dollars inescapably prove that better procurement methods must be established. The argument that design and development and competitive testing of a weapon could "take too long" is shot down when we look at the horrible results of the paper studies.

I should like to recount a few of the bad bungles we have had in the past:

The F-111 program. Members have all been aware of this fiasco. The F-111-B program was finally completely scrubbed by the Navy.

The main battle tank program, which I believe should have been scrubbed 2 or 3 years ago. We had at least the courage and foresight to not let them go any further in this year's budget, and took out the MBT funds.

The C-5A. I do not need to say any more except to say that the "fly before you buy" concept will hopefully prevent such boondoggles in the future.

I should like to quote now from the committee report, which says:

The very complex studies and analyses which have preceded weapons procurement have proven to be more costly than reliable. The results of the paper studies are interpreted differently by different people. Ambiguities exist and errors exist. The ability of men to put all the pertinent factors involved on paper so that other men can make the proper decision as to which of two weapons systems should proceed has proved faulty.

Secretary Laird, I believe, has now put this train on the right track. He has done an outstanding job, and will, I know, make every effort to avoid the derailments that plagued the previous administrations.

Our committee feels that fabrication and testing of prototype models in a competitive environment would minimize the problem of concurrency which has existed between development and production phases of major weapon systems programs. This excessive concurrency has been a serious source of waste resulting in numerous deficiencies in production equipment, reducing the effectiveness or increasing the price of the equipment, or both. And all too often, I must say, both.

To obtain maximum advantage from the prototyping concept, our consensus

is that competition should be established between at least two companies on each system, with the incentive of a profitable procurement contract insuring maximum effort on the part of the competitors.

I want to assure my colleagues in the committee that if this administration follows these guidelines—and I believe they will—this will result in savings, as we look down the road, of literally billions of dollars. I am only sorry that the "fly before you buy" concept was not started sooner.

Mr. YATES. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINSHALL. I yield to the gentleman for a question.

Mr. YATES. The gentleman said that he was glad to see the administration had adopted the fly-before-you-buy concept. Would the gentleman say that that approach is applicable to the F-14 program?

Mr. MINSHALL. No. I said in the beginning of the transition period there were certain foibles and weaknesses in this program, but we are transitioning as fast as we can, to avoid the mistakes of the past. This is the plan of Secretary Laird and the administration.

Mr. YATES. With respect to the F-14, it is a concurrency program at present?

Mr. MINSHALL. It is to a degree, and I am sure we are on top of it and will make sure that there is no more waste and extravagance in the program than can possibly be avoided.

Mr. MAHON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINSHALL. I am glad to yield to the chairman of the committee.

Mr. MAHON. I think in all fairness it should be said that it will probably not be possible to use the prototype approach, the fly-before-you-buy approach, completely on all weapons systems.

Mr. MINSHALL. I said that in my statement, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly concur with you, but at least we are pushing in that direction and we are going to carry out the concept as rapidly and as best we can.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. MINSHALL. Thank you.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. WHITTEN).

(Mr. WHITTEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for this bill because neither the committee, the chairman of the full committee, nor the staff have had an opportunity to do the preliminary work which is essential to support the changes which I believe to be an absolute must if we are to save our Nation.

Later in this speech I will elaborate on some of the things I say here, giving excerpts from the hearings and debates in the Congress to support my views.

In the first place, I think this Nation is faced with certain realities of life and we will have to review our overall foreign policy and our defense policy and scale down in a great way the total amount that we are spending in the name of defense which is not really that, in my opinion.

As many of you know, I started serving on the Committee on Appropriations

in 1943. Except for 2 or 3 years, I have served on the appropriations end of the military operations since that time.

Let me briefly tell you why I want to take this time. It is because, in the first place, after World War II, this Nation set out on an international policy of injecting ourselves into the internal affairs of just about every country in the world which would let us.

THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Chairman, because in World War I we had not joined the League of Nations and World War II came along, many people took the simple thought that had we joined the League of Nations we might not have had World War II. That does not necessarily follow. And, at this late date many people might have thought that the United Nations, since we did not get in the League of Nations, might be a deterrent to future wars and might prove to be an instrument for preventing what has happened.

But now we look at it after 15 or 18 years. What it turned out to be was a forum in which all of our enemies could reach the ears of the people of the world through the present new media and then through our foreign aid program, we had to buy the votes of many small countries which we had created in Africa; most of whom we had gotten into the United Nations. We know the U.N. or a majority of its members now seem to delight in turning down and condemning our country.

Mr. Chairman, largely through various foreign aid programs we have made competitors out of our customers. I know you have heard my colleagues go into many, many details, but this phase of it I do not know that you have had presented to you, but we have had many companies organized for the specific purpose of handling foreign aid programs. Many have made their stockholders rich just to engage in the business of giving away the substance of the American people to almost everyone who would take it. Now after going in debt about \$140 billion, this program not only has failed but it has the United States in a bad way at home and abroad.

Mr. Chairman, some years ago there was an investigation by a subcommittee which I had the honor to head to see what we were doing with American dollars and American technical know-how. It developed that we had 723 American experts teaching people all over the world how to produce the same agricultural commodities we produce in the United States today. We feel the adverse effects today.

It was our country that went to Europe and said, "Well, you folks ought to get together and organize for a common market between yourselves, thus it was our Nation which sponsored the European Common Market with our money. However, many did not realize, and would not believe that when European countries got together they would make efforts to freeze us out—they see it now.

Mr. Chairman, that is what is happening. I say to you that we have made competitors out of our customers around the world. We have injected ourselves into the internal affairs of just about every country which would let us do it.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE CONSPIRACIES, SUBVERSION, ESPIONAGE

STATINTL

STATINTL

In the opinion of American observers, no other aspect of U.S. foreign policy with the exception of the Vietnam war has evoked such vigorous condemnation and protest as the subversive actions of the U.S. intelligence service, its covert and not infrequently overt interference in the internal affairs of other states, its complicity in all kinds of reactionary conspiracies and putsches. The generally known failures and scandalous exposures of its intelligence service have certainly impaired the prestige of the United States.

A MONSTER TOWERING OVER CONGRESS

Immediately after the end of World War II, seeking a greater say in policy-making, the most powerful spokesmen of monopoly capital secured reorganization of the entire government machinery of the United States. In July 1947 the National Security Act was promulgated, envisaging cardinal reconstruction of the military departments, the establishment of a single Department of Defense, a Joint Chiefs of Staff committee, and a Department of the Air Force. At the same time there was constituted the National Security Council, the highest, after the President, body called upon to play an important role in shaping U.S. foreign policy.

During the reorganization of the military and political leadership of the country the greatest attention was paid to intelligence. Drawing upon the experience of Hitler's Germany, the U.S. imperialists set about establishing their own system of total espionage — on a colossal scale as "befits" the United States of America. Q. Petter, a U.S. intelligence theoretician, wrote that to exercise leadership of the world in all continents, of all types of states and social systems, of all races and religions in any social, economic and political conditions, the United States needed an exceptionally wide-ranging intelligence service

The Central Intelligence Agency, subordinated directly to the President, became the first postwar independent intelligence organization. It was charged with collecting intelligence data and at the same time engineering subversion in other states tasks:

(1) To obtain intelligence information in both secret and legal ways, (2) to generalize the information collected by other organizations and agencies, evaluate it and submit to politicians in a form suitable for utilization, (3) to prepare, in secret, interference in the affairs of other nations in case orders came regarding the need for such interference. Thus, the National Security Act enabled the CIA to exert its influence on matters of state importance, something on which the advocates of a "positions-of-strength policy" pressing for the militarization of the economy and social life of the United States insisted with particular vigour. According to Allen Dulles, this act gave American intelligence a more influential position in government than that held by intelligence in any other country of the world.

INCREASING POWER OF CIA

As American authors claim, the power of the CIA and of its chief has been growing in a geometrical progression. In 1948 the NSC issued a secret order authorizing the CIA to conduct secret political opera-

operations, it was stressed, were to be carried out in such a way that the U.S. government could, if necessary, disassociate itself from them. Thus, in the first year of its existence, the CIA was assigned functions which no other intelligence service has ever had.

In 1949 Congress adopted, as an addition to the National Security Act, a special law, on the Central Intelligence Agency. By this act the United States' government and parliament, for the first time in mankind's history, openly elevated espionage to the rank of state policy and thereby officially approved methods of action involving interference in the internal affairs of other countries and violation of their sovereignty.

The law of 1949 already openly placed intelligence above all American legislature: it deprived the congressional committees of the right to intervene in matters pertaining to the organization and activities of the CIA and gave its head unlimited freedom of action, vesting him with almost dictatorial powers. The CIA could ignore federal laws and ordinances whose observance could involve divulgence of information about its structure, functions, names, official designations, salaries, the size of the personnel (the Treasury was instructed not to report to Congress on anything connected

with the CIA). In the matters of hire and dismissal the CIA director is not bound by any political or legal norms, procedures or recommendations obligatory for government institutions.

The Central Intelligence Agency was authorized to subsidize the programmes of colleges, to institute and keep up different foundations, cultural societies and publishing houses. Moreover, it could spend material means in disregard of the laws or rules established for government institutions and have its accounts certified only by its director. The latter was thus in a position to spend any sum from the vast allocations without any control or explanations. The CIA was allowed to earmark special sums to be spent by its personnel abroad. It could conclude contracts with non-government institutions on the conduct of research projects.

However, publicly promulgated laws do not give a full idea of the extent of the powers with which the CIA is vested. Along with them there exist top-secret directives of the National Security Council. To be sure, Allen Dulles wrote, there is the secret aspect of the matter, and the law authorizes the NSC (i.e., actually the President) to entrust the CIA with some powers in addition to those specified in the law. These powers are not given publicly. What is involved here is "special operations" and clandestine actions designed to install (often through military coups) reactionary pro-U.S. regimes enjoying the financial and political support of the American ruling circles and the biggest monopolies. Eventually these actions became an organic part of the CIA's practical activities.

AN ADOPTED POLICY.

Following the invasion of Cuba and the exposure of other secret operations of American intelligence voices began to be heard in Congress demanding that curbs be imposed on the CIA and less confidence be shown in it. There was talk of it having become "a state within a state" and of the need to restrict its power and make it dependent on the State Department and the Pentagon. At first President Kennedy seemed determined to "cut off the wings" of the Agency. But there was no serious intention "to cut off" or even "clip" its wings. The attempt to limit the powers of the CIA came up against

massive objections, with the result that it remained, as Fred Cook, an American journalist, put it, a monster towering over its creator, Congress.

Thus the United States' striving for world supremacy determined, in a new way, the role of intelligence. It had to penetrate into all countries, to extend its tentacles to all the corners of the globe. It was to become, as President Truman pointed out, the chief instrument of an all-embracing co-ordinated programme directed first and foremost against the Soviet Union and the entire socialist system. There was an unprecedented increase in allocations for intelligence activity. By the beginning of the 1960s they had reached almost \$2,500 million a year, and the total number of persons directly employed in the U.S. intelligence service had come, according to some estimates, to about 100,000. The diplomatic apparatus and a large number of state, public, scientific and educational establishments were placed at the disposal of intelligence. According to J. MacCamy, all the government institutions of the United States participate in some way or other in carrying out intelligence tasks.

INDOCTRINATION OF AMERICANS

Running parallel to the enlargement of the intelligence apparatus and the unheard-of increase in expenditures on its maintenance was the indoctrina-

tion of an ever greater number of Americans with the aim of drawing them into intelligence work. There appeared a colossal amount of publications extolling the "exploits" of spies and wreckers and many "theoretical works" arguing in favour of capturing Americans on a mass scale within the orbit of intelligence. Thus, in new conditions, on a new ground, the American ruling circles ultimately came to the same notorious three precepts formulated in his time by Hitler's henchman Rudolf Hess and made the basis upon which the Gestapo was built: "Everyone can be a spy. Everyone must become a spy. There is no secret which cannot be learned."

THE INTELLIGENCE OLYMPUS OF THE UNITED STATES

One of the characteristic features of the U.S. intelligence service today is the multifunctionality of its functions, by virtue of which most diverse elements of the machinery of state find themselves drawn, to a smaller or greater extent, into intelligence activities. At the same time, some of the specialized organs of intelligence set themselves apart. Thus there forms a fairly involved, from the viewpoint of organization and structure, complex of intelligence institutions.

In Washington itself and around it are situated the headquarters of nine governmental institutions and organs responsible for the collection of all kinds of intelligence data all over the world and in outer space above it. They are the Central Intelligence Agency, Defence Intelligence Agency, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Office of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Air Force Chief of Intelligence, National Security Agency, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is these nine organizations that constitute the basis of the American intelligence

system known as the American intelligence system. They are united by the supreme military-political organ, the National Security Council, which was set up simultaneously with the CIA and started functioning on September 27, 1947. It exercises general guidance of the work of all intelligence organizations, but its principal function is to advise the President on major political issues. In preparing its recommendations the NSC has the assistance of different government institutions. Endorsed by the President, who adopts decisions individually, without putting them to vote, these recommendations are binding for all the departments of the government.

The most important working organ of the NSC, which co-ordinates the activities of the various specialized intelligence services, is Intelligence Board. Consisting of high-ranking representatives of the intelligence organizations, it functions almost continuously: its sittings are held at least once a week at the CIA headquarters. It supervises the work of the Intelligence Community and its special independent officers in the main departments of the federal government. The Intelligence Board is empowered to control and co-ordinate the work of the United States intelligence services. It is serviced by special committees and groups numbering about 50 and staffed with intelligence officers competent in different fields.

There is one more organ which has the right to intervene in secret affairs. It is the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. It came into being in the mid-fifties. The failures and gross miscalculations of intelligence injurious to U.S. prestige had roused irritation in the ruling circles, with congressmen demanding and investigation into the work of the secret services. In January 1956, after one such investigation, conducted by the Hoover commission, President Eisenhower announced the institution of this council, which the American press dubbed, quite appropriately, the "water-gate" Board formally possesses

fairly extensive powers. It will be borne in mind that it is the only governmental organization which has not only powers of control over the entire intelligence system of the United States but also practical

possibilities for the exercise of such control.

The chapter "The CIA: Headquarters of Global Espionage" contains a detailed description of the activities of this organization, which has become, together with the Pentagon, the main instrument of the expansionist policy of U.S. imperialism. With the help of diversified but purposeful propaganda, the author writes, the CIA has been legalized in the eyes of the average American: it operates, not as a secret institution which the government would have to disown, but as a quite legitimate one working on a legal and "morally pure" basis. In other words, in the second half of the 20th century the concepts "CIA", "espionage", "intelligence", "intelligence operation" have become part and parcel of the everyday life and vocabulary of the American man in the street, along with the concepts "army", "war", "politics", "diplomacy." Espionage has become a legal occupation chosen by a man like any other profession. To the American government there is no task more important than intelligence activity all over the world. President Eisenhower declared during laying the foundation of the new building of the CIA on November 3, 1959.

STRATEGY

The strategy of American intelligence rests on the envelopment of the entire globe with a CIA spiderwork. L. Kirkpatrick Jr., professor of political science of Brown University and executive director of the CIA, reproaching the U.S. government for its past neglect of intelligence, noted with gratification in his book, appearing in 1963, that only after the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency had the United States acquired a state-wide service dealing with external intelligence and with the extension of its network

on a global scale. Two years before that the U.S. press had declared that the CIA was the largest and costliest intelligence service in the world, that its personnel numbered 15,000 to 20,000 people, with one half of them being scattered in different countries of the world under cover of various missions, representations and associations and the other concentrated in the central apparatus.

The CIA does not conceal the global character of its actions, though it does not advertise them. Being an instrument of the United States' manoeuvres in the foreign policy field and servicing the expansionist plans of monopoly capital, the CIA actively interferes, with the knowledge of and on instructions from the government, in the internal affairs of other states, i.e., in such areas as their economy, policy, ideology and culture. W. Rabeorn, the predecessor of the current CIA director, publicly admitted that the CIA engaged in active intelligence work in all countries and on all questions, including those that were of a purely internal concern to these countries.

Nixon's super-secret memorandum criticising CIA

New York, Monday

Newsweek magazine said yesterday President Nixon had written a super-secret memorandum sharply criticising the U.S. intelligence network for a series of five recent failures.

The latest issue of the magazine said the real reasons for Mr. Nixon's re-organisation of U.S. intelligence activities spelled out in meticulous detail in the top-secret document.

Newsweek said the president's discrepancies on how the U.S. could detect possible Soviet violations of any arms control agreement. Newsweek also described how the Central Intelligence Agency planned and carried out the overthrow of Antoine Gizenga's Congolese government.

Mr. Nixon, the report said, singled out five main failures: — Failure to predict the ferocity of Liberation Army resistance to the Laotian campaign earlier this year;

— Misinformation that led to an elaborately-planned commando raid on an empty prisoner of war camp at Son Tay (which, says Newsweek, still rankles the White House).

— Incorrect estimates of the number of Liberation Army weapons and supplies flowing through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville;

— Belated discovery of surface-to-air missiles that suddenly sprouted in the Middle East ceasefire zone last year;

— and an eight-month delay in the strategic arms limitation talks while the White House tried to sort out intelligence.

Plymouth car from the CIA delivers a stiff, grey, legal-sized folder marked 'President's daily briefing' to the White House.

Only three other copies of the report are delivered — one to Secretary of State William Rogers, one to Defence Secretary Melvin Laird, and one to Attorney-General John Mitchell.

But the President does not bother to read his copy of the top secret report. Instead, he asks his advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to summarise it for him, Newsweek claimed.

At one point, according to the magazine's account, a crate of Kalashnikov rifles meant for the rebels — and disguised as Red Cross packages for refugees — was allowed to drop and break open while being unloaded from a Czechoslovak ship in Khartoum.

Newsweek said a CIA agent later successfully stole from a courier at Khartoum airport a suitcase containing 330,000 U.S. dollars. This had been supplied by the Soviet KGB and was also bound for Gizenga's troops, it said.

Referring to how Mr. Nixon receives his daily intelligence briefing, Newsweek said that early every morning a black

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Review Of Intelligence

Senators Symington and Fulbright expressed unhappiness with action by President Nixon to reshape the nation's intelligence network. They said Nixon had vested more control in the hands of Henry A. Kissinger, his adviser for national security affairs, without obtaining Congressional advice.

The White House responded that intelligence activities were being organized to improve their efficiency and effectiveness.

Symington called for a full review of intelligence changes, to be made by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

He felt that important aspects of intelligence aspects had been taken out of the hands of professionals and turned over to the military and to the White House staff.

Symington also said the reorganization might turn out to be "a constructive move."

The proposal for a Senate committee review should meet with approval by the general public which knows little about our intelligence organizations.

Richard Helms has been given control over all intelligence activities. As director of Central Intelligence, he should be capable in that position, Kissinger has been put in charge of a subcommittee of the National Security Council.

Symington is probably right in wanting a Senate committee review, and also in thinking the reorganization may be "a constructive move."

Taxpayers will have more confidence in our intelligence programs if they know a Senate committee is aware of what goes on. Director Helms, for example, or even Dr. Kissinger, may one day be in line to succeed J. Edgar Hoover as head of the FBI.

Symington speaks for most of the people of the nation when he suggests that responsibility for the most critical aspects of intelligence should not be left in the hands of the military or the White House staff.

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U.S. Spy Network

It is amazing that in all the years that the United States has been a super power, there was not a super intelligence agency to determine the relative strategic balance between major powers. This would have enabled our defense department to correct any faults that were found, and to meet all challenges to our security.

That the Soviet buildup of nuclear arms and naval power could reach such proportions, before we took measures to counter them, is a cause for national dismay. This development is believed to have brought about the reorganization of the American intelligence community into a network that perhaps should have been organized long ago.

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has been given 30 days to reorganize his own office so that he can become the head of the new network, to coordinate civilian and military intelligence and bring the military role under civilian control. Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Helms' deputy, will take over operating responsibilities for CIA.

Unofficially, the various intelligence agencies in the government are said to employ an army of 200,000 persons, at home and abroad, at a cost of some \$5 billion a year. It is a huge and very important undertaking. Helms will supervise the consolidated intelligence network and the budget it will require. He will be responsible for national intelligence requirements and priorities, the security of intelligence data and the protection of sources and methods used.

The results will be channeled to the National Security Council, which will make White House assessments of the relative strategic balance between major powers and evaluate intelligence quality. If this plan creates the intelligence that can keep the nation at peace through strength, it will be worth the huge outlay of men and money collecting it.

SANTA MONICA, CAL.

OUTLOOK

NOV 16 1971

E - 35,948

CIA 'Shakeup' Poses Questions

To most Americans the intelligence-gathering activities abroad by the United States — spying in least charitable terms — is a mysterious matter. Their closest brush with it is usually a glamorized but distorted James Bond movie.

Thus the action of President Nixon to integrate the far-flung activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and many other similar groups, is unlikely to arouse the average citizen for long, although it should. It is his own survival, as well as his tax dollar, that are at stake.

By the same token, the complexity and cryptic qualities of these agencies make the average citizen unqualified to discuss the specifics of the subject with any authority. He is obliged to speak of the problems of national intelligence in terms of goals and principles.

As a first principle, the average citizen would agree that we must always undertake whatever level of intelligence-gathering that is essential to our security. In carrying out this principle we should not be surprised if on occasion the pursuit of information is not savory, for this is a game without rules. We should not be surprised at the cost, because intelligence ranges from the observations of a lookout posted on a hill in Cambodia to information acquired by the most sophisticated and extensive electronic masterpieces.

As a second principle we should ensure that there always is a

diversity of sources reporting to the President, and that there are adequate checks and balances as to the validity of the information provided.

Over the years Congress has authorized a number of intelligence agencies that range from those in the executive branch of government to those in the military services. On occasion the information that they have given the President has been conflicting, but by and large the combined effort has been a success.

Therefore, the proposed administrative action which narrows the sources of information that the government uses to develop foreign policy decisions does raise some genuine qualms.

Is it, for example, wise to have the same person who has something close to final authority on which international information should be passed on to the President also serve as the chief foreign policy adviser to the Chief Executive?

Further, does the consolidation have the effect of making the intelligence operations even more distant and cryptic by removing them farther from the Congress and the executive branch?

Finally, meriting some introspection, is the thought that it is better for the United States to have a degree of redundancy and even waste in its intelligence system than to have it become so efficient that it may become a security problem on its own.

BOSTON, MASS.

HERALD TRAVELER

NOV 15 1974

M - 194,557

The President's Prerogative

President Nixon has realigned the top echelon of the vast military-civilian intelligence complex in a manner he has deemed best suited to his needs. Predictably, a couple of senatorial scolds have raised a fuss.

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been freed from his day-to-day supervision of the CIA to coordinate that agency's work with the input of other intelligence-gathering departments, including the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

Moreover, the President has created a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, which will naturally include CIA director Helms but which will be chaired by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's special assistant for national security affairs and executive secretary of the National Security Council staff.

Senators J. William Fulbright and Stuart Symington object. They object, they say, because Congress was not consulted in advance and because

Mr. Kissinger's executive immunity from congressional supervision "further erodes congressional control over the intelligence community."

The President, of course, does not have to consult with or obtain the permission of Congress to create or reshuffle intelligence (or other) committees within the Executive Branch. Furthermore, the complaint that congressional control over the intelligence community is being "eroded" would have some credibility if direct congressional control were actually exercised or if such agencies as the CIA were created to serve Congress instead of the President.

The real target of the complaints is Mr. Kissinger, whom Sen. Fulbright and others have tried (unsuccessfully) to hale before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for interrogation. But to complain about Mr. Kissinger's position as chairman of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee is to cavil about titles. The fact is the CIA (and thus Mr. Helms) serves directly under the National Security Council and the Council's staff (and functions) are already under Mr. Kissinger's direction.

Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0013004

4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM News

STATION WMCA Radio

DATE November 15, 1971 10:00 PM

CITY New York

COVER STORY ON CIA CHIEF

ANNOUNCER: The gaudy era of the cloak-and-dagger superspy has passed, reports this week's Newsweek magazine. Today, satellites deliver vastly more information untouched by human hands. But America's intelligence community, which costs six billion dollars a year, has a special not-so-secret problem: 95 percent of its money is spent for gathering information, and only 5 percent for analyzing it.

Read the New Espionage American-style, cover story on CIA Chief Richard Helms and his top secret domain in Newsweek, the world's most quoted news weekly.

15 NOV 1971

INTELLIGENCE:

Helms at the Helm

For months the talk in Washington was that the President was about to reorder the nation's vast, \$8 billion military-civilian intelligence complex. Last week, in a two-page low-key announcement, the White House disclosed that Mr. Nixon had given Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms, 58, a broad mandate to unsharpen the U.S. intelligence-gathering agencies. Putting Helms at the helm, insiders predicted, might prove to be the most significant power realignment in U.S. intelligence since the CIA was founded in 1947.

Helms's new job falls well short of over-all intelligence "czar." Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger is still virtually the sole conduit of intelligence information to the President. And, significantly, Kissinger will chair the new National Security Council Intelligence Committee, which Mr. Nixon also created, to evaluate White House-bound data. But the President's order frees Helms of many of his routine CIA duties (which will be taken over by his deputy, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr.) so that he can devote his time to the task of coordinating and streamlining the nation's far-flung and disparate intelligence organizations, which include the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

HOUSTON, TEXAS

POST

NOV 14 1977

M - 294,677

S - 329,710

An intelligent move

The Nixon administration's plan to consolidate the activities of U.S. intelligence agencies operating abroad is a step toward further efficiency and economy in this vital and expensive bulwark of our national security.

Under the administration plan, Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms will supervise all U.S. foreign intelligence gathering operations. The revamping holds the promise of reducing conflicting and overlapping efforts by a plethora of U.S. intelligence organizations.

Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield and Republican Sen. George D. Aiken, both members of a special Senate review panel for CIA activities, have endorsed the reorganization plan. Speaking of the need for centralized administration of our intelligence work, Sen. Aiken said:

"We've had too many intelligence agencies. Every agency of government seems to have one — the Defense Department, the Navy, the Army, and God knows how many others. If you have more than two agencies of government working on the same thing they always try to undercut each other."

The public gets only sketchy indications of the huge sums spent by government agencies on intelligence gathering precisely because most such activities are classified. One indication appeared a few months ago in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report that the CIA spent well over \$100 million last year to halt North Vietnamese advances in Laos.

It remains to be seen what economies can be effected in intelligence agency budgets but it is reasonable to assume that some money can be saved through reduced duplication of effort and coordinated planning. The main goal, however, is improved efficiency. This country's economic troubles dictate that we get more mileage from our intelligence-gathering dollars as from other forms of government spending.

MANCHESTER, N.H.
 UNION-LEADER
 D - 58,903
 N.H. NEWS
 S - 49,019

NOV 14 1971

I Wonder Who's Kissinger Now

Walter Trohan (see column opposite page) may have something in his charge that it is Henry Kissinger who mesmerized Mr. Nixon into 180-degree flipflops on Red China and the Soviets. Trohan cites earlier writings of the Harvard "swinger" to show that his own "complete about face" on the Communists has been as flagrant as the President's and probably preceded it.

Nixon, be it noted, took to reversing his stands on major foreign and domestic issues only after he promoted the lady-killer to be his most trusted aide. Since then the President has vested increasing power in his "adviser for National Security Affairs," by-passing the rest of his cabinet, including Sec. of State Rogers.

Last week this culminated in the appointment of Kissinger to head up a committee which will shake up, and thereafter supervise, all the intelligence agencies including CIA. CIA's highly regarded director, Richard Helms, was booted upstairs to the nominal post of overall intelligence chief, under Kissinger's direct control.

Angry protests came from Congress, whose members charge a deliberate attempt by Mr. Nixon to erode the statutes which give them at least theoretical control of the intelligence community. Congress was

furnished no details on the CIA shakeup nor the reasons for it. Meanwhile rumors persist that Mr. Nixon is taking steps to get rid of J. Edgar Hoover. Is Kissinger to take over both the CIA and the FBI?

And what is it that our double-back-somersaulting President and his fair-haired boy have in mind as new directions for the intelligence agents? Will the latter now be hamstrung in their probes of Communist espionage, already redoubled by the Soviets and certain to be stepped up by Peking's appointees to the UN?

We find the emergence of Kissinger as boss of intelligence even more disturbing than his role as de-facto Secretary of State. Who is this male Mata Hari really working for?

13 NOV 1971

Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0013004

*Capital Fare***Get Intelligence Wholesale?**

By Andrew Tully

The McNaught Syndicate, Inc.

WASHINGTON — Dr. Henry Kissinger by now is known to most Americans who are interested in the news as a White House personality who moonlights as a man-about-town with an eye for a pretty girl. Since this is evidence that President Nixon's assistant for National Security Affairs is human, I am capable of restraining my enthusiasm for the role Kissinger has been given in Nixon's reorganization of the intelligence community.

Indeed, I find myself wondering whether Kissinger's power over foreign policy rivals that of the President, which is not good. It is not good because the doctor would be less than the human being he has revealed himself to be if he did not enjoy power, and use it.

Most reports on the reordering of our spy shop have emphasized that CIA Director Richard Helms will be the czar of all intelligence agencies, including those inside the Pentagon. His most powerful weapon, in a government where one name for the power game is the dollar, will be in his new assignment to draw up one budget for the entire espionage establishment.

That's splendid because Helms was not born yesterday and he is aware that President Nixon

is annoyed at the high cost of international snooping — some \$5 billion a year. No one has to tell Helms his No. 1 priority is to get intelligence as wholesale as possible.

But it says here that the real boss of intelligence could very well be Henry Kissinger, whose new title is chairman of the new National Security Council Intelligence Committee, charged with providing "guidance and direction" to Chief Helms. In effect, Kissinger through his committee not only will tell Helms how to run the show, but will decide which intelligence assessments find their way to the President's desk. Power in Washington lies not only in having the ear of the President; it is also in refusing the President's ear to others of a dissenting viewpoint.

In his new role, Kissinger will have it both ways. His committee and his personal staff will initiate intelligence studies, and then will edit the resulting opinions and options before presentation to the Oval Office.

To be sure, Helms has the power to submit his own recommendations directly to Nixon, and so have Secretary of State William Rogers, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But since Kissinger's job is to take the task of reviewing options off the presidential shoulders, a dissenter already will have two strikes on him. Nixon does not

often give a subordinate an assignment and then second-guess him; he lives by the executive book. And you can count the occasions on the fingers of one hand when the President has overruled his highly competent national security aide.

Indeed, Nixon's reorganization has merely put into fine print what Kissinger has been doing for three years. Without any spelled-out authority, Kissinger's Senior Review Group has always been Nixon's personal State Department. Under a Presidential directive, the Group invites policy options from State, Defense, CIA, then recommends what action the President should take.

The difference now is that there is a document bearing Richard Nixon's signature which says no intelligence assessment or proposed operation will be approved until it has gone through Kissinger's shop. Richard Helms is the czar of all the intelligence czars, but only at Henry Kissinger's pleasure.

The new system may be the best possible solution to bringing the sprawling intelligence community, with its more than 260,000 employees, under Presidential control. At the same time, I don't consider it overly boorish to point out who's got the real power in this one. Contemplating Kissinger's new role, in some leafy haven across the Styx, Richelieu must be frantic with envy.

13 NOV 1971

The World at Weekend

White House conspiracy

The concentration of ever greater power in the White House and the inner circles of the Nixon Administration is continuing to an alarming extent.

The latest development is the concentration of the enormous intelligence (in plain words, spying) network in the hands of a sub-committee of the National Security Council. This sub-committee is headed by Henry Kissinger, Nixon's adviser on national security affairs. It includes Attorney General John Mitchell, an ultra-Rightist of the Nixon brand, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), will have an enhanced "overall supervisory role."

The setup is like a dream of the military-industrial complex come true. It fits into the increasingly tighter state-monopoly capitalist framework of the United States and the developing fascistic patterns the most aggressive, oppressive and racist sections of the state-monopoly capitalist setup are imposing.

Nixon's action was caustically denounced by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo) as "a further erosion of Congressional control over the intelligence community."

Nixon has on various occasions invaded the area assigned to Congress by the Constitution, as in his expansion of the powers of the Subversive Activities Control Board, or in the Treasury Department's arbitrary decision to give corporations a \$37 billion tax bonanza over ten years.

Just as the Nixon economic policy contains the "seeds of a fascist economic structure," these moves are the seeds of a fascist political structure.

STATINTL

KEOKUK, IOWA
GATE CITY

NOV 13 1971
E - 8,930

U.S. spy network

It is amazing that in all the years that the United States has been a super power, there was not a super intelligence agency to determine the relative strategic balance between major powers. This would have enabled our defense department to correct any faults that were found, and to meet all challenges to our security.

That the Soviet buildup of nuclear arms and naval power could reach such proportions, before we took measures to counter them, is a cause for national dismay. This development is believed to have brought about the reorganization of the American intelligence community into a network that perhaps should have been organized long ago.

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has been given 30 days to reorganize its own office so that he can become the head of the new network, to coordinate civilian and military intelligence and bring the military

role under civilian control. Lt. Gen. Robert M. Cushman, Helms' deputy, will take over operating responsibilities for CIA.

Unofficially, the various intelligence agencies in the government are said to employ an army of 200,000 persons, at home and abroad, at a cost of some \$5 billion a year. It is a huge and very important undertaking. Helms will supervise the consolidated intelligence network and the budget it will require. He will be responsible for national intelligence requirements and priorities, the security of intelligence data and the protection of sources and methods used.

The results will be channeled to the National Security Council, which will make White House assessments of the relative strategic balance between major powers and evaluate intelligence quality. If this plan creates the intelligence that can keep the nation at peace through strength, it will be worth the huge outlay of men and money collecting it.

MILWAUKEE, WISC.

JOURNAL

NOV 13 1971

E - 359,036

S - 537,875

Cloak and Dagger Hidden From Congress

The US intelligence network, a hydra-like structure of which the Central Intelligence Agency is a major portion, has always been a headache for the executive and Congress. For the White House there has been the problem of management and co-ordination; for Congress the problem of determining accountability.

President Nixon has attempted to solve his management problem. Last week he announced a reorganization that would elevate CIA Director Richard Helms to a position of super-co-ordinator of all intelligence activities. He tied the whole apparatus more tightly into the National Security Council through a new National Security Council Intelligence Committee headed by presidential adviser Kissinger. Presumably the White House hopes to be better able to keep its thumb on intelligence operations and budgets, to suppress the petty jealousies that exist between such units as the FBI and the CIA and to cut down on the competitive duplication of work

done by various intelligence organizations both in and out of the military. It is a valiant attempt. Former Defense Secretary McNamara tried it within the Pentagon structure and achieved only a modicum of success.

The administration moves, however, do not solve the needs of the money granting body, Congress. In fact, Senators Fulbright and Symington Thursday expressed strong fears that tucking the intelligence community more firmly into the White House structure will withdraw it even further from congressional monitoring.

Their point is well taken. Right now there are few requirements for the CIA to tell Congress what it is doing. Its budget is secreted in other agencies. There is every reason to believe that Kissinger will refuse to testify before Congress as he has before, claiming executive privilege. Traditional congressional checks are missing. And that is a dangerous situation.

Good wishes, Mr. Helms

President Nixon has made an interesting move intended to correct a condition which got his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, into a lot of trouble. We can only hope, for the sake of the future welfare of the American republic, that much comes of it.

The move is to give to Richard Helms, director of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), a broader mandate aimed at coordinating intelligence gathering and weighing in Washington.

The condition that needs correcting has been documented in two recent publications. Lyndon Johnson's new book, "The Vantage Point" does it gently. The chapter on the Tet offensive carries the following statements:

"... we did not expect them to attack as many (population centers) as they did. ..."

"We expected a large force to attack; it was larger than we estimated."

"... the scale of the attacks and the size of the Communist force were greater than I had anticipated."

In other words the information about the capabilities of the enemy in Vietnam which got through to the President in the White House was not very good. If better information was available, he didn't get it.

The Pentagon papers provide much more and broader detail on the same subject, and also point out where and how it happened.

They show that in the American intelligence community there are many houses, and two of them almost always got their assessments right, but that they didn't succeed in getting through to the President (perhaps in part because it wasn't what he wanted to hear).

It comes out clearly from "the papers" that Mr. Johnson agreed to the big escalation of the American commitment in Vietnam in 1965 on the assumption that a half million Americans in a relatively small Asian country would "nail the coonskin to the door" in ample time for the presidential election of 1968.

But the basis for such a mistaken evaluation did not come from either the CIA

or from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. These two offices were consistently skeptical about what could be done in Vietnam with the American forces allotted to the task. The optimism which lay behind the 1965 decision came from within Mr. Johnson's own White House and from the separate intelligence operations of the various armed forces at the Pentagon.

And it was from non-CIA and non-State sources that Mr. Johnson got a general impression of the military situation which caused him surprise at the time of Tet.


The logical answer is, of course, to take the top man from the agency which had the best track record on intelligence during the Vietnam war and put him in broader charge of all the much uncoordinated intelligence activities of the federal government. And this, of course, is precisely what Mr. Nixon is trying to do.

Mr. Helms is told, in effect, to survey the whole intelligence scene in Washington; try to draw it together; try to make it more efficient and less expensive; and get it in shape to produce the kind of intelligence analysis which will not mislead future presidents as Mr. Johnson was misled.

It sounds easy. It isn't. A president may try to do something like this. But there is no fury like that of an armed service deprived of its own special intelligence branch, for it is on the evaluations of its own intelligence that its appropriations for the following year are based.

Army intelligence stresses the might of the Russian Army. Navy intelligence stresses the might of the Russian Navy. Etc., etc.

Intelligence in Washington can neither be coordinated nor made less expensive by avoidance of overlapping work except after a battle on every frontier. Every department and branch thereof in Washington is a stockade of privilege and vested interest. Mr. Helms is like an Indian chieftain on the American frontier who sets out to overrun every white stockade from Fort Laramie back to the Mississippi River. We wish him well.



Editorials

Secret police threat

The restructuring of the U.S. intelligence agencies ordered by President Nixon recalls the promotion of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris by Hitler a generation ago. Canaris was installed as head of the Nazi intelligence agencies to make them into a more effective instrument of the fascist regime.

The new responsibilities placed by the President on Henry Kissinger and Richard Helms are intended, similarly, to concentrate control of the nation's secret police in Nixon's hands.

Kissinger will head the National Security Council's intelligence committee which will also include Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Attorney General John Mitchell; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It will thus embrace the major law-enforcement, civilian espionage, and military intelligence forces.

Secret police operations will be coordinated by the United States Intelligence Board headed by Helms. The board will also include the deputy CIA director, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and representatives of the Treasury Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The effect of the President's action is, as Senators J.W. Fulbright and Stuart Symington have said, to insulate the secret police operations from Congressional inquiry or control. That is to be accomplished by claiming White House "executive privilege" for them through Kissinger.

The Senate itself has abetted Nixon's moves, for the Senate subcommittee which is supposed to supervise the CIA "has not met once this year," as Symington admitted.

The centralization of control over the secret police forces is a step toward the creation of the police-state which Nixon has in mind. His attempt to subvert the Supreme Court and his creation of the Pay Board to handcuff the trade union movement are part of the same program.

The President's secret-police moves are a threat to Constitutional government as it exists in the United States. They merit the animosity and opposition of all Americans.

LITTLE ROCK, ARK.

GAZETTE

NOV 12 1971

M - 108,821

S - 124,741

"This Is Control . . . the Chief Speaking . . ."



ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376
S - 541,868

NOV 12 1971

More Executive Secrecy?

A further indication of the tendency of the Nixon Administration to keep vital information from Congress is suggested by the recent White House announcement of a reorganization of the government's intelligence operations. The reorganization plan would, among other things, give Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the authority to co-ordinate his own budget with those of intelligence agencies in the State and Defense departments. But more significantly, from the standpoint of Congress, it would vest responsibility for making the so-called "net assessment" of intelligence data in a unit working under Dr. Henry Kissinger as head of the National Security Council staff.

Senators Symington and Fulbright are properly concerned that this overhaul may mean that intelligence operations will be even further beyond the reach of Congress than they already are. Despite repeated attempts in the Senate to enact bills requiring the CIA to make reports to responsible Senate and House committees and to compel the CIA at least to reveal its gross budget, Congress has so far not acted.

With Dr. Kissinger having final responsibility for making the intelligence assessment on which the President presumably will act,

Senator Fulbright for good reason sees "a further erosion of congressional control over the intelligence community." On the basis of a claim of executive privilege, Dr. Kissinger has avoided testifying before congressional committees.

While conceding that the changes could be constructive, Senator Symington wants to hold hearings on the reorganization in order to ask questions about what it means as to the assignment given by Congress to the CIA. Obviously, Congress should be kept informed about intelligence activities, not only because Congress is expected to appropriate money for them but also because, in legislating in response to presidential requests, the legislators should have access to the same data on which the executive is relying for making its judgments.

Recent disparate analyses by the CIA and the Defense Department as to the nature and strength of Soviet capabilities lead to the suspicion that the White House would like to produce an intelligence estimate over which it has firmer control and which Congress would have to accept. Such a development would hamper Congress in making independent legislative judgments and in serving as a check upon the excessive power of the executive.

11 NOV 1971

*National News*

STATINTL

White House gains by intelligence shift

WASHINGTON — Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo) and J. William Fulbright (D-Ark) charged Wednesday that President Nixon reshaped the U.S. intelligence network, placing more control in the hands of Henry Kissinger, his adviser on national security, to evade Congressional supervision.

Symington made the charge in a Senate speech.

Fulbright told a reporter that the reorganization of the spy and intelligence network was "a further erosion of Congressional control over the intelligence community." He pointed out that Kissinger has steadily refused to testify before Congressional committees.

The new development began with the announcement by the White House last Friday that intelligence was being reorganized to "improve efficiency and effectiveness."

Richard Helms, currently CIA director, was given charge of all intelligence operations, including those of the military services. Kissinger was put in charge of a subcommittee of the National Security Council whose function is to review intelligence operations. On this new subcommittee with Kissinger is Attorney General John Mitchell and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Symington asked whether this new White House committee "has been given authority and/or responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of the CIA, and which the Congress, under the National Security Act, vested in the agency."

He also charged that the White House action, "unilaterally decreed," did not reveal what caused the shakeup, and in effect was hiding information from Congress.

4 LOUISVILLE, KY.

TIMES Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0013004400
STATINTL

E - 173,180

NOV 11 1971

Symington Questions Shake-Up in Intelligence

By PETER LISAGOR

© Chicago Daily News Service

WASHINGTON—If the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and allied units in the government have been inefficient or unresponsive, Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., wants to know how and why.

Symington, ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also wants an explanation of why appropriate congressional committees were not consulted in advance of administrative changes in the intelligence operations announced by President Nixon last Friday.

A White House spokesman says there were consultations with key congressional leaders before the changes were made. But Symington says that the CIA subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee has not met this year.

Symington's challenge centered on the administration's alleged failure to consult Congress. While he admitted the changes might be "constructive," he posed several questions based on the White House press release that described the reorganization as an effort to improve the "efficiency and effectiveness" of all U.S. intelligence.

It would provide an "enhanced leadership role" for the CIA's director and would give presidential adviser Henry

Kissinger responsibility for making a net assessment of all available intelligence.

Symington asked in a statement on the Senate floor how the role of CIA Director Richard Helms was being "enhanced" by the "creation" of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the President for national security affairs.

He also noted that the attorney general and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will sit on the new committee. Symington asked two questions about it:

"Has this new White House committee been given authority or/and responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of the CIA; and which the Congress, under the National Security Act, vested in the agency?"

"How can the integrity of the intelligence product be assured when responsibility for the most critical aspects of intelligence analysis is taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in a combination of military professionals and the White House staff?"

STATINTL

NEW ORLEANS, LA.
TIMES-PICAYUNE
NOV 1 1 1971
M - 196,345
S - 308,949

Tightening Up Spy System

Reforms in the structure of the nation's "intelligence community" recently announced by the President are aimed at producing three needed results: more coherent overall direction and budgeting, more control over the military agencies by the civilian agency and more control over it all by the President.

Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms is to have the government-wide coordinating role, his authority backed up by his holding the budgetary reins of the military agencies as well as his own.

*A new National Security Council intelligence committee, headed by the presidential adviser on national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, will be the direct conduit to the President as both giver of orders and evaluator of results.

It is denied but openly suspected that the reforms took this particular shape because of top-level dissatisfaction with the performances of the military intelligence branches.

It is necessary for an intelligence system to have several different sources and channels of information. It may be more costly, involve some duplication and promote cross-purposes and complexity, but the alternative is a monolithic agency whose reports may not have the needed balance and cannot easily be evaluated by the chief user, the President.

Placing the smaller branches under stricter coordination by the larger, we hope, can keep the best features of this situation while eliminating many of the worst.

NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST

EVENING - 623,245
WEEKEND - 354,797

NOV 11 1971

Challenge Nixon on CIA Shift

By PETER LISAGOR

WASHINGTON (CDN)—
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Kissinger at Top

The reshuffling would provide an "enhanced leadership role" for the CIA's director and would place re-

sponsibility for making a net assessment of all available intelligence under Presidential advisor Henry A. Kissinger.

Symington asked in a statement on the Senate floor how the role of the CIA's director, Richard Helms, would be "enhanced" by the "creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the advisor to the President for national security affairs."

The Senator also noted that the Attorney General and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also will sit on the new committee. And he asked two questions:

"Has this new White House committee been given authority or/and responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of the CIA, and which the Congress, under the National Security Act, vested in the agency?" And:

"How can the integrity of the intelligence product be assured when responsibility of intelligence analysis is taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in a combination of military professionals and the White House staff?"

White House sources said that the reorganization gives Kissinger no additional authority and was basically designed to evaluate the product of the intelligence community better.

STATINTL

..STATINTL

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 463,503


S - 867,810

NOV 11 1971

Washington Dateline

Senators Challenge Intelligence Shuffle

Sens. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) and J. William Fulbright (D, Ark.) said Wednesday that President Nixon had reshaped the nation's intelligence network to vest more control in the hands of White House adviser Henry Kissinger without Congressional advice.



Sen. Symington

"Symington, in a Senate speech, called for a full review by the Senate Armed Services Committee. He charged that critical aspects of intelligence analysis had been taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in the military and the White House staff.

Fulbright, asked for comment by a reporter, said the reorganization was "a further erosion of Congressional control over the intelligence community" on grounds that Kissin-

ger, in his position as the President's national security adviser, was insulated from Congressional scrutiny.

The White House announced last Friday that intelligence activities were being restructured to improve their "efficiency and effectiveness." CIA director Richard Helms was given control over all intelligence activities while Kissinger was placed in charge of a subcommittee of the National Security Council to review intelligence operations.

STATINTL

SACRAMENTO, CAL.
UNION

M - 82,122
S - 80,531

NOV 11 1971

Game Without Rules

'Streamlining' Intelligence May Add to Security Risks

To most Americans, the intelligence-gathering activities abroad by the United States of America — spying in less charitable terms — is a mysterious matter because their closest brush with it is usually a glamorized but distorted James Bond movie.

Thus, the action of President Nixon to integrate the far-flung activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and other similar groups, is unlikely to arouse the average citizen for long, although it should. It is his own survival, as well as his tax dollar, that is at stake.

By the same token, the complexity, cryptic qualities of these agencies make the average citizen unqualified to discuss the specifics of the subject with any authority. He is obliged to speak of national intelligence in terms of goals and principles.

As a first principle, it would appear that we must always undertake whatever level of intelligence gatherings that is essential to our security.

In carrying out this principle, we should not be surprised, if on occasion, the pursuit of information is not savory, for this is a game without rules.

We should not be surprised at the cost, because intelligence ranges from the observations of a lookout posted on a hill in Cambodia to information acquired by the most sophisticated and expensive electronic masterpieces.

We should ensure that there always is a

diversity of sources reporting to the President and that there are adequate checks and balances as to the validity of the intelligence.

Over the years, Congress has authorized a number of intelligence agencies that range from those in the executive branch of government to those in the military services.

On occasion, the information that they have given the President has been faulty. But, by and large, the combined effort has been a success.

Therefore, the proposed administrative action which narrows the funnel through which the information that the government uses to develop foreign-policy decisions does raise some genuine qualms.

Is it, for example, wise to have the same person who has something close to final authority on which international information should be passed on to the President also serve as the chief foreign-policy adviser to the Chief Executive?

Further, does the consolidation have the effect of making the intelligence operations even more distant and cryptic by removing them farther from the Congress and the executive branch?

Finally, meriting some introspection, is the thought that it is better for the United States to have a degree of redundancy and even waste in its intelligence activities than to have it become so efficient that it may become a security problem on its own.

ST. LOUIS, MO.

GLOBE-DEMOCRAT

Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440

MORNING - 292,789

WEEKEND - 306,889

NOV 11 1971

Symington challenges

intelligence shakeup

By EDWARD W. O'BRIEN
Chief of the Globe-Democrat
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, said Wednesday the "integrity" of U.S. intelligence analyses may be threatened by a recent White House move which he charged gives more power to presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger.

In a Senate speech Symington challenged the intelligence reorganization announced last Friday for the White House as designed to shift responsibility for "the most critical aspects" of intelligence interpretation and vest it instead in "a combination of military professionals and the White House staff."

Symington asked the Senate Armed Services Committee to hold hearings on the reorganization and obtain "answers" which have not been disclosed by the White House.

THE COMMITTEE chairman, Sen. John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi, made no immediate reply.

In his speech Symington noted acidly that the Senate central intelligence subcommittee, a unit of the armed services group, "has not met once this year."

The subcommittee is supposedly one of the key agencies which Congress uses to assure itself of proper supervision of highly secret intelligence operations around the world.

Though Symington mentioned Kissinger only by job title and not by name, his speech amounted to a renewed criticism that Kissinger, as President Nixon's top security assistant, has been given tremendous powers and yet is beyond the reach of congressional committees which want to question him.

IN A PREVIOUS headline-

making speech, Symington charged that Kissinger is widely regarded around town as the real secretary of state.

In his latest speech, Symington suggested that the same downgrading may be happening to Richard Helms, the highly regarded chief of the CIA.

Symington's worry, he implied, is that such critical analyses as comparisons of the United States and the Soviet in strategic military weaponry may be influenced or manipulated to make them fit presidential and Pentagon policies.

The White House announcement Friday asserted that Helms will enjoy "an enhanced leadership role" in the new setup.

BUT SYMINGTON SAID:

"How is the leadership role of the CIA director 'enhanced' by the creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the President for national security affairs (Kissinger), on which new board sits not only the attorney general but also the chairman of the Pentagon joint chiefs of staff?"

The effect of the reorganization, Symington said, will be to "bring the most important aspects of intelligence production and coordination directly under the White House."

Congress already is "severely restricted" in obtaining intelligence analyses, he said, and may find itself in worse shape through increased application by the President of the doctrine

of "executive privilege" in refusing to share secret information with Congress.

In an interview, Sen. J. W. Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, agreed with Symington that the reorganization means "a further erosion of congressional controls" over intelligence operations.

ST. LOUIS, MO
POST-DISPATCH

STATINTL

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E - 326,376
S - 541,868

NOV 11 1971

Demands Hearings On Intelligence Changes

By LAWRENCE E. TAYLOR
A Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 11 — Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, called yesterday for congressional hearings on the Nixon Administration's reorganization of American intelligence operations.

Symington said in a Senate speech that although many questions about the restructuring were unanswered, one thing was clear: The White House "does not consider either the organization or the operations of the intelligence community to be matters of concern to the Congress."

The changes ordered last Friday by President Richard M. Nixon brought American intelligence and spying operations under closer control of the White House. There were reports, however, that the move had been made, in part, because of what Symington termed "general unhappiness about various specific intelligence estimates."

"Unfortunately, however, it has been impossible for the public, or even concerned members of Congress, to obtain enough information on this subject for informed judgment," he said.

Symington said he had asked for hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or by its subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency. He is a member of each.

The intelligence shake-up last week provided a stronger role for Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and created several new groups to assess and direct intelligence operations.

Among them was the establishment of a "net assessment group" within the National Security Council. There were indications that one of the group's chief concerns would be an evaluation of the balance between the United States and Russia in terms of weapons, economics and politics.

In recent months Government experts have disagreed on the balance of power between the two nations. Department of Defense analysts, including Secretary Melvin R. Laird, have contended that the USSR was gaining strength rapidly. The CIA, on the other hand, had appeared more skeptical about Russian power and capabilities.

Mr. Nixon said that the reorganization was ordered after a full study by the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said the reorganization was "a further erosion of congressional control over the intelligence community."

He pointed out that Henry A. Kissinger, placed in charge of the review group, was insulated from congressional scrutiny in his position as the President's national security adviser.

Symington, in his address, said that the changes could be constructive, but, he said, Congress should not be eliminated from the picture.

He said that he would not accept the proposition "that our only current and continuing responsibility is to appropriate whatever number of billions of dollars the executive branch requests to handle this work."

Instead, Congress needs answers to such questions as what were the deficiencies in the U.S. intelligence operation, in what way should it be made more responsive and what is implied by the White House reference to "strengthened leadership" in intelligence?

Symington questioned how Helms's leadership role would be "enhanced," as the White House contended, "by the creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the President for national security affairs (Kissinger), on which new board not only sits

the Attorney General but also the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

"Has this new White House committee been given authority or/and responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of the CIA; and which the Congress, under the National Security Act, vested in the agency?" Symington asked.

"How can the integrity of the intelligence product be assured when responsibility for the most critical aspects of intelligence analysis is taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in a combination of military professionals and the White House staff?"

Fulbright, Symington Hit Kissinger Powers

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) and J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) expressed concern yesterday that new powers given to Henry A. Kissinger over U.S. intelligence operations might be used to deny information to Congress.

In part this is the latest version of a running controversy over what some senators see as the ever-growing power of the President's influential national security adviser, who is beyond the reach of Congress.

But it also represents suspicion that the White House may be creating new barriers for which could restrict Congress access to differing intelligence evaluations.

Symington, on the Senate floor, called for hearings to examine the purpose and consequences of the Nixon administration's reorganization of the control structure for the national intelligence systems, announced last Friday. He protested that there was no advance consultation, and that "the Executive Branch does not consider either the organization, or the operation, of the intelligence community to be matters of concern to the Congress."

Congressional access to information about U.S. intelligence activities is "already severely restricted far more than other aspect of the federal budget," Symington protested.

It may be that the reorganization "is a constructive move" to eliminate duplication and waste, said Symington, and that should be examined. However, he said, the new plan will lead to "the creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the president for national security affairs (Kissinger)..."

This arrangement, Symington said, can bring the most important aspects of intelligence production and coordination "directly under the White House" and "thus within the scope of what the President believes he can deny to the Congress through the exercise of executive privilege."

Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told newsmen that Kissinger's new authority represents "a further erosion of congressional control over the intelligence community." Fulbright earlier this year introduced what was dubbed "the Kissinger bill," to set up new rules to limit the exercise of executive privilege, which the President can invoke to keep Congress from questioning Kissinger and other White House advisers.

Symington said that last Saturday he wrote Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, urging hearings on the intelligence shift be held before either that committee or its Subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency.

As a senior member of both groups, Symington disclosed yesterday that despite claims that there is constant congressional supervision of the CIA, the Senate CIA Subcommittee "has not met once this year."

Symington is the only congressman who is a member of both the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees.

S 17996

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

November 10, 1971

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Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I agree that the foreign aid program needs a very careful review next year, when we reconvene.

I also agree that certain things need to be done. I agree that there should be reform. Meanwhile, I want a program that will help people.

Ninety-three percent of the funds spent in the foreign aid program are spent within the United States. They involve the labors of 5,000 companies and over 60,000 people, many of whom would be out of work by the ending of such a program arbitrarily or by its excessive diminution.

This is a program to help people. That is why the AFL-CIO is interested in it and has long been interested in it.

It is a program to help people, too, in the other countries of the world. It is a program to help children through UNICEF. It is a program to help the developing countries by means of the developing funds, the multilateral funds, and many of the bilateral funds.

It is a program by which we are enabled to keep our promises and our treaties. It is a program by which we have undertaken to see that, as we withdraw from a long and unpopular war, we do not leave those who remain totally abandoned, utterly unprovided for, and, further, embittered at the ingratitude of the United States.

As a Nation, we have made our covenants. We have given our bonds. We have furnished our assurances to the other peoples of the world. If, for no other reason, we will have to continue the program. Then after we do, let us, by all means, review it. After all, any program that has been in existence for 25 years can stand review.

Let us see if we cannot get one which is less expensive, one which is less costly in the misunderstandings it brings about, one which is more fully in the enlightened self-interest of America, and one which does more fully meet the modern problems of the rest of the world, rather than being structured on the basis of the problems of the world as they were 25 years ago.

I think that the Senate in a spirit of conciliation and compromise is about ready to adopt the proposed new foreign aid program. I think the Senate is perfectly capable of writing a good and a new one. I think we can write it on Capitol Hill. I think that we know our job and are prepared to perform in accordance with it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what the Committee on Foreign Relations reported was a less expensive program. What the administration wants is a continuing resolution, which would be a more expensive program. Furthermore, the program has turned into an arms sales and an arms grant program, by means of which we shift, to a large extent, obsolete weapons of various kinds to various countries and, in that way, build up a dependency, a process which I think is open to question. This country has become the largest arms dealer in the world.

I think it is about time to put a stop to this kind of program and to call it

what it is. That is the purpose of the two bills which will be before the Senate today and tomorrow. I am only sorry that the proposals were not broken down into three parts—economic, humanitarian, and military. This was attempted. Unfortunately, the votes were not present to operate on that basis.

I hope, and I am very sure, the Senate will take a close and a hard look at the proposals now before it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I should like to associate myself with the words of the distinguished majority leader.

In listening to the news media last night and this morning, many high officials in this administration were lecturing the Senate as to its recent actions on foreign aid. I, for one, do not intend to be sandbagged by any heavy onslaught against the decisions of the Senate.

I also believe it is about time we recognize that the American taxpayer cannot afford to spend tens of billions of dollars to destroy many of these countries—only recently we started on another one, Cambodia—and then spend tens of billions of dollars bringing them back to some form of reasonable economic stability.

I would like to also associate myself with the remarks of the majority leader with respect to the continuing resolution. In my opinion, at this point and under these circumstances, a continuing resolution would be an abandonment on the part of the legislative branch of its prerogatives and responsibilities under the Constitution.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. In accordance with the previous order, the distinguished Senator from Missouri is now recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, last Friday the White House announced that the President had ordered a reorganization of the intelligence community. I ask unanimous consent that their press release to this end be printed in the Record at the conclusion of these remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as reported by the press, the administration's plan creates an "enhanced leadership role" for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, turns more of the operating responsibility for that Agency over to the Deputy Director, who is a lieutenant general in the Marine Corps, and creates or reconstitutes a variety of boards, committees, and groups who are charged with important responsibilities within the intelligence community.

The reported aim of the reorganization is to improve the "efficiency and effectiveness" of U.S. intelligence activities and press comments on this move include references to alleged concern over the size

and cost of intelligence operations; also to general unhappiness about various specific intelligence estimates. Such reports have been officially denied, but it is acknowledged that this reorganization is the result of "an exhaustive study" of the U.S. intelligence activities.

It could be that the reorganization announced last week by the White House is a constructive move. In recent years there has been a growing belief that there was heavy duplication and therefore waste within the overall intelligence community. Unfortunately, however, it has been impossible for the public, or even concerned Members of Congress, to obtain enough information on this subject for informed judgment.

By the same token, it is equally impossible to determine, at least at this time, whether the organization changes now decreed will accomplish their stated purposes, or to determine what will be their practical effect.

One thing is clear, based on the manner in which the reorganization was handled and announced; namely, the executive branch does not consider either the organization, or the operation, of the intelligence community to be matters of concern to the Congress. To my knowledge there was no advance consultation whatever with the Congress regarding this reorganization, or even any advance notice of what had been decided.

In 1947 the Central Intelligence Agency was established by act of Congress. Its powers and duties are specified by law. Its Director and Deputy Director are subject to confirmation by the Senate.

Last year the Congress appropriated an amount estimated by the press to be between \$5 and \$6 billion for the activities of this Agency and the other component parts of the intelligence community.

As one Member of the Senate, I will not accept the proposition that the role of Congress in organizing the intelligence community ended 24 years ago with the passage of the National Security Act, or that our only current and continuing responsibility is to appropriate whatever number of billions of dollars the executive branch requests so as to handle this work.

Last Saturday, when I learned from the press about this intelligence reorganization, as ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services, I wrote the chairman of that committee, requesting hearings either by the full committee or by the CIA subcommittee, of which I have been a member for some 15 years. In that letter I presented the fact that this subcommittee has not met once this year.

This latest reorganization on the face of it raises questions about past, present, and future performance of our multi-billion dollar annually intelligence community; questions such as:

If it has been inefficient, what and where were its deficiencies?

In what sense does it need to be more "responsive"?

What is implied about the past by the reference in the press release to the objective of insuring "strengthened leadership" in the future?

NOV 10 1975
E - 161,249
S - 215,360

CIA Gadfly Welcomes Move To Streamline Spy Action

Victor Marchetti was in Dayton today feeling a little better about the future of the Central Intelligence agency than he has in the past few months.

Marchetti, 41, worked for the agency 14 years. He left it two years ago and wrote a spy novel, "The Rope Dancers," which, he says, looks at the intelligence business realistically.

He also has been criticizing the agency, charging that it is too big, too wasteful, is dominated by the military and

lacks adequate congressional controls.

WHAT MADE Marchetti at least somewhat satisfied, if not happy with the agency, was the announcement from the White House last week that the agency's director, Richard Helms, has been given increased authority to coordinate and streamline the complicated U.S. intelligence community. Some cuts will be made in intelligence spending.

Marchetti does not exactly take credit for the action, but he said it vindicates the posi-

tion he has been taking in interviews and radio and television appearances.

Marchetti estimates that the U.S. intelligence community involves expenditures of about \$6 billion yearly and the efforts of 75,000 to 200,000 persons, depending upon the definition.

HE SAID he feels that \$1 billion to \$2 billion could be cut from the spending. Much of his criticism is leveled against the so-called action elements which involve paramilitary, psychological warfare, and political action as

opposed to the classical intelligence function of gathering and analyzing information.

He said the agency started its own "private war" in Laos, beginning in 1962, with U.S. spending running \$500 million yearly.

"The same kind of thing happened in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Cuba," he said.

CIA-Chef wird zum Boß der geheimen Bosse

Von HEINZ BARTH
Washington

Das Weiße Haus hat die seit langem erwartete Reorganisation der amerikanischen Nachrichtendienste angekündigt, bei der Richard Helms, dem Chef der Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), die Rolle eines Koordinators zufallen wird. Präsident Nixon hatte schon bald nach seinem Amtsantritt eine gründlichen Überprüfung der weitverbreiteten Organisationen angeordnet, die mit Spionageabwehr, Nachrichtenbeschaffung, strategischen Analysen und anderen sich teilweise überschneidenden Aufträgen betraut sind. Eine der entscheidenden Änderungen ist die zentrale Steuerung der Auslandsprogramme durch einen neugeschaffenen „Intelligence Board“, der von Helms geleitet werden soll.

Die Überholung des gesamten Nachrichtenapparates sieht keine Zusammenlegung von Dienststellen, wohl aber eine rationellere Aufgabenteilung zwischen ihnen vor. Helms ist vom Weißen Haus beauftragt, sein eigenes Büro in ein Lenkungsorgan auf Regierungsebene umzuwandeln. Es ist bekannt, daß er die von manchen Stellen der Nixon-



Die Hand auf der Kasse: Helms

Foto: UPI

Administration erwogene Zentralisierung der Nachrichtendienste in einer Hand angesichts der unterschiedlichen Aufgaben, die sie zu erfüllen haben, für unzuverlässig hält. An der strukturellen Trennung des zivilen vom militärischen Bereich der Geheimdienstorganisationen ändert sich also nichts. Helms erhält keine unmittelbare Befehlsgewalt über die nicht dem CIA angegliederten Dienste, trotzdem kann er sie künftig durch die Verteilung der Mittel steuern, die dafür im Haushaltsplan vorgesehen sind.

Mit der Koordinierung des Apparates unter der Oberaufsicht des CIA-Chefs beginnt für den amerikanischen Secret Service ein neuer Abschnitt. Sein beherrschendes Kennzeichen ist die Kontrolle, die der zivile Sektor in Zukunft über die militärischen Geheimdienste ausüben wird. Die Vermutung liegt nahe, daß zu dem Umbau die schwere Panne beitrug, die den militärischen Geheimdienst vor fast genau einem Jahr unterlief. Sie erlebten im November 1970 einen bösen Reinfall, als das Einsatzkommando, das eine Gruppe amerikanischer Kriegsgefangener in Nordvietnam aus dem Lager von Son Tay befreien sollte, dort nur verlassene Baracken vorfand.

Das Weiße Haus bestreitet, daß die Reorganisation auf diesen eklatanten Versager zurückzuführen ist. Tatsächlich waren die Reformpläne schon in Vorbereitung, bevor das Unternehmen von Son Tay scheiterte. Man kommt den Tatsachen wesentlich näher, wenn man den Entschluß der Nixon-Administration, die Nachrichtendienste kürzer an den Zügel zu nehmen, im Zusammenhang mit der allgemeinen Tendenz sieht, die militärischen Engagements in Übersee auf ein tragbares Maß herunterzuschrauben.

Kommando-Aktionen wie die der „Green Berets“ gehörten in Vietnam zu den weniger erbaulichen Aspekten der Kriegführung, zu der die Amerikaner durch die Vietkong-Methoden gezwungen wurden. In Laos ist der vom CIA finanzierte Einsatz der Stammesguerillas noch heute ein unentbehrlicher Faktor, um die Situation gegenüber der kommunistischen Invasion im Gleichgewicht zu halten.

Helms bleibt nominell Chef des CIA. Die praktische Arbeit an der Spitze dieser Organisation wird aber sein Stellvertreter, General Robert Cushman, zu leisten haben. Als maßgebende Autorität im Bereich des Nachrichtenwesens fungiert in Zukunft der Intelligence Board, dem unter dem Vorsitz von Helms neben Cushman ex officio die Chefs der Nachrichtenabteilungen von Pentagon und State Department sowie Vertreter des Finanzministeriums, des Bundeskriminalamtes FBI und der Atombehörde angehören. Daneben ist ein dem Nationalen Sicherheitsrat angegliederter Regierungsausschuß vorgesehen, der gegenüber den Nachrichtenorganisationen weisungsbefugt und bevollmächtigt ist, Urteile über die Brauchbarkeit der beschafften Informationen zu fällen. In dieser Funktion wird der Ausschuß durch einen Sonderstab unterstützt, dem es obliegt, neben der Qualität der Nachrichten auch das strategische Gleichgewicht zwischen Amerika und der Sowjetunion unter ständiger Überwachung zu halten.

Henry Kissinger, der Sicherheitsberater des Präsidenten, und Justizminister John Mitchell sind die maßgebenden Persönlichkeiten im Ausschuß. Es ist auf den ersten Blick erkennbar, daß mit der Reorganisation ein neuer und sehr fühlbarer Machtwuchs für Kissinger verbunden ist. Strukturell bleibt die Dezentralisierung der Nachrichtendienste erhalten. De facto aber laufen alle Fäden jetzt bei Kissinger und Helms zusammen, der die Hand auf der Kasse hat. Dadurch rückt Helms in den engsten Kreis der Männer um Nixon auf, die den außenpolitischen Kurs bestimmen.

Das bestätigt das hohe Ansehen, in dem dieser Diplomat unter den Geheimdienstspezialisten bei der Administration steht. Sein Aufstieg ist die Anerkennung für fachliche Qualität und Leistung, die im amerikanischen Nachrichtenwesen vor parteipolitischen Erwägungen rangiert. Es hat ihm nicht geschadet, daß in den McNamara-Papieren neben den vielen Stellen, die Vietnam falsch beurteilten, der CIA am besten abschnitt. Gemeinsam mit Kissinger bildet Helms ein Gespann, das nicht aus der taktischen Perspektive der Militärs, sondern aus der strategischen Übersicht der weltpolitischen Zusammenhänge planen wird.

KANSAS CITY, MO. Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00
STAR

E - 325,351
S - 396,682
NOV 10 1977

Symington Quiz on CIA

By John R. Cauley
Chief of The Star's Washington Bureau
Washington — Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said today the decision of the White House to reorganize the United States intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, "raises questions about the past, present and future performance" of the yearly multi-billion-dollar operation.

In a speech to the Senate Symington called for hearings on the reorganization by the armed services committee or by the CIA subcommittee of which he has been a member 15 years.

Symington noted the administration plan creates an "enhanced leadership role" for Richard Helms, director of the CIA, turned more of the operating responsibility for that agency over to the deputy director and reconstitutes a variety of boards, committees and groups that are charged with important responsibilities within the intelligence community.

Involved besides the CIA are the U.S. intelligence board, the national security agency, the defense intelligence activities and the national security council.

Symington said if the American intelligence operation has been inefficient, "what are where were its deficiencies? What sense does it need to be more responsive? What is implied about the past by the presence in the White House release to the objective of increasing strengthened leadership the future?"

The Missouri senator said

White House announcement offers neither answers to those questions nor explanation of the remedies which have now been decreed.

In calling for hearings Symington said the CIA subcommittee has not met this year and added he will not accept the proposition that the role of Congress in organizing the intelligence community ended 24 years ago with the passage of the national security act. Nor does Symington feel the only current and continuing responsibility of Congress is to appropriate whatever billions of dollars the White House requests in order to handle this work.

Symington said the reorganization could be a constructive move, but it has been impossible for the public or concerned members of Congress to obtain enough information to make an informed judgment.

In order to understand the action by the executive branch, Symington said Congress should know the answers to questions such as these:

"How is the leadership role of the director of the Central Intelligence Agency 'enhanced' by the creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the President for national security affairs, on which new board not only sits the attorney general but also the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?"

Has this new White House committee been given authority

and/or responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of CIA—responsibility which Congress vested in CIA?

How can the integrity of the intelligence product be assured when responsibility for the most critical aspects of intelligence analysis is taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in a combination of

military professionals and the White House staff?

How will access of Congress to information concerning intelligence activities and products, already severely restricted, be affected by bringing the most important aspects of intelligence production and co-ordination directly under the White House and thus within the scope of what the President believes he can deny to Congress through the exercise of executive privilege?

Symington noted Congress appropriated between 5 and 6 billion dollars for intelligence activities of the government.

STATINTL

EFFICIENCY NOT SOLE TEST

Intelligence Gives Security

To most Americans the intelligence gathering activities abroad by the United States of America — spying in least charitable terms — is a mysterious matter. Their closest brush with it is usually a glamorized but distorted James Bond movie.

Thus the action of President Nixon to integrate the far-flung activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and many other similar groups, is unlikely to arouse the average citizen for long, although it should. It is his own survival, as well as his tax dollar, that are at stake.

By the same token, the complexity and cryptic qualities of these agencies make the average citizen unqualified to discuss the specifics of the subject with any authority. He is obliged to speak of the problems of national intelligence in terms of goals and principles.

As a first principle, the average citizen would agree that we must always undertake whatever level of intelligence-gathering that is essential to our security. In carrying out this principle we should not be surprised if on occasion the pursuit of information is not savory, for this is a game without rules. We should not be surprised at the cost, because intelligence ranges from the observations of a lookout posted on a hill in Cambodia to information acquired by the most sophisticated and expensive electronic masterpieces.

As a second principle we should ensure that there always is a diversity of sources reporting to the President, and that there are adequate checks and balances as to the validity of the information provided.

Over the years Congress has authorized a number of intelligence agencies that range from those in the executive branch of government to those in the military services. On occasion the information that they have given the President has been conflicting, but by and large the combined effort has been a success.


Therefore, the proposed administrative action which narrows the sources of information that the government uses to develop foreign policy decisions does raise some genuine qualms.

Is it, for example, wise to have the same person who has something close to final authority on which international information should be passed on to the President also serve as the chief foreign policy adviser to the chief executive?

Further, does the consolidation have the effect of making the intelligence operations even more distant and cryptic by removing them farther from the Congress and the executive branch?

Finally, meriting some introspection, is the thought that it is better for the United States to have a degree of redundancy and even waste in its intelligence system than to have it become so efficient that it may become a security problem on its own.

'Able To Leap Tall Buildings...'



IT'S A BIRD?

IT'S A GUY!
NOT A PLANE!

By [signature]
Copley Newspapers

EFFICIENCY NOT SOLE TEST

Intelligence Gives Security

To most Americans the intelligence gathering activities abroad by the United States of America — spying in least charitable terms — is a mysterious matter. Their closest brush with it is usually a glamorized but distorted James Bond movie.

Thus the action of President Nixon to integrate the far-flung activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and many other similar groups, is unlikely to arouse the average citizen for long, although it should. It is his own survival, as well as his tax dollar, that are at stake.

By the same token, the complexity and cryptic qualities of these agencies make the average citizen unqualified to discuss the specifics of the subject with any authority. He is obliged to speak of the problems of national intelligence in terms of goals and principles.

As a first principle, the average citizen would agree that we must always undertake whatever level of intelligence-gathering that is essential to our security. In carrying out this principle we should not be surprised if on occasion the pursuit of information is not savory, for this is a game without rules. We should not be surprised at the cost, because intelligence ranges from the observations of a lookout posted on a hill in Cambodia to information acquired by the most sophisticated and expensive electronic masterpieces.

As a second principle we should ensure that there always is a diversity

of sources reporting to the President, and that there are adequate checks and balances as to the validity of the information provided.

Over the years Congress has authorized a number of intelligence agencies that range from those in the executive branch of government to those in the military services. On occasion the information that they have given the President has been conflicting, but by and large the combined effort has been a success.

Therefore, the proposed administrative action which narrows the sources of information that the government uses to develop foreign policy decisions does raise some genuine qualms.

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ATLANTA, GA.
JOURNAL
E - 257,863
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION
S - 536,497
Nov 9 1974

Bringing It Together

WHETHER President Nixon has really "brought us together" is a controversial and partisan matter which will be thoroughly hashed and rehashed in next year's campaigns.

But we welcome the news that he has brought together the various and varied intelligence gathering agencies of the federal government.

That there is a vital need for intelligence agencies is beyond question. One need only look about at the jungle world and it becomes apparent that we need to know a great deal about a great many things which are not normally published in the public press. That is, we need to know if we accept the premise that survival is a paramount issue.

It is natural, therefore, that over the years various agencies have evolved under various guises aimed at collecting needed information. But because they have worked separately, there has been a certain amount of duplication and overlapping.

And this is not only unnecessary expense. It is also a waste of energy de-

rived from using a shotgun approach instead of that of a high-powered rifle.

Thus President Nixon has directed a centralization of intelligence gathering within the federal government. It was not done off the top of his head. It was done after at least a year of careful study.

Appropriately enough, such efforts will be carried out under the supervision of Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the logical means of bringing together the divergent and independent efforts of other agencies.

Centralization of intelligence gathering should mean many benefits. Among them would be economy, both in terms of money and in terms of effort. Moreover, one director who is cognizant of what we are seeking and how we are seeking it should prove immensely more effective than several different directors going their own secret and independent ways.

This is a positive forward move. It should pay off in handsome dividends.

WASHINGTON POST

Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

Joseph Kraft

Recasting Intelligence

THE REORGANIZATION of the intelligence community announced last week looks at first glance like a mere administrative tightening. The producers of the raw intelligence are simply being made more responsive to the needs of the consumers in the White House.

But the Nixon administration is no more free than most others of the itch to enforce conformity. Unless very carefully watched, the new set-up could be one more device for destroying independent centers of analysis and information inside government.

The reorganization has two main components. For one thing, Richard Helms, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has been given authority to coordinate his own budget with those of the intelligence units within the Defense and State Departments.

Since Helms as CIA director is a member of most of the high-level policy committees in government, he is alert to the intelligence needs of the President and his closest advisers. Presumably he will be able—perhaps with considerable saving of money—to make the work of such intelligence outfits as the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency more relevant to White House needs. His part of the reorganization seems relatively straightforward.

THE SECOND PART of the reorganization involves what is called "net assessment." That is a fancy term for the answer to the question: How does the strategic balance stand between Russia and the United States? That question, with deep ramifications in politics and economics as well as foreign policy, is to the various private and public interests that come to a head in government what a piece of red meat is to a pack of starving dogs.

Under the Eisenhower administration the net assessment was handled by a secret subcommittee of the National Security Council headed by a general officer and working out of the Pentagon. In the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the net assessments were essentially made under the direction of Secretary Robert McNamara in the Systems Analysis Division of the Department of Defense.

Under the Nixon administration there has been no central responsibility for net assessment. The result has been a chaotic battle featuring many protagonists. In general, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, with the backing of his director of research John Foster and to the delight of congressional hawks, has tended to rate the Soviet threat very highly. The CIA, to the delight of congressional doves, has been more skeptical about the Communist menace.

Under the new reorganization, responsibility for making the net assessment will be vested in a group working under the head of the National Security Council staff, Dr. Henry Kissinger. The official immediately responsible for the net assessments will be Andrew Marshall, who now leaves the Rand corporation where he has been serving as an analyst to take a place on the NSC staff.

Mr. Marshall is by all accounts an extremely good man—experienced, reliable and discriminating in judgment. Presumably he can do a serious job of pulling together the vast range of complicated data required for making the net assessment.

BUT IT IS a serious question whether that office should be performed in such close range to the White House. For the atmosphere in the White House is heavily political. There is no great disposition toward de-

tached analysis, still less to hear news out of keeping with prejudices and commitments.

A nice case in point is the defense program review committee set up under Dr. Kissinger back in 1969. The purpose of that group was to cast a cold, analytic eye on the defense budget, and some of the best analysts in and out of government signed on to do the staff work.

But the President has backed the big spending program of Defense Secretary Laird. The review committee has been allowed to wither on the vine. Half a dozen of the analysts connected with it have resigned, and the senior official presently concerned, Dr. K. Wayne Smith, is rumored to be leaving soon.

No serious high level critique of the defense budget is now being made anywhere in government. That is one of the reasons the Congress, and those of us in the press, are floundering so when it comes to defense expenditures.

What all this means is that the new intelligence set-up should be watched with great care. It looks like a sensible arrangement. But it could easily become one more instrument for restricting information and criticism to the disadvantage of all of those on the outside of government.

STATINTL

Laird Sees Intelligence Merger Soon

HONOLULU — (AP) — Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said Saturday that the Pentagon is ready to carry out quickly President Nixon's new orders to consolidate federal intelligence-gathering operations.

"I believe the Department of Defense will be able ultimately to reduce costs because of these actions," Laird said in Honolulu for a stop-over while he was flying from Saigon to Washington after surveying the Vietnam situation for Nixon.

DEFENSE officials said the consolidations should save millions of dollars through elimination of duplications and reductions in staff but they said it is too early to estimate accurately how much costs will be cut.

The full extent of defense intelligence operations in their various forms never has been disclosed publicly, but a hint of their magnitude can be gleaned from an estimate that they involve about 150,000 people and about \$3 million a year.

Laird's statement came a day after the White House announced a reorganization of the wide-ranging intelligence apparatus of the government, giving Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms "an enhanced leadership role" and coordinating authority.

IN HIS statement, Laird appeared to be backing up the generals' and admirals' view that each armed force must have its own intelli-

gence arms.

Recalling streamlining proposals by his own blue-ribbon defense panel, Laird said "we have paid particular attention to intelligence, including the need to maintain the intelligence capabilities of the four armed services."

Even before the White House acted, Laird had created a new assistant secretary of defense slot which he said "will increase civilian supervision of intelligence matters in my office."

The new post is held by Dr. Albert C. Hall, until recently a vice president of an aerospace company.

BUT LAIRD never has followed through on a recommendation by the blue-ribbon panel that would have stripped command of foreign intelligence from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Pentagon authorities said that Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Hall rank as co-equals.

The Defense chief said that establishment of a National Cryptologic Command, to handle all code-cracking and communications intelligence, "will proceed in an orderly manner." And he said his staff is working on establishment of a Defense Map Agency and an Office of Defense Investigations.

HELMES TOLD TO CUT GLOBAL EXPENDITURES

Nixon Order Aims at Better Intelligence Gathering

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 — President Nixon has given Richard Helms, his Director of Central Intelligence, new orders—and new authority—to trim costs and improve the output of the nation's global intelligence system.

In a statement issued yesterday by the White House under circumstances strongly suggesting it was designed to attract as little public notice as possible—Mr. Nixon disclosed details of a far-reaching reorganization.

Intelligence experts here believe that Mr. Helms, armed with his new Presidential backing, may be able in the coming months to cut \$1-billion from the \$5-billion to \$6-billion that the United States spends yearly to ascertain, with spy satellites, electronic eavesdropping, secret agents and other sources, Soviet and Chinese Communist military developments.

The reorganization plan, which has been under study at the Office of Management and Budget for at least a year, makes three main changes, informants say:

1. It gives Mr. Helms, who is 53 years old, the first authority ever given an intelligence chief to review—and thus affect—the budgets of all the nation's foreign intelligence agencies as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, which he will continue to head. The other agencies include units within the Defense and State Departments, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. It will free Mr. Helms from much day-to-day responsibility for espionage, counter-espionage and such covert operations as the White House periodically orders through its secret "Rory Committee."

This committee, named for a numbered memorandum, includes Henry A. Kissinger, the White House national security assistant, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin 2d, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Helms.

Mr. Helms's duties here will be assumed by his deputy, Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

3. It creates a new intelligence subcommittee under the National Security Council with the aim of tailoring the daily "product" garnered by the nation's vast overseas intelligence network closer to the needs of the "consumers". President Nixon and his top staff.

Presumably, intelligence sources say, the Rory Committee will be merged into the council's new subcommittee since the membership of each is identical.

Not Always Responsive

"The President and Henry [Kissinger] have felt that the intelligence we were collecting wasn't always responsive to their needs," said one source. "They suspected that one reason was because the intelligence community had no way of knowing day to day what the President and Kissinger needed. This is a new link between producers and consumers. We'll have to wait and see if it works."

Mr. Kissinger will add the chairmanship of the new subcommittee to several others he already holds.

Another development in the president's reorganization is the creation of a "net assessment group" inside Mr. Kissinger's National Security Council staff. It will be headed by Andrew M. Marshall, a consultant with the Rand Corporation of Los Angeles.

"Net assessment means comparing over-all U.S.S.R. forces and capabilities with those of the U.S.," said an American intelligence expert. "It's as complicated a calculus as exists. We in the intelligence world often know more about Soviet forces and capabilities than we do about our own—and this new group is intended to pull it all together in one place for the President."

Resources Committee

Under the new plan Mr. Helms will also head an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee on which will be represented the state and Defense Departments, the office of Management and Budget and the C.I.A.

The white house announcement said that the committee will "advise the D.C.I. on the preparation of a consolidated program budget." This, in the view of experts, is Mr. Helms's new authority to supervise and, at least partly, control the work involved in collecting intelligence.

The Pentagon spends \$3-billion yearly on intelligence if all its activities are counted, said one source.

"This is 80 per cent of everything the United States spends for intelligence," he said. The President hasn't given Helms control of the D.O.D.'s intelligence budget, but at least he can now see it and advise on it before it's presented as a fait accompli."

STATINTL

STATINTL

Intelligence Under Kissinger's Wing

By GEORGE SIEMERMAN

Star Staff Writer

President Nixon's drastic reordering of the intelligence community brings still more power to that White House advisor-extraordinaire—Henry A. Kissinger.

People most intimately involved see the erstwhile professor's passion for order and efficiency triumphing.

On one level CIA Director Richard Helms was given a mandate to become director of all American intelligence in fact, as well as in name.

But on the White House level, Kissinger was put at head of the new "National Security Council Intelligence Committee" providing "guidance and direction" to Helms.

In other words, under the reshaping ordered Friday, Helms has the job of coordinating the work of the often-warring intelligence agencies, inside and outside the Pentagon. For the first time, with an expanded personal staff, he will be in charge of drawing up one intelligence budget—now unofficially reckoned at \$5 billion yearly.

Kissinger at Helm

But the direction in which his machine goes will be determined by Kissinger's committee. This group, of which Helms, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, undersecretaries from the State and Defense Departments, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also are members, will determine the intelligence assessments which get to President Nixon.

The new committee is simply the latest addition to that national security council system. Kissinger has systematically set up in almost three years in the White House. It is roughly akin to the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also heads, responsible for filtering the foreign policy options which reach the President.

According to most insiders, this Review Group has been the vehicle for Kissinger's virtually taking control of foreign policy away from more passive Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Interdepartmental groups from the state, defense and other interested departments feed policy options into the Kissinger shop, which reviews them for

Options Discussed

The options also are discussed by the National Security Council—whose chairman is the President, and whose members include the secretaries of State and Defense. Furthermore, the State Department, through Rogers, has the power to submit its own recommendations directly to the President on any given option.

But in nearly three years, Kissinger's driving energy and devotion to detailed staff work—plus his undisputed intellectual power—have given him the upper hand. He and his staff initiate government-wide policy studies, and precious little national security policy is decided by the President against Kissinger's advice.

In the intelligence shake-up the Kissinger apparatus will also get powers at the lower levels. The mechanism is a new Net Assessment Group (NAG) headed by Anthony Marshall, a senior member of Kissinger's White House staff.

"The functions of NAG will be just what the name suggests," said one insider — "to nag the intelligence community."

That means the group is to be responsible for suggesting to Helms & Co. that they should assess what results might flow abroad from any policy under consideration in the White House. Naturally, Kissinger, chairman of the Senior Review Group, will be in a position to know what those possible policies are. So the Kissinger shop becomes practically the coordinator between policy and intelligence.

The job of NAG also will be to produce comparative assessments of the relative strength of various world powers. It will do this by pulling together intelligence estimates from all

over the government—political, military and economic. For instance, NAG would assess the strategic balance between the U.S. and Soviet Union, or between the Arab world and Israel.

All of which adds up to a major new responsibility for Kissinger. It also marks a major step in Nixon's drive to put centralized control over every vital government function in the White House.

STATINTL

White House Shakes Up Vast Intelligence-Gathering Network

CIA's Helms Seen Possible Czar, Pentagon's Agency
Downgraded as Kissinger and Staff Receive New Powers

BY DAVID KRASLOW

Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON -- The White House announced Friday a shakeup of the government's massive intelligence bureaucracy that could have major impact in enabling the President to assess more accurately any Soviet threat to the United States.

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, emerges from the long-planned reorganization as an even stronger figure with responsibility for coordinating all intelligence activities. Some sources said Helms' role could develop into that of an intelligence czar.

Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, and the National Security Council staff also are given significant new powers in the shakeup.

Budget-Clearing Procedure

The Pentagon's huge Defense Intelligence Agency is downgraded and will be required, along with other intelligence arms of the government, to clear its budget through a new Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee chaired by Helms.

Informed sources said the shakeup reflected the President's unhappiness with the quality of information supplied him on occasion and his belief that the splintered intelligence activities can be coordinated better.

The President also is convinced, it was said, that the government's intelligence bill -- reliably estimated at about \$5 billion a year now -- is unnecessarily high. Administration officials hope to achieve a saving of at least several hundred million dollars along with greater efficiency.

For years many in Congress and in the executive branch have thought that the government's intelligence effort, because of growth of staff and fragmentation among various agencies, was becoming unmanageable and that the cost was getting out of hand.

The studies that led to Friday's announcement were launched secretly by the National Security

Council more than a year ago.

A major change, which for the first time will give the White House the expert capability to make its own intelligence evaluation of such strategic problems as the Soviet missile threat, is the establishment of the Net Assessment Group within the National Security Council staff.

The group will be headed by a senior staff member. A White House source said that job would go to Andrew W. Marshall, now director of strategic studies at the Rand Corp. in Santa Monica.

The different interpretations that the Pentagon and the CIA have given to the construction of about 90 missile silos in the Soviet Union is expected to be one of the first strategic policy problems to be put before the NAG.

The size of the defense budget and the strategic arms limitation talks with the Russians could be affected by whatever decision the President finally makes regarding the purpose of those still-empty silos.

Pentagon analysts have tended to a more alarmist reading of the silo construction, suggesting the Russians may be developing a new weapons system for offensive purposes.

While not ruling out that possibility, the CIA, it is understood, tends to the view that the silos are designed primarily to afford greater protection for missiles already in being and are therefore defensive.

Thus, where differences arise in the intelligence community on strategic questions, the NAG would be expected to reduce such disputes to manageable proportions for the President.

Helms' strengthened position will derive in large measure from his new authority over what the White House described as a "consolidated intelligence program budget."

Never before has there been a single intelligence budget. Under the present system each agency engaged in intelligence work submits its own budget request to the White House.

Under the reorganization the budget requests will go to the committee chaired by Helms and whose membership will include representatives of the State and Defense departments and the Office of Management and Budget.

Also among the "major management improvements" announced by the White House were:


— "An enhanced leadership role" for the director of central intelligence (Helms) in "planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence."

— Establishment of a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, chaired by the President's national security assistant (Kissinger), whose membership will include the attorney general, the director of central intelligence, the undersecretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

That committee is to "give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence user."



RICHARD HELMS
... Intelligence chief



GEN. ROBERT CUSHMAN
... new CIA duties

Helms to Oversee U.S. Spy Network

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon announced a long-awaited reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community yesterday, creating a government-wide coordinating role for CIA Director Richard Helms and bringing military agencies under closer civilian control.

The overhaul was ordered following what the White

House called "an exhaustive study" of the far-flung foreign intelligence agencies of the U.S. government. The various agencies are unofficially reported to employ 200,000 persons and to cost \$5 billion yearly.

The aim of the reorganization, according to the White House announcement, is to improve "efficiency and effectiveness." Although the statement did not say so, high-ranking officials are known to feel that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful information it produces.

There also have been reports that the President and senior aides were unhappy with the military intelligence planning which went into the abortive Sontay prison raid and the South Vietnamese incursion. House officials denied yesterday that reorganization is in response to dissatisfaction about particular estimates or reports.

One of the principal changes announced yesterday is the creation of a consolidated foreign intelligence program budget for the entire government, to be supervised by a high-ranking committee under Helms. Officials said Helms would be empowered to dip into any intelligence agency, civilian or military, for information to justify elements of its budget.

According to the announcement, Helms is being granted "an enhanced leadership role ... in planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence."

Helms has been instructed to reorganize his own office

he may assume his new government-wide responsibilities, officials said.

He will turn over many of his operating responsibilities for the Central Intelligence Agency to his deputy director, Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr.

Cushman served four years as the national security aide of then-Vice President Nixon from 1957 to 1960, and is considered close to Mr. Nixon.

Helms will become chairman of a reconstituted U.S. intelligence board to consider national intelligence requirements and priorities, the security of intelligence data and the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Other members of the board will be Cushman, the chiefs of the major intelligence agencies of the Defense and State Departments and representatives of the Treasury Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Atomic Energy Commission.

Two elements of the reorganization appear to give greater control to the National Security Council staff under presidential assistant Henry A. Kissinger.

A new NSC intelligence committee, headed by Kissinger and including Attorney General John N. Mitchell and other high officials, has been established to give "direction and guidance" on national intelligence needs and evaluate the usefulness of the information received from the user's point of view.

At the NSC staff level, the reorganization created a new net assessment group to be headed by Anthony Marshall, former director of strategic studies of the Rand Corp. NAG, as it is known, will produce White House assessments of the relative strategic balance between major powers, as well as assessments of intelligence quality.

The assessment of the strategic balance is a critical factor in the battle over future military budgets. U.S. military leaders, intelligence services and some outsiders have expressed anxiety about a large Soviet buildup of strategic arms and are calling for ex-

The White House announcement also said that Mr. Nixon has ordered three consolidations in the Pentagon's intelligence organization:

- A national cryptologic command to consolidate all communications intelligence activities under the director of the National Security Agency, the monitoring and codebreaking agency with headquarters at Fort Meade, Md.

- An office of Defense investigations, to consolidate all personnel security investigations in the Defense Department.

- A Defense map agency to combine the now separate mapping, charting and geodetic organizations of the military services.

Officials said the reorganization is "not a plan to save money," but they expressed optimism that some funds will be saved through the various new controls and consolidations.

STATINTL

Spending at Heart of Spying Shakeup

By ONE KELLY
Star Staff Writer

The creation of a consolidated intelligence program budget is at the heart of the intelligence shakeup ordered by President Nixon, informed sources say.

Preparation of the intelligence budget should for the first time give the President and other top officials a clear picture of how much is being spent for intelligence, where it is being spent and what it is buying, these officials said.

Richard Helms, who now is head of the Central Intelligence Agency, will be responsible for preparation of the budget as part of what the White House announcement said would be his "enhanced leadership role" in the intelligence field.

Not 'Intelligence Czar'

Informed officials cautioned, however, that the changes ordered by the President would not make Helms an "intelligence czar" in the sense that he will tell the heads of other intelligence agencies within the government how to run their jobs. His control over the purse strings will, however, give him much more control of the over-all intelligence activities of the government than he has had in the past.

The changes ordered by Nixon also give his assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, an enhanced role in the intelligence field by making him chairman of a new National Security Council Intelligence Committee—one of a growing number of similar committees he heads.

A new Net Assessment Group will be under Kissinger. Its job is to review and evaluate all the products of intelligence work

and to make comparative studies of American and Soviet capabilities. It will be headed by Andrew Marshall, a member of the National Security Council staff.

The changes, designed to bring greater control over the estimated \$5 billion a year spent and 200,000 people who work on intelligence, have been the subject of a lengthy dispute within the administration.

Peckard Unimpressed

In a press conference Thursday, the day before the changes were announced at the White House, Deputy Defense Secretary David Peckard, one of the most outspoken government officials, indicated he was not entirely pleased by the way the struggle had worked out.

"There have been people thinking if we just had someone over in the White House to ride herd on this over-all intelligence that things would be improved," he said. "I don't really support that view. After having experience with a lot of people in the White House the last couple of years, trying to coordinate all kinds of things, I think if anything we need a little less coordination from that point than more. But that's my own personal view."

Because the Defense Department spends most of the money and employs most of the people and machines involved in intelligence, the changes will have a major impact there.

Consolidation Is Key

The President ordered the consolidation of all Defense Department security investigations into a single Office of Defense Investigations and the consolidation of all mapping and charting activities into a Defense Map Agency. Defense officials

said these two changes won't be much of a problem.

But they said the order to set up a National Cryptologic Command under Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the National Security Agency, would "take some doing" because the Defense Department's code-breaking activities now are so fragmented.

Similarly, they said, the Defense Department faces some difficulties in reorganizing its tactical intelligence—the information used by field commanders rather than top officials in Washington.

National Terms

Although the tendency is to think in terms of national intelligence—the kind of information on which the President bases major decisions, for example—the bulk of the intelligence gathered by the various agencies is of a tactical nature, involving such things as the day-to-day movements of potentially hostile ships.

The White House said Helms a career intelligence officer, would turn over most of his CIA operational responsibilities to his deputy, Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Cushman Jr., so he can devote more time to the leadership of the over-all intelligence community.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee that has been looking into the nation's intelligence operations, said his concern is that the changes ordered by the President place an added burden on Helms who, he said, already has a "super-human job."

"One wonders if any human is capable of that kind of responsibility," he said.

Nixon moves to better spy systems' coordination; Kissinger, Helms assigned broader powers

BY ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington--President Nixon moved yesterday to improve coordination among the government agencies involved in foreign intelligence activities.

Part of the plan would tie the intelligence effort more closely into the National Security Council apparatus headed by Mr. Nixon's most influential foreign-policy adviser, Henry A. Kissinger.

The reorganization also will mean that Richard Helms, the director of central intelligence, will turn over many of his agency's day-to-day operations to his deputy and spend more time as the government's general intelligence overseer.


The CIA chief theoretically has been the head of the whole "intelligence community" since the Kennedy administration, presiding over the United States Intelligence Board. But the limits of his authority never have been defined very precisely.

The White House, announcing the new structures yesterday, said they were designed "to improve the efficiency and effectiveness" of the intelligence agencies, which together employ an estimated 200,000 persons--three-fourths of them military servicemen -- and spend about \$5 billion a year.

Mr. Nixon also ordered the creation of a new National Security Council Intelligence Committee, which Dr. Kissinger will head. The committee, the White House said, "will give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products."

This seemed to indicate that the council will have greatly expanded authority over the different agencies.

Within the council's structure a new "net assessment group," also will be created. The group will evaluate intelligence data and make studies on the relative balances



RICHARD HELMS

the world. The unit will be headed by Andrew Marshall, the Rand Corporation's former director of strategic studies.

The CIA director will be given "an enhanced leadership role," serving as chairman of a reconstituted U.S. intelligence board and also heading a new Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, which will draw up proposals for a consolidated budget for all the intelligence agencies.

Marine in charge

Officials said this means that the CIA's deputy director, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman of the Marine Corps, will take over much of the responsibility for the CIA's own operations.

Government agencies represented on the intelligence board include, beside the CIA, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; the Defense Department's National Security Agency, which specializes in code-cracking; the Defense Intelligence Agency, which has separate Army, Navy and Air Force components working on military intelligence; the Treasury Department, the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission.



HENRY KISSINGER

Proposals to revamp the intelligence structure have been floating through the administration for many months. The plan announced yesterday was drafted primarily by the National Security Council staff and the Office of Management and Budget.

2 failures cited

Questions about the present system's effectiveness seemed to center mainly on the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Two notable intelligence failures in Indochina have been cited as causing the failure of an attempt by U.S. troops in November, 1970, to rescue American prisoners of war from the Son Tay Prison Camp in North Vietnam and as having hampered the South Vietnamese campaign in Laos last February and March.

In the Son Tay attempt, the Army and Air Force raiders landed only to discover that all the P.O.W.'s had been moved out.

In the Laos campaign, the South Vietnamese Army units were sent reeling back

STATINTL

across the border when North Vietnamese forces in the frontier zone proved to be far stronger than had been anticipated.

HARRISBURG, PA.
PATRIOT
M - 45,299
PATRIOT-NEWS
S - 159,880

NOV 6 1971

CIA Chief to Head Overhaul of All Intelligence Units

From The Patriot Wire Services
WASHINGTON -- CIA Director Richard A. Helms has been given broad overall supervision in an overhaul of the United States' intelligence gathering operations, the White House announced yesterday.

Officials said Helms would be freed from some operational responsibility at the Central Intelligence Agency to assume "communitywide responsibilities of the several scattered intelligence operations."

Chairman George H. Mahon of the House Appropriations Committee, which has been among congressional critics of U.S. intelligence operations, said after a White House briefing on the reorganization that it was a step in the right direction, but it was too early to predict results.

"I believe we can save personnel and money and get more intelligence," Mahon told a reporter, but he quickly added that intelligence operations had been repeatedly reorganized with but limited success.

Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of a House armed services subcommittee with supervisory responsibility for the CIA and Pentagon intelligence operations, said he did not find the new shakeup particularly "dramatic."

But Nedzi questioned the additional duties given Helms. "I have doubts about the capacity of any one person to be able to oversee the entire intelligence operation and at the same time administer the CIA," the congressman said.

The reorganization also revived the old U.S. Intelligence Board whose membership will include Helms, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, the chief of the Defense intelligence agency and representatives of other agencies with a stake in intelligence operations.

Time magazine reported in its October 25 issue that Hoover recently had "effectively cut off the international from the national intelligence effort" by limiting contacts between FBI and CIA men. But officials flatly denied the report.

Time in the same article said Hoover also had abolished a seven-man FBI section that maintained contact with other U.S. intelligence units, including the defense intelligence agency.

The White House announcement listed these specific steps:

--Helms will assume "enhanced leadership" in planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities.

--An intelligence committee will be set up within the National Security Council which will be headed by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, presidential adviser on national security affairs. The committee will include the CIA director, the attorney general, the under secretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

--A "net assessment group" will be established within the National Security Council which will be responsible for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

BULLETIN

NOV 6 1971

E - 634,371

S - 701,743

Helms Ordered To Take Over All Intelligence

Nixon Designates

CIA Director to

Consolidate Agencies

Washington — (UPI) — President Nixon has ordered the nation's scattered military and civilian intelligence gathering operations to be consolidated under the leadership of CIA Director Richard M. Helms.

The White House said Helms would head some of his duties as director of the Central Intelligence Agency to spy and counter-spy agencies. The Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate the work of U.S. spy and counter-spy agencies as the result of a lengthy executive branch study of duplication of efforts in their operations.

Congressional committees have long been critical of alleged overlapping of intelligence activities and the new plan won tentative approval of one key lawmaker, Rep. George H. Mahon (D-Tex) chairman of the House appropriations Committee.

Helms will work with a new National Security Council intelligence committee headed by presidential aide Henry Kissinger and consisting of the attorney general, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the State and Defense Departments.

Mr. Nixon also ordered reconstruction of the United States Intelligence Board to be headed by Helms, and to include representatives of the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Treasury Department, Atomic Energy Commission and the National Security Agency.

Rep. Lucian Nedzi (D-Mich), chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee with supervisory responsibility for the CIA and Pentagon intelligence operations, said he had doubts "about the capacity of any one person to be able to oversee the entire intelligence operation and at the same time administer the CIA."

Lt. Gen. Robert E.ushman, deputy director of the CIA, was expected to take over many Helms' operating responsibilities.

Other provisions include creation of a "net assessment group" within the National Security Council to evaluate all intelligence, and establishment of a "intelligence resources advisory committee," headed by Helms and which will advise on the preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 463,503
S - 867 810

NOV 6 1971

CIA Director Is Appointed by President To Overhaul U.S. Intelligence Operations

WASHINGTON (UPI). --

The White House announced on Friday President Nixon has ordered an overhaul of the government's intelligence operations, assigning Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a broader overall supervisory role.

Administration officials said that Helms would be freed from some operational responsibilities at the CIA and assume "community-wide responsibilities" in the U.S. foreign intelligence gathering operations.

The White House announce-



RICHARD HELMS

... wider responsibility

ment listed these specific steps:

—HELMs WILL assume "enhanced leadership" in

planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities.

—AN INTELLIGENCE committee will be set up within the National Security Council which will be headed by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Presidential adviser on national security affairs. The committee will include the CIA director, the attorney general, the under secretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.

—A "NET ASSESSMENT

group" will be established within the national security council which will be responsible for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence.

—AN "INTELLIGENCE resources advisory committee," headed by Helms, will advise on the preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget.

The White House said that a national cryptologic command, a code-breaking organization, would be set up under the National Security Agency to consolidate work now being carried out in different agencies.

SPRINGFIELD, MASS.

NEWS

E - 95,055

REPUBLICAN

S - 113,754

NOV 6 1971

Intelligence Overhaul

President Nixon's decision to overhaul the government's intelligence operations does not necessarily mean that the Central Intelligence Agency will be downgraded into a lesser intelligence role.


But the plan for reform and coordination of intelligence gathering systems indicates that congressional critics of the CIA have scored some strong points. As these critics contend, the CIA has been too much a law unto itself and has wrapped all its operations in a cloak of super secrecy.

If a better coordinated intelligence system emerges, and if Congress and the American public are better informed about our international spying tactics, then this overhaul of U.S. intelligence operations will have served a valuable purpose.

NOV 1971



RICHARD HELMS



HENRY KISSINGER

STATINTL

U.S. Revamps Its Intelligence

By GARNETT D. HORNBER

Star Staff Writer

The White House announced a series of steps today aimed at improving U.S. foreign intelligence.

The new setup in effect makes Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms a sort of super boss of all government intelligence operations, including Pentagon activities in this field.

As the White House put it, Helms will have "an enhanced leadership role" in planning, reviewing, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities.

Officials said the CIA director the CIA director would have a key voice in the allocation of available resources between operational responsibilities to the deputy director, now Marine Lt. Gen. Robert F. Cushman Jr., of the military service intelligence arms and broader-scale activities.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, also is given a key role in the intelligence field as chairman of a National Security Council Intelligence Committee.

The White House said this committee "will give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence user." The CIA director will be a member of this committee.

Much of the CIA director's new power will come from his role as chairman of a new Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, which will advise him "on the preparation of a

Among other changes ordered by the President the White House said, a National Cryptologic Command will be set up under the director of the National Security Agency to consolidate code-breaking activities now carried out by separate agencies.

To Be Consolidated

Another change involves consolidation of all Defense Department personnel security investigations into a single Office of Defense Investigations.

The President also directed that a Defense Map Agency be created by combining the now-separate mapping, charting and geodetic organizations of the military services in order to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.

The White House said the President's objectives in ordering the changes in the intelligence field are to insure continuing review of the responsiveness of intelligence effort to national needs; strengthen leadership for the community as a whole; more efficient use of resources in the collection of intelligence information; elimination of less efficient or out-moded activities, and "improvement in the quality, scope and timeliness of intelligence information."

Hodges

EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

#291

5 November 1971

INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS

The White House today released the following statement to the press. The Director wishes to make the full text available to Agency employees.

"The White House announced today that the President has directed a number of management steps to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the U. S. foreign intelligence community.

"The President's objectives are to ensure:

- Continuing review of the responsiveness of the U. S. intelligence effort to national needs.
- Strengthened leadership for the community as a whole.
- More efficient use of resources in the collection of intelligence information.
- Elimination of less efficient or outmoded activities.
- Improvement in the quality, scope and timeliness of intelligence information.

"The improvements directed by the President follow an exhaustive study conducted at his direction by the staffs of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with contributions from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the President's Science Advisor, and the Intelligence Community.

"The major management improvements include:

- An enhanced leadership role for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in planning, reviewing, coordinating, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence.
- Establishment of a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Its members will include the Attorney General, the DCI, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Committee will give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence user.
- Establishment of a Net Assessment Group within the National Security Council Staff. The group will be headed by a senior staff member and will be responsible for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence products and for producing net assessments.
- Establishment of an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, chaired by the DCI, including as members a senior representative from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Central Intelligence Agency. This Committee will advise the DCI on the preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget.
- Reconstitution of the United States Intelligence Board chaired by the DCI, including as members the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Vice Chairman); Director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department; Director of National Security Agency, Director of the

Defense Intelligence Agency; representatives of the Secretary of the Treasury and of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission. The Board will advise and assist the DCI with respect to the production of national intelligence, the establishment of national intelligence requirements and priorities, the supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material, and the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

"The President has also directed certain changes in the Department of Defense's intelligence organization.

"A National Cryptologic Command will be set up under the Director of the National Security Agency. Under this command will be consolidated activities now carried out by separate agencies. A further change is the consolidation of all Department of Defense personnel security investigations into a single Office of Defense Investigations. The President has also directed that a Defense Map Agency be created by combining the now separate mapping, charting and geodetic organizations of the military services in order to achieve maximum efficiency and economy in production."

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1 NOV 1971

STATINTL

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BY STEWART ALSOP

OUR TURN TO BLINK?

STATINTL

WASHINGTON—It is highly likely that one of these days soon, probably before Christmas, quite possibly before Thanksgiving, CIA director Richard Helms will call the White House and ask for an urgent appointment with the President. A great deal will then depend on what Helms tells President Nixon, and what President Nixon decides to do about it.

Helms, of course, is the No. 1 man in the U.S. intelligence community. The intelligence community is braced for "the other shoe to drop." The other shoe is a series of Soviet missile tests that the intelligence specialists are sure—rather mysteriously sure—will take place before the end of this year, most probably in November or early December.

These tests will tell a great deal about the real purpose of the very great Soviet investment in offensive strategic weapons. This investment is the first shoe, and it is symbolized by the missile silos—"holes," they are called in the intelligence trade—that the Russians have been constructing with extraordinary urgency throughout this year. The tests will show what kind of missiles the Russians intend to put in their holes.

PEACE AND THE HOLES

This is not, admittedly, a subject that much interests most people in the present, curious mood of this country. But it is a subject that has to interest the intelligence specialists—and the President, too. For what goes into the Russian holes may well determine whether or not it is rational to hope for what the President likes to call "a generation of peace."

The facts about the holes are as follows (and these facts are indeed facts, for the Pentagon's reconnaissance satellites bring back pictures of the holes almost as detailed as a picture of a building across the street). A total of 91 new holes has been dug so far this year. Twenty-five of these new holes are very large—larger than the holes that used to be dug for the huge, 25-megaton SS-9 missile. Sixty-six of the holes are somewhat smaller than the regular SS-9 holes but larger than the holes for the 1-megaton SS-11 missile.

These smaller holes are dug in a big circle, with ten missiles to a circle. In the middle of a half dozen or so of these circles, a very big hole, bigger than any missile silo ever built, has

been dug. None of the holes has as yet been fitted with a missile, and the experts do not expect them to be operational until about July 1972.

There are no doubt innumerable papers marked Top Secret filled with details about the Russian holes, but the essential facts are as stated above. These facts make it possible for any reasonably intelligent reader of this magazine to be his own intelligence analyst. What are the holes for?

WHAT ARE THEY FOR?

It is very unlikely that they are simply for more first-generation SS-9s and SS-11s. Otherwise, the missiles would already be in their holes. They could be for improved versions of the SS-9 and the SS-11. Or they could be for entirely new weapons.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the Russians want to do one thing to improve the SS-9, and another thing to improve the SS-11. The SS-9, or an entirely new version of the big missile, could be provided with multiple warheads, or "MIRVed." Because its warhead is so immense, the missile could be MIRVed six, or even ten times over. Given sufficient accuracy, even a relatively small number of MIRVed multi-megaton missiles could be used to destroy, in a first strike, this country's main strategic deterrent—our 1,000 land-based Minuteman missiles.

Greatly improved accuracy for the SS-11, or some new version of such a missile, would have a similar effect. The SS-11 is an "anti-city" weapon; it is only roughly accurate, since only rough accuracy is required to destroy a city with a 1-megaton warhead. But if it could be rendered accurate enough to dig a Minuteman missile out of its concrete silo, then it too would become a direct threat to our strategic deterrent.

How about the enormous new holes? The reader's guess may be as good as the specialists', for the specialists do not pretend to have the answer. These huge holes could be for hardened control centers. Or they could be for some new kind of offensive strategic missile, perhaps filled with penetration aids to blind the U.S. defense, perhaps with an enormous warhead designed to black out the defense's radar and control systems. Nobody knows.

After the expected tests, a lot more will be known, for the tests tell us al-

most as much as they tell the Russians about such factors as accuracy, range and megatonnage. Suppose the tests show (a) a MIRVed SS-9-type missile, (b) greatly improved accuracy for the SS-11-type missile, and (c) an entirely new offensive strategic missile of immense size. Even if the tests showed only one or two of these things, Richard Helms would have to ask for that urgent appointment with the President. What would the President do then?

Already, it is too late to talk about missile "parity." The Russians have 1,600 intercontinental missiles against 1,051 American missiles, and in terms of missile megatonnage, they have between five and ten times the thermonuclear capacity we have. Their anti-ballistic-missile complex is fully operational in the Moscow area and being urgently extended, whereas our ABM system will not be operational for several years.

A NEW CONFRONTATION

They are ready to produce an entirely new swept-wing attack bomber, with an undoubted "anti-U.S. attack capability," whereas our B-52s are Model T bombers, terribly vulnerable to the new SA-5 Soviet anti-aircraft. The Soviet Y-class nuclear submarine fleet of 41 boats now equals ours, and instead of halting production, the Russians have doubled their production capacity. The Soviet conventional fleet is already in several categories superior to ours.

The new Soviet missile tests could indicate at least the serious possibility that the Soviets are building up for a new eyeball-to-eyeball nuclear confrontation, like the 1962 Cuban crisis, in which it would be our turn to blink. The likely locale of the confrontation is obvious—the Middle East. It is easy to dismiss this possibility as mere Pentagon propaganda. But it is also silly.

The intelligence analysts, including the Pentagon's, have consistently underestimated the Soviet missile program. As for the President, his political future may be at stake. If he were to abandon hope for successful SALT talks and ask for very large new appropriations to regain nuclear parity with the Russians, he might well be throwing away his chance of re-election, in this country's present mood.

So what would the President do? If some of the gloomier analysts are right, what will the President do?

E - 252,198

S - 344,155

Ex-CU Head Has No Comment on Alleged CIA Word About Riha

By FRED GILLES

Denver Post Staff Writer

Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, former president of the University of Colorado, declined comment Monday on a report that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided assurances of the safety of Prof. Thomas Riha shortly after he vanished from the University of Colorado about 2½ years ago.

Smiley, now president of the University of Texas at El Paso, recalled that while he was president of CU, he had contacted "reliable sources in Washington" in April 1969 and had received the assurance that Riha was "alive and well" at that time.

But a February 1970 investigation by the Denver District attorney's office indicated there was "no substantial basis in fact" for Smiley's public statement about Riha's safety.

Also in February 1970, the Boulder Police Department said that its earlier "alive-and-well" report on Riha was based on "a misunderstanding." Similar reports of Riha's safety issued by the Denver Police Department were based on Boulder police sources.

A New York Times dispatch Sunday said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) broke off direct liaison with the CIA a year and a half ago because the CIA wouldn't tell J. Edgar Hoover who had leaked information about Riha's disappearance to the CIA, which then passed on the information to Smiley.

The dispatch said the FBI learned that there had been no foul play, and that Riha had chosen to leave Boulder for personal reasons.

According to well-informed sources, the dispatch said, an

agent in the FBI's Denver office, acting on his own, told a CIA employee in Denver. The CIA then suggested that the FBI tell Smiley, and when the FBI refused, the CIA went ahead and informed Smiley, pledging him to secrecy.

A CIA spokesman in Washington declined comment Monday on the reported rift between the CIA and the FBI.

SPLIT DENIED

Other Washington sources, however, insisted there has been no disruption of any kind in the direct liaison between the two agencies. The CIA and the FBI, this source said, "constantly have communication by telephone, letter and (weekly) meetings of the U. S. Intelligence Board, as well as in conversations with one another."

The board was described as the liaison instrument between members of the intelligence community. Members of the board include the FBI, CIA, National Security Agency, State Department and U. S. Atomic Energy Commission.

An FBI spokesman was quoted in the New York Times dispatch as denying any break in direct FBI-CIA liaison a year and a half ago. "The FBI," the spokesman was quoted, "has always maintained liaison with the CIA, and it is very close and effective liaison."

The dispatch said that as a result of the alleged break in liaison, high officials of the intelligence community were concerned about the government's ability to control foreign espionage in this country.

'FBI CONCERNED'

In a telephone conversation from El Paso Monday, Smiley told The Denver Post, "I'm still concerned about the professor

(Riha) and the impenetrable mystery about all this."

Riha, then 40, disappeared March 15, 1968, from CU, where he was an associate professor of Russian history. An acquaintance of the professor, Mrs. Galya Tannenbaum, committed suicide by cyanide poisoning last March at Colorado State Hospital. Before she died, she reportedly said Riha had "just made it to Russia" after leaving Boulder.

Mrs. Tannenbaum had been committed to the hospital after being found legally insane on the July 1963 date she allegedly

forged Riha's name to a check for a charter flight. At the time of her death she was involved in court proceedings in connection with her alleged conversion of some of Riha's property to her own use.

STATINTL

11 OCT 1971

THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

STATINTL

A FORMER STAFF OFFICER
CRITICIZES CIA ACTIVITIES

STATINTL

Is the CIA starting to spy on Americans at home—turning talents and money against students, blacks, others? That is one of several key questions raised in a wide ranging criticism. A direct response starts on page 81.

STATINTL

THE ATTACK

The following was written by Edward K. DeLong of United Press International, based on an interview with a Central Intelligence Agency official who has resigned. The dispatch was distributed by UPI for publication on October 3.

Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it—that is, dissident student groups and civil-rights organizations—Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U. S. intelligence community.

"I think we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA—and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine "ops" (operations)—and there just aren't that many places any more to display that talent," Marchetti says.

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who—if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like—are certainly considering it.

"This is going to get to be very tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, [Va.], a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'the enemy within.'"

Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself with a degree in Russian studies and history.

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of—an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House. During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

Then he was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, as special assistant to the CIA's executive director, and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the national reconnaissance organization—the whole bit. And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

With many of his lifelong views about the world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen career. One of the reasons was to explain to Director Richard Helms why he was leaving.



Mr. Marchetti

continued

11 OCT 1971

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THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

STATINTL

A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

STATINTL

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years

THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad for what it has allegedly done as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big


This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles

pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U. S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a



Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is worldwide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-

10 OCT 1971

STATINTL

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F.B.I. Is Said to Have Cut Direct Liaison With C.I.A.

Hoover Move in Quarrel 1½ Years Ago Causes Concern Among Intelligence Officials About Coping With Spies

By ROBERT M. SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 9.—The Federal Bureau of Investigation broke off direct liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency a year and a half ago because the C.I.A. would not tell J. Edgar Hoover who had leaked information from his organization, according to authoritative sources.

As a result, high officials of the intelligence community are concerned about the Government's ability to control foreign espionage in this country. Their apprehension has been increased by the recent British discovery of extensive Soviet operations.

To offset some of the danger, officials of the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. have held private meetings, unknown to Mr. Hoover, at which they exchanged information. Authorized communication is limited to mail, telephone and infrequent special meetings.

F.B.I. Spokesman's Statement

Asked if it was true that the bureau broke direct liaison with the C.I.A. more than a year ago, an F.B.I. spokesman said today. "It is not true." He added, "The F.B.I. has always maintained liaison with the C.I.A., and it is very close and effective liaison." Spokesmen

for the C.I.A. could not be reached today.

The suspension of direct contact is one of the factors prompting leading members of the intelligence community to feel that Mr. Hoover must be deposed as Director of the F.B.I. The feelings of these officials run so high that some of them have dropped their customary secrecy to make their views known. Others remain silent because they fear public criticism might boomerang, reinforcing Mr. Hoover's desire to continue in his post and evoking public support for him.

Reputation a Factor

Adding to the anxiety and anger of members of the intelligence community is Mr. Hoover's reputation. In their view, his personality is a compound of insecurity and authoritarianism. They fear the 76-year-old Director will do nothing to repair the breakdown in liaison between the two agencies and will try to remain as long as he can at the post he has held for 46 years.

Mr. Hoover's retirement has been periodically predicted and

is said to be favored, for a variety of reasons, by several prominent members of the Administration. But so far there is no sign that he has lost the backing of the one person who counts—President Nixon.

Only four cases involving the exposure of foreign espionage agents in the United States have come to public attention in the last three years. Two of the cases involved the expulsion of Soviet agents; another involved two Cuban diplomats at the United Nations and a South African girl, and the fourth dealt with a Swiss Government official.

The story of the severance of F.B.I.-C.I.A. liaison begins with the disappearance of Prof. Thomas Riha in March, 1969. Mr. Riha was a Czech-born associate professor of modern Russian history at the University of Colorado.

The 40-year-old professor left the university abruptly, apparently took nothing with him and left a mysterious trail. He disappeared from the campus so suddenly that, though normally a neat and precise man, he left papers scattered on his university desk where he had been preparing his income tax return.

Friends and fellow faculty members said they feared that Professor Riha might be dead, but police officials in Boulder and Denver and the former president of the university, Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, insisted that he was alive.

Dr. Smiley told the press enigmatically at the time that he had been assured of the professor's safety "by what I consider reliable sources" in Washington.

"I repeat my real regret that I can't go beyond what I have said," he told The New York Times in a telephone interview in January, 1970. "A confidence is a confidence."

Confidential Information

What Dr. Smiley, by then president of the University of Texas at El Paso, could not say was that he had been given the information concerning Professor Riha in confidence by an employee of the C.I.A.

The agency was interested in the Riha case because of the professor's Czech origin. It wanted to know if there had been foreign interference. The F.B.I. learned that there had been no foul play, that the professor had chosen to leave for personal reasons.

According to well informed sources, an individual agent in the F.B.I.'s large Denver office, acting on his own, told a C.I.A. employee in Denver. (The C.I.A.

is restricted by law from operating as an intelligence agency within this country. The employee in Denver was involved in recruiting.)

The agency then suggested that the F.B.I. tell Dr. Smiley, who was very concerned about Mr. Riha's disappearance, what had happened on a confidential basis to quiet his and the community's fears. The bureau refused.

After the refusal, the C.I.A. went ahead and told Dr. Smiley, pledging him to secrecy. According to reliable sources, Dr. Smiley later inadvertently let it get out that there had been no foul play. The question arose at F.B.I. headquarters in Washington: How had the president of the university obtained this information?

The bureau office in Denver told headquarters that it had not given the information to anyone. It eventually was learned here, however, that an individual F.B.I. man had told the story to a C.I.A. man. For Mr. Hoover, the question then became: Which of my men gave out this information? He asked the C.I.A.


The C.I.A. man in Denver was inflexible. He told his superiors that the information had been given him in confidence and it was a matter of confidence, science. According to sources, he well knew what would happen to any F.B.I. man he named—at the least, exile to Montana; at the most, dismissal.

The C.I.A. man held his ground under pressure from the bureau, saying any disclosure would be a breach of faith. The Director of the C.I.A., Richard Helms, accepted his man's position and refused to force him to divulge the F.B.I. man's identity.

Irritated, Mr. Hoover broke off all direct liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Until February of last year, the F.B.I. man who provided the personal link with the C.I.A. was Sam Papich. Mr. Papich grew up in Montana and worked in mines there before he attended Northwestern University. He played professional football, then went to work for the F.B.I.

Mr. Papich worked in Latin America for a while for the bureau and handled several special assignments. He later became the liaison officer between the bureau and the C.I.A. His reputation was that of an honest and sincere man with high professional competence and an insatiable appetite for work. Most importantly, in an area potentially fraught with jealousy, intrigue and deceit.



Profile of Richard Helms: America's Top Spy

Newsweek Feature Service

WASHINGTON — In a recent edition of "Who's Who In America," the official biography for one Richard McGarrath Helms is less than an inch long. It identifies him simply as a "govt. ofcl.," lists prosaic things like his educational credentials (B.A. Williams Coll. 1935), his clubs (Chevy Chase, City Tavern Assn.) and his office address: Central Intelligence Agy., Washington, 20505.

What the brief sketch doesn't mention, however, is that in the colorful career of the tall, handsome Helms, the U.S.'s chief intelligence officer, there is enough intrigue and deriding-do to fill a dozen spy novels.

TAKE, for instance, the time, in 1956 just after Nikita Khrushchev had delivered his secret "de-Stalinization" speech to the Communist Party Congress in Moscow.

As deputy chief of the CIA's clandestine services, Helms directed the agents who dummied up a copy of the speech with 32 derogatory inserts about neutral nations and their leaders. They then circulated it abroad — and caused the Russians some severe embarrassment.

Or take the time Helms supervised an operation that involved the digging of a tunnel under 500 yards of East and West German soil to allow CIA agents to tap Moscow's phone conversations with the East German government, its own secret police agents and its own army command.

In all probability, most of Helms' career will remain classified "top secret" until long after his death — which is exactly as he would have it. As he told a recent meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, "... It is axiomatic that an intelligence service — whatever type of government it serves — must wrap itself in as much secrecy as possible in order to operate effectively..."

The speech, Helms' first public address since he was named CIA director in 1966, was encouraged by the Nixon administration, which had become disturbed by critics charging that an intelligence network is incompatible with a democratic society.

AFTER countering several criticisms with cool grace, Helms said, "The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service..."

In all official circles,



RICHARD HELMS

Helms is already regarded not only as honorable but also as dedicated, talented and — the supreme accolade in a capital that has its share of high-level dilettantes — immensely professional.

Where once it was thought that Richard Nixon would replace Helms with a Republican appointee, the current consensus is that when and if the President reorganizes the sprawling intelligence community he will solidify, rather than diminish, Helms's authority.

Helms already has three separate roles: CIA director; overall director of central intelligence (which means that he is chief intelligence adviser to the White House and Congress); and chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board (which comprises all the other governmental intelligence outfits).

But he has no real authority over any group but the CIA. Under a reorganization, it is possible that Helms would either be given direct control of all intelligence operations or relocated in a special White House capacity.

Helms' quick mind, his remarkable grasp of complex issues, his insistence on staying out of the policy-making field and, above all, his forthrightness have earned him the respect of many of the administration's severest congressional critics.

"Helms is great with Congress," says one Senate staffer. "He admits when he doesn't know something. He never lies."

He is also one of the most sought-after dinner guests in the world, charming, witty, debonaire, completely removed

from the popular image of the nation's super-spy.

The 58-year-old Helms learned his social graces in Europe, where he spent two years in fashionable schools. After graduating from Williams, he went back to Europe as a wire-service reporter. Utilizing his fluency in German (he also speaks almost flawless French), he managed to wangle an exclusive interview with one of the Continent's rising radical politicians, Adolf Hitler.

FINANCIAL and personal problems forced him to abandon reporting and join the business side of a newspaper in Indiana. Then, during World War II, he worked for the Office of Strategic Services, and as soon as the CIA was created in 1947, he signed on.

Through the years, he served in most of the agency's branches, so that when the time came for President Johnson to pick a new director in 1966, Helms was the logical choice even though no career man had ever headed the agency before.

Helms lives in Washington with his second wife, Cynthia, whom he married in 1963. Between them they have five grown children.

He keeps in shape by playing a creditable game of tennis and, if rumors are to be believed, one of his favorite pastimes is a kind of busman's holiday: reading spy novels.

But mostly Helms devotes himself to his work — work that he believes, as he told the ASNE, "is necessary to permit this country to grow on in a better world, and to find its way into a better and more peaceful one."

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British ousted 105 Russians purely because of numbers World powers all play 'legal spy' game; it's a way of life

By Nathan Cobb
Globe Staff

While official US sources have remained tight-lipped regarding last week's expulsion by Britain of 105 Soviet diplomats and other officials for spying, this area's best-known academic authorities on government intelligence have reacted with surprise.

Their response is based on their belief the Soviets probably have more official agents in Britain than the 105 who were revealed, even though the figure represents nearly one-fifth of the diplomatic and commercial representatives in the country.

In addition, they stated this week that such a percentage of "legal spies" placed on foreign soil — agents with official functions who are covered by diplomatic immunities and treaties — is typical of most major world powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union.

According to Dr. William H. Harris, currently a teaching fellow at Harvard, the "low percentage" of names revealed suggests that the British have not identified the remaining agents or simply want to keep them under surveillance for purposes of counter-intelligence.

Dr. Harris has just completed a mammoth bibliography on intelligence and national security, and was part of a 1968 Council on Foreign Relations discussion group on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which included several former US intelligence officials.

At Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Prof. Barton Whaley has studied

intelligence agents. Prof. Whaley has studied government intelligence for 11 years and has compiled works of US military and Soviet intelligence.

The entire business of "legal spying" goes back centuries. "Legal agents" operating under "official cover" have been bounced from Napoleonic France, Czarist Russia and World War II Britain. Since 1960, 22 Russians have been asked to leave the US, the last in February, 1970. A US State Department spokesman would not reveal the number of Americans on "official business" who have been expelled from the USSR for allegedly spying, saying only that "the number is about the same."

While it has generally been conceded that the Russians put a heavier emphasis on espionage than other powers (FBI Dir. J. Edgar Hoover has said that 80 percent of the Russians stationed in the US are spies), both Dr. Harris and Prof. Whaley expressed skepticism that a higher percentage of Russians in a given embassy are more likely to be involved in spying than their counterparts at an American embassy.

They added, however, that the Russians usually have larger staffs. For example, the Soviet embassy in Washington has 202 Russian employees, while the US embassy in Moscow employs 109 Americans. The British have 78 officials at their Moscow embassy, while there are 550 Soviet officials in London.

Much of the Soviet intelligence-gathering is overseen by the Committee for State Security (KGB). According to one local Soviet expert, KGB members within an embassy often hold more power than the am-

rectly to KGB headquarters at 2 Dzerzhinski st., Moscow.

The US intelligence effort comes under the United States Intelligence Board, and its members consist of representatives of such agencies as the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, Dept. of State, FBI and Atomic Energy Commission. The CIA has primary jurisdiction and its director, Richard Helms, is chairman of the Intelligence Board.

At the Council of Foreign Relations meeting attended by Dr. Harris in 1968, it was revealed that the CIA would prefer to transfer its major foreign espionage efforts from embassies to "unofficial cover" sources such as businessmen, members of private organizations or foreign recruits. There have been no indications that such a shift has taken place.

What does a "legal spy" do?

According to the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the 105 agents evicted from his country were busying themselves with the "running of agents, instruction in the use of clandestine techniques, and the offer and payment of considerable sums of money to residents to acquire classified information."

"Generally," added Prof. Whaley of Tufts, "the 'legal agent' directs, recruits and collects information from whatever source he can. That includes everything from circulating at an embassy party to recruiting citizens of the country in which he's stationed. He usually doesn't do much spying himself; he recruits people to do it."

"And often," Dr. Harris added, "the mission in one country will be directed towards a third country. They find they get less flak from the host country if that country knows their efforts are directed against another country."

...way of life in diplomatic circles, a tacit agreement among nations. Only occasionally are controls such as last week's imposed

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INSIDE THE CIA:

A Former High Aide Says Our Spy Agency Is Becoming a Danger to America

By EDWARD K. DELONG
United Press International

OAKTON, Va. — Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask.

But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it — that is, dissident student groups and civil rights organizations — Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and Congressional control over the entire U.S. intelligence community.

"I THINK we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA — and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine ops (operations) — and there just aren't that many places anymore to display that talent," Marchetti says.

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who — if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like — are certainly considering it.

"This is going to get to be very tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a president to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against 'the enemy within.'"

MARCHETTI speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view.

At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself for an intelligence career, graduating in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history.

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of — an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House.

During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

THEN HE was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting; as special assistant to the CIA's executive director; and as executive assistant to the agency's deputy

director, Vice Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done, and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too. The National Security Agency. The DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency). The National Reconnaissance Organization. The whole bit.

"And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

WITH MANY of his lifelong views about the world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen career. One of the last things he did at the CIA was to explain to Director Richard Helms why he was leaving.

"I told him I thought the intelligence community and the intelligence agency were too big and too costly, that I thought there was too much military influence on intelligence — and very bad effects from that — and that I felt the need for more control and more direction.

"The clandestine attitude, the amorality of it all, the Cold War mentality — these kinds of things made me feel the agency was really out of step with the times," Marchetti said.

"We parted friends. I cried all the way home."

MARCHETTI, 41, hardly looks the stereotype of a man who spent 14 years in the CIA.

His dark rimmed glasses, full face, slightly stout figure, soft voice, curly black hair and bushy sideburns would seem more at home on a college campus. He pronounces his name the Italian way — Marketti.

Marchetti's first impulse after quitting the CIA was to write a non-fiction account of what was wrong with the U.S. intelligence community. But, he said, he could not bring himself to do it then.

Instead he wrote a spy novel, "a reaction to the James Bond and British spy story stereotypes," which he says looks at the intelligence business realistically from the headquarters point of view he knows so well.

The novel, "The Rope Dancer," was published last month. It is a thinly disguised view of the inner struggle over Vietnam and Russian strategic advances as Marchetti saw them within the CIA, the Pentagon and the White House under President Johnson.

Writing the novel took a year. Then came two tries at non-fiction articles, one rejected as too dull and the other turned down as too chatty, and a start on a second novel.

But Marchetti said the need for intelligence reform continued to gnaw at him, and as his first novel was about to come out he came into contact with others who agreed with him, including Rep. Herman Badillo, (D., N.Y.)

Now, Marchetti said, the second novel has been laid aside so he can devote full time to a campaign for reform.


ALTHOUGH now a dove, on Vietnam, which he calls an unwinnable war to "support a crooked,

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FOR NEW YORK CITY
OCTOBER 1971
EXCLUSIVE
PROFILE

CIA
BOSS
RICHARD
HELMS



STATINTL

Cool and cunning, Helms knows what the Reds are thinking even before they think it -- which makes the CIA the most deadly-efficient fact-finding corps in the world

By ARCHER SCANLON

He's Outfoxed Castro,
Mao, And The Kremlin

AMERICA'S
TOP
SUPER SPY

Kissinger And The Spooks

By Andrew Tully
The McNaught Syndicate, Inc.

WASHINGTON—Shortly after he took over his post as President Nixon's top adviser on national security affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger complained wryly to an aide that "These spooks really tell me more than I want to know about the birth rate in Cambodia."

Kissinger's reference was to the Republic's vast espionage empire, with its nearly 200,000 employees, its "secret" \$5-billion annual budget, and its penchant for overwhelming the White House with every scrap of incidental intelligence it can gather. The story is timely because at long last it appears that something will be done to reduce the size and cost of this empire. Sen. Allen Ellender, D-La., chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, wants to cut \$500-million from the total intelligence budget, thereby eliminating 50,000 jobs. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird already is engaged in a reorganization plan to whittle down the size of the enormous military spy shop.

Laird got moving shortly after President Nixon, early this year, ordered a study of all intelligence operations. The pres-

tigious Central Intelligence Agency, which employs a variety of experts ranging from beauticians to nuclear scientists, is also expected to bite the economy bullet, albeit with a certain amount of kicking and screaming.

But the Pentagon will suffer most from the axe, for the simple reason that its intelligence community is the biggest and costliest—and possibly the least efficient. Laird presides over an establishment which includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, intelligence divisions of the three services and the super hush-hush National Security Agency, the nation's code-making and code-breaking apparatus. It is an establishment that employs some 150,000 people and spends an estimated \$3-billion a year.

Laird's spies are in trouble with President Nixon. He has been telling the defense Secretary for months that the military spy factory is "too damn big," and that its bigness apparently breeds inefficiency.

Specifically, although he boasted of both operations in public, Nixon was unhappy with the intelligence planning for the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos and the abortive prisoner-of-

war raid at Sontay. More recently, he has been "unimpressed"—as he told Laird—with intelligence on Viet Cong hit-and-run attacks in South Vietnam. Both the Pentagon and the CIA got a scolding from the President when they failed to discover Soviet missile installations near the Suez Canal during the summer of 1970.

Nixon also reportedly has cracked down on so-called "politico-sociological" studies conducted within friendly foreign countries by Army Intelligence, or G-2. After complaints from Secretary of State William Rogers, Nixon in July ordered the Pentagon to recall a research group dispatched to Czechoslovakia to prepare an estimate of the chances of a people's revolt.

Rogers is said to have described the project as representing a "dangerous gamble" that could get the U.S. in serious trouble. He compared it with the notorious 1965 "Camelot" project set up to determine the factors involved in promoting and inhibiting revolution in Chile. That operation was cancelled after a strong protest by the Chilean government, but by then it already had cost the taxpayers \$1-million.

Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that any administration by itself can reform our swollen intelligence community. Like all bureaucratic baronies, it is a powerful lobby within the administration. No President wants to be accused of restraining, for budgetary reasons, a spy who might discover tomorrow that Red China has invented a new bomb. Eventually, if any real reorganization is to be realized, Congress will have to step in with its power of the purse strings.

But the Nixon administration is indeed making the first meaningful progress in intelligence reform since Harry Truman established the CIA. Even if Congress again shirks its responsibilities, the cost of spying almost surely will be reduced in the next year or two. Richard Nixon has a record for frugality.

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September 28, 1971

guards do not venture at night. Beatings, deaths, and suicides are frequent in the dormitories. Rape, robbery, and homosexuality are rampant, as marauding gangs and individuals pillage the dormitories and terrorize their fellow inmates.

Many prisoners would deeply understand the vivid description of penal life provided by the Russian novelist Dostoevsky, whose book "The House of the Dead," describes his devastating ordeal while imprisoned in Siberia.

If he died and awoke in hell, Dostoevsky reasoned, he would expect it to be no worse than life in prison. On his last night in jail, walking beside the fence that had confined him for 4 years, Dostoevsky concluded that on the whole the men there were no better and no worse than people generally. Among them were exceptionally strong and gifted people. The waste of their lives was an intolerable cruelty. From his experience in prison he defined man as "a creature that can become accustomed to anything."

We in America spend more than \$1 billion a year maintaining our archaic prison system. Ninety-five percent of all expenditures in the entire field of corrections in the United States goes for custody—iron bars, stone walls and guards—while only 5 percent goes for hope—health services, education, and developing employment skills.

As a consequence of the high rate of recidivism, the American taxpayer is grossly shortchanged in the investment of his tax dollar aimed at achieving criminal rehabilitation. In fact, if a private business had as poor a percentage of success and as high a level of cost as does our prison system, it would have difficulty surviving its first shareholders' meeting.

The American Correctional Association has estimated that it takes \$11,000 a year to keep a married man in prison. This figure is based on the inmate's loss of earnings, the cost of keeping him in prison—\$10.24 a day in Federal prisons and \$5.31 a day in State prisons—the cost to the taxpayer if his family has to go on relief and the loss of taxes he would pay.

Medical and dental facilities are sadly lacking in prisons. The result is that many prisoners lose their sense of dignity by being forced to live with debilitating physical problems. For example, many prisoners are badly in need of dental work, but few receive adequate attention in prison. Personalities are shaped by such factors as the loss of teeth. The lack of the most fundamental medical services is a significant part of the dehumanizing daily existence of prison life that results in brutalization.

Our prison system also suffers from a staggering need for increased psychiatric and educational personnel. There are only 50 full-time psychiatrists for all American prisons, 15 of them in Federal institutions which hold only 4 percent of all prisoners. In adult penal institutions, there is only one teacher available for every 150 inmates, although fewer than 5 percent of the inmates of Federal institutions function at a 12th-grade level, and one psychologist for every 1,200 prisoners.

The acute lack of psychiatric and psychological personnel is particularly deplorable as studies have shown that most prisoners suffer from mental disturbances at the time they committed their crime.

Many ex-convicts revert to a life of crime because they have not received job training that would assist them in obtaining employment in the outside world. Licence plate and mop bucket manufacturing are two examples of prison vocations that bear little relation to potential jobs in private industry. Eighty-five percent of the inmates of Federal penal institutions lack any marketable skill when they leave prison.

Although much attention has been focused on the condition of our Federal and State prisons, a recent census of 4,037 local and county jails, conducted by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, revealed many problems that plague these institutions. Eighty-six percent of the county institutions or jails located in cities of 25,000 or greater population had no facilities whatsoever for exercise or recreation. Eighty percent lacked educational programs, while 26 percent were without visiting facilities. About 50 percent had no medical services. About 15 percent lacked toilets. In addition, 19,000 of the 98,000 cells in these jails were between 51 and 100 years old, and 5,416 of the cells were more than a century old.

The same survey also revealed that 52 percent of all inmates in city and county jails were held for reasons other than conviction of a crime. Almost all the inmates in this category were awaiting trial, many of them unable to raise the bail necessary for their release. The result is that prisoners who have not come to trial must sit idly, waiting months and with no constructive activity available to them. During this purgatorial period of enforced idleness, they mingle with convicted criminals, often assimilating their views and lifestyles.

We have drawn an iron curtain in our minds, shutting out from our awareness the daily tragedy of life in America's prisons. Except when there are prison riots such as occurred at Attica, jail breaks or scandals, little thought, attention or concern is given to our correctional institutions and their inmates. It is time to recognize that repression is an inadequate substitute for rehabilitation. It is time the American people realized that punishment alone does not bring correction. We must awaken to the fact that the present system of criminal justice, in the words of the President's Violence Commission, "does not deter, does not detect, does not convict, does not correct."

It is not for humanitarian reasons alone that we must reform our corrections system. It is for our own safety. We have never faced up to the facts that most convicts will some day be released from the hellholes we call correctional institutions. They come out, as we have seen, more bitter, more disturbed, more antisocial, and more skilled in crime than when they went in.

Accordingly, if we are to break the vicious circle of recidivism, we will need to

revolutionize our corrections program.

Twenty-five hundred years ago, the ancient Chinese Philosopher Confucius wrote:

A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step.

An important initial step toward improving our detention centers would be the creation of a House Select Committee on Penal Reform. It is my earnest hope that Members of the House will give swift attention to this vitally needed measure and will join with me in calling for the establishment of such a Select Committee.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The SPEAKER, Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HAMILTON) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, we in Congress worry too much about the role of Congress in foreign affairs, and not enough about its competence. When that competence is achieved, the present imbalance between the executive and legislative branches will be improved, if not corrected.

One important way the competence of the Congress in foreign affairs can be improved is through the creation of a Joint Committee on National Security.

I have introduced legislation, H.R. 10899, to create such a committee. The same legislation has been introduced in the Senate by Senator HUMPHREY.

This joint committee would function in the national security field in a manner comparable to the operation of the Joint Economic Committee in the field of economics. Just as the Joint Economic Committee examines the annual economic report of the President, the Joint Committee on National Security could study and analyze the annual foreign policy messages of the President and the Secretary of State.

The Joint Economic Committee has become a respected forum for examining economic issues, and its recommendations have a substantial impact on the development of economic policy. The joint committee I propose could have the same impact on our national security policy.

Just as the Joint Economic Committee unifies the otherwise fragmented voice of Congress on economic policy, the Joint Committee on National Security would channel congressional opinion on foreign policy. It has been estimated that more than half of the 38 standing committees on Congress are involved in some aspect of our foreign policy. As a result, there is no way of knowing what the Congress thinks about a particular international issue. This joint committee will offer a centralized voice.

Its main responsibilities would be these:

First, to study and make recommendations on all issues concerning national security.

Second, to review, study and evaluate the Pentagon Papers and other documents covering U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Laird Eyes Civilian for Intelligence

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House is expected to approve soon a Pentagon plan which would install, for the first time, a civilian as the top-ranking intelligence official in the Defense Department, according to informed government sources.

The move is part of a more extensive, government-wide reorganization plan, much of which is still unsettled, aimed at making the gathering of all types of military and foreign intelligence more efficient and far less expensive.

Estimates of the current government-wide cost each year for global intelligence gathering, sorting and analyzing run to about \$5 billion and involve some 200,000 people.


The bulk of the money—an estimated \$3 billion annually—and the people—about 150,000—are associated with the Defense Department.

The Pentagon part of the planned reorganization involves establishment of a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence whose job would be to oversee the entire military network, including the separate activities of all three services plus those of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is headed by a military man, and the code-cracking National Security Agency.

There are several candidates for the new post. But the man most Pentagon insiders expect to get the job is Dr. Albert C. Hall, currently a vice-president of Martin-Marietta Corp., the company that builds the booster rockets for most of the U.S. spy satellites.

Hall has a reputation as a top-notch engineer and space expert, having been one of the leading space planners in the Pentagon between 1963-65. He is no stranger to the intelligence field, currently heading

The new assistant secretary will become the ranking intelligence official in the Pentagon and Defense Secretary Laird's chief intelligence advisor. As Defense officials describe the plan, however, the



1960 AP Picture

ALBERT C. HALL

...may join Pentagon

director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, will also retain direct access to Laird.

The Pentagon has never had a civilian in the top intelligence job before, on a full-time basis. (Last year, after the department was rocked by disclosures of military spying on civilians, Laird named his close friend and then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, Robert F. Froehke, to also serve as a special assistant for intelligence).

Behind the new move, as Pentagon officials explain it, is a need to cut down the enormous size of the military intelligence community and to weed out unnecessary projects and facilities.

The feeling that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful information it was producing was the principal impetus, according to civilian officials, for a White House-ordered study of all intelligence operations earlier this year.

In addition, some sources say that President Nixon, while impressed in large measure with the work of the civilian-run Central Intelligence Agency, was unhappy with military intelligence planning going into the abortive Son Tay prison raid and the South Vi-

Also, the President reportedly was annoyed with the lag in U.S. knowledge of a Soviet cease-fire violation involving construction of SAM missile sites near the Suez Canal during the summer of 1970.

Demands for more efficiency have also come recently from Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.), chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee. Ellender is threatening to cut \$500 million out of the total intelligence budget which might involve eliminating some 50,000 jobs.

Some government officials estimate that actual cuts could run to about 20,000 people and a savings of a few hundred million dollars.

While the Pentagon, as the chief target of the efficiency experts, is about to get some help, proposals for reorganizing the rest of the intelligence community appear to be still involved in bureaucratic infighting.

Plans to create a new super-agency with CIA director Richard Helms as the chief have been dropped, though many officials believe that Helms will eventually emerge with strengthened and broader powers over all intelligence operations and resources.

Plans to put a new intelligence coordinator in the White House are also said to be unsettled, though such a prospect is viewed as likely.

Helms appears to be a central figure in the question of how far the government will go to shake-up the entire intelligence community. While Helms is viewed in all quarters as the top professional in the field, some intelligence experts fear that giving him a job with a bigger administrative work load will dilute his contribution to the overall quality of U.S. intelligence, weaken the tightly knit CIA, and focus even more power in the White House.

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Trust The CIA?

It may be too serious a subject to laugh about, but it's terribly hard to resist the urge to smile.

First, we have some news about America's proposals which will be made to the Russians at the SALT talks being leaked to the press by an unidentified source.

Then the FBI sleuths, complete with tape recorders and lie detectors, invade the State Department, the Pentagon and even the White House to find out who did the talking.

If we can't trust the people at the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House, how do we know we can trust the FBI?

This may be a job for the CIA.—KLR

Dossier on the

C.I.A.

by William R. Carson

For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times policy-making arm of the government. I never thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. —ex-President Harry S. Truman.

NOTHING has happened since that pronouncement by the agency's creator in December 1963 to remove or reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's development. As currently organized, supervised, structured and led, it may be that the CIA has outlived its usefulness. Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine operations. Possibly its reputation, regardless of the facts, is now so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue of its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing past intelligence failures and consequent foreign policy fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So American taxpayers provide upwards of \$750,000,000 a year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or to what extent the CIA fulfils or exceeds its authorized intelligence functions.

The gathering of intelligence is a necessary and legitimate activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does raise a very real problem of the proper place and control of agents who are required, or authorized on their own recognizance, to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage but it can be — and has been — perverted to hide intelligence activities even from those with the constitutional responsibility to sanction them. A common rationalization is the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn't know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part of politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this indecision.

What we need to do is to examine how the U.S. gathers its intelligence, and consider how effective its instruments are and what room there is for improvement. Every government agency must be subject to some form of audit. The CIA's Director, acknowledged before the American Society

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representative of the unending, gambitry and bigger and bigger life human aspect of espionage and secret operations. At this level the stakes are lower and the "struggle" frequently takes bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote noted in his *Handbook for Spies*, the average agent's "real difficulties are concerned with the practice of his trade. The setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administrative details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking life."

As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in 1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On arrival he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test does and was wired up, and the technician plugged the machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it blew out all the hotel's lights. The ensuing confusion and darkness did not cover a getaway by the trio. They were discovered, arrested, and jailed as American spies.

By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old Peters Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the CIA set off a two-stage international incident between England and the United States, caused the Secretary of State to write a letter of apology to a foreign chief of state, made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like the proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation wherein the United States Government lied in public — and was caught!

UNIVERSITY REVIEW

NO. 19 1971

September

A CIA Paper

"...Although this entire series of discussions was 'off the record', the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions."

—C. Douglas Dillon

By The Africa Research Group

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the few governmental agencies whose public image has actually improved as a result of the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclosures of "The Agency's" role in assassinations, sabotage, and coup d'états consciously intended to subvert international law, America's secret agency has actually emerged in some quarters with the veneration due prophets, or at least the respect due its suggested efficiency and accuracy.

Virtually every newspaper editor, not to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has heaped praise on the CIA for the accuracy of its estimates detailing the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Time and again, the Agency's "level headed professionalism" has been contrasted with the escalation-overkill orientation of the Pentagon or the President's advisors. The editor of the Christian Science Monitor even called upon policy makers to consult the CIA more, calling it a "remarkably accurate source of information." But such backhanded praise for conspirators confuses public understanding of the important and closely integrated role which the CIA plays in advancing the Pax Americana on a global scale.

For many, the Pentagon Papers provided a first peek into the inner sanctum of foreign policy making. As the government's attempt to suppress the study illustrates, the people are not supposed to have access to the real plans of their government. On close inspection, what emerges is not an "invisible government" but an indivisible system in which each agency offers its own specialized input, and is delegated its own slice of responsibility. Coordinated inter-departmental agencies work out the division of imperial labor. There are disagreements and bureaucratic

rivalries, to be sure, but once the decisions are reached at the top they are carried out with the monolithic tone of state power.

The intelligence community now plays an expanded and critical role in creating and administering the real stuff of American foreign policy. CIA Director Richard Helms presides over a U.S. Intelligence Board which links the secret services of all government agencies, including the FBI. In the White House, Henry Kissinger presides over an expanded National Security Council structure which further centralizes covert foreign policy planning. It is here that the contingency plans are cooked up and the "options" so carefully worked out. It is in these closed chambers and strangelovian "situation rooms" that plans affecting the lives of millions are formulated for subsequent execution by a myriad of U.S. controlled agencies and agents.

Increasingly, these schemes rely on covert tactics whose full meaning is seldom perceived by the people affected — be they Americans or people of foreign countries. The old empires, with their colonial administrators and civilizing mission have given way to the more subtle craftsman of intervention. Their manipulations take place in the front rooms of neo-colonial institutions and the parlors of dependent third world elites. In this world of realpolitik, appearances are often purposely deceptive and political stances intentionally misleading. The U.S. aggression in Vietnam, lest anyone forget, began as a covert involvement largely engineered by the CIA. Similar covert interventions now underway elsewhere in the world may be fueling tomorrow's Vietnams.

It is for this reason that the Africa Research Group, an independent radical research collective, is now making public major excerpts from a document which offers an informed insider's view of the secret workings of the American intelligence apparatus abroad. Never intended for publication, it was made

CIA manipulations.

Richard Bissell, the man who led the Council discussion that night, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corporation, Bissell served as the CIA's Deputy Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included a number of intelligence experts including Robert Amory, Jr., another former Deputy Director, and the late CIA chief, Allen Dulles, long considered the grand old man of American espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to

*The complete text of the document will be available for \$1 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Continued

DOVISH NEDZI'S NEW JOB

Overseer to Lift CIA's Lid

By ORR KELLY
Star Staff Writer

Shortly after Congress returns from its August recess, five congressmen will turn off the George Washington Memorial Parkway at an unmarked exit, swing back across the parkway on than overpass and suddenly emerge into a spacious, tree-dotted parking lot surrounding a gleaming white building.

Only after they have parked and entered the building will they see their first solid evidence — inlaid into the floor in a giant seal — that this is the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Heading the little group of congressmen will be Rep. Lucien Norbert Nedzi, a 46-year-old Democrat who has represented the eastern portion of Detroit since 1962, and who has just been named — to the surprise of many — as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on central intelligence.

Nedzi's record has not been the kind that would, on the surface, endear him to the more senior — and generally more conservative — members of the committee. He co-sponsored an end-the-war amendment in the House, has opposed the B1 bomber and the Safeguard missile defense system, and is one of a tiny group of rebels on the 41-man committee known as the Fearless Five.

Why did Rep. F. Edward Hebert, a Democrat from Louisiana, choose Nedzi for one of the most important subcommittee assignments — a post traditionally held by the chairman himself?

Nedzi Explains Choice

"The chairman was generally interested in having a review of this area," Nedzi explained in an interview. "My experience with him has been excellent — we understand each other. I know where he stands, and he knows where I stand. I have never deceived him and he has never reflected deception to me."

"He feels that we need to call a spade a spade and he feels I'll do just that."

Nedzi comes to his new assignment — which will cover all intelligence agencies, not just the CIA — with few preconceptions and, in fact, very little knowledge of the field.

"The senior members were on the Central Intelligence subcommittee and we were not privy to their deliberations. We had absolutely no information on the budgets of the agencies or what they were up to. Periodically, we got intelligence reports," Nedzi said.

The five-man subcommittee was, in the past, made up of the chairmen of the full committee and the two senior members from each party. The senior members serving with Nedzi will be Reps. Melvin Price, D-Ill., O. C. Fisher, D-Tex., William G. Bray, R-Ind., and Alvin E. O'Konski, R-Wis.

Nedzi had some brief exposure to the intelligence field when he served on a special subcommittee looking into the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo by the North Koreans.

Has Met Helms

He has met Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, on several occasions when Helms has appeared before the committee and he thinks highly of him. But Nedzi has never visited the CIA, has never called on the CIA for a special intelligence briefing, and does not know Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, or Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the super-secret National Security Agency.

The only time a top intelligence official has appeared in an open hearing in the last decade, was on June 2, 1961 when Helms, then No. 2 man in the CIA, testified before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee. Normally, Helms and other CIA officials not only testify in closed hearings but their names and the name of their agency are deleted before a transcript on the hearing is made public.

Sets Priorities

Despite his lack of experience in the area, Nedzi has a pretty good idea of the areas he would like to explore and he listed them this way:

1— Is there too much overlapping of functions among the CIA and the State and Defense Department intelligence operations?

2— Are the budgets the proper size and does all the information paid for at great expense get to the man who needs it when he needs it?

3— Are individual rights being protected? Nedzi is aware that military intelligence people have been told to cut out their domestic intelligence activities, but he wants to make sure the new rules are being obeyed.

4— Is it proper for the CIA to manage operations such as those in Laos?

"There is a question of whether we should be involved in such operations and the further questions of whether this agency is the proper one to do it," Nedzi said.

5— Should the whole system of security classification be revised?

"That this is a difficult area, I realize," Nedzi said, "and I'm not sure we're going to be able to come up with a Solomon-like decision."

6— How are the national intelligence estimates arrived at? What really is the basis for arriving at decisions?

Since his selection for the new job announced earlier this week, Nedzi said, his phone has been constantly busy with callers volunteering information about U.S. intelligence operations.

"We will give them an appropriate audience," he said. "We are hearing from people with all sorts of axes to grind. We'll screen them all for substance, but no one is preemptorily dismissed."

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BOOK
REVIEWS*Intelligence**Scandal*

BY VLADIMIROV

SCANDAL is the word best characterizing the context in which most citizens have viewed, in recent times, the intelligence establishment, particularly the CIA. This is the conclusion arrived at by Professor Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University in his book* on the U.S. intelligence system which he has been studying for a good many years.

The book is by no means an exposé. The author's position is rather that of a well-wisher who would like to see the defects in the system eliminated in order that it might function more successfully. All the more noteworthy, then, is the material he has collected, as well as some of his own admissions, for they reveal the basic deficiencies of the "intelligence establishment" which are essentially a reflection of the evils of the social system that engendered it.

In Ransom's opinion the intelligence system, with the CIA at its head, is inefficient. Indeed, he considers "the CIA problem" to be one of the most urgent problems of U.S. foreign policy inasmuch as the failures of the CIA and the political scandals caused by them seriously damage the national interest and the international prestige of the United States. The same applies to the other intelligence agencies which perform functions similar to those of the CIA.

* H. Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970

The chief members of the vast espionage and subversion community, apart from the CIA, are the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) with subordinate services in the army, air force and navy, the National Security Agency, the State Department's Office of Research and Intelligence, the intelligence branch of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). There are ten or more other departments and offices, among them the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and the Agency for International Development, Ransom tells us, which while not officially associated with the intelligence community nevertheless play their part. The annual budget of the intelligence establishment, according to the author, is in the neighbourhood of \$4,000 million, of which \$1,000 million each goes to the CIA and the National Security Agency. The central offices of the CIA, DIA and the NSA alone have a personnel of more than 30,000.

A large part of the book is given over to an analysis of the activities of America's principal intelligence agency, the CIA. Ransom is of the opinion that the CIA has become something more than an intelligence outfit, it has assumed a wide range of political functions in the sphere of international relations and enjoys far greater powers than were foreseen by the National Security Act of 1947. Violating the norms of international law, the CIA interferes in the internal affairs of other states. It prosecutes undeclared wars, maintains dictatorial regimes and engineers the overthrow of governments undesirable to the U.S.; it influences elections, sends its agents into public organizations in the U.S. and abroad in order to control their activity, directs the work of "free" radio stations, secretly organizes the publication of books and articles, creates "private" air companies which are used for espionage purposes. Ransom maintains that the CIA has exceeded all limits as regards the use of foreign diplomatic and other official U.S. agencies for espionage and subversion. According to the American journal *Foreign Affairs*, of the 22,000 persons on the staffs of 263 U.S. diplomatic missions, only 3,300 are employed by the State Department. The remaining 18,700 work for the intelligence and propaganda departments.

Of considerable interest is Ransom's account of how the intelligence information obtained by the American

espionage network influences important government policy decisions. In the United States, according to Ransom, intelligence alone has the exclusive prerogative to make assessments concerning the situation in any foreign country and the plans of the respective government. This is all the more disturbing since the intelligence people, in the author's opinion, are stricken with what he calls "information pathology," i.e., a tendency "to interpret events in terms of how they prefer things to be rather than as they actually are" (p. 37). Anti-communism, hatred for the socialist countries lend a sinister colouring to intelligence estimates, helping to create a war psychosis in the United States and engender anti-Soviet campaigns.

Describing the state of affairs in the American espionage community, Ransom comes to the conclusion that the CIA is in need of reform. Since the unsavoury reputation earned by American intelligence is, in Ransom's opinion, due mainly to espionage, plots, political provocations, etc., which he euphemistically refers to as "clandestine political actions," he proposes removing them from the CIA's province. He suggests further that thought be given to the question of introducing censorship of the American press which, he says, writes far too much about the CIA's blunders and is hence to blame for its "bad publicity." Finally, he advocates stricter government control over intelligence agencies, with a view primarily to establishing a more effective system of operative leadership of subversive activities in order to reduce the risk of failure.

Ransom's recipes, of course, are not likely to produce the desired results, for it is not a matter of rectifying some individual flaw, but of the sum total of the sinister activities of the American intelligence. The affairs of the CIA and the other espionage agencies are conducted with the knowledge and consent of the President and on instructions from the National Security Council. This means that all its activities are directed by the top men in Washington in keeping with the requirements of the foreign policy strategy of American imperialism. The adventurous nature of that strategy makes it safe to predict that new "scandals" are in store for U.S. intelligence in the future as well.

DETROIT, MICH.

NEWS

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Nedzi named chairman

House unit to probe U.S. intelligence net

By RICHARD A. RYAN
News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — How do the many government intelligence agencies function? How does the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) differ from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)?

How are the many agencies funded? Whom do they investigate? Do they overlap and duplicate their efforts?

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Detroit Democrat, intends to seek the answers to these and other questions about the supersecret intelligence organizations.

Nedzi yesterday was appointed chairman of a new intelligence subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. The subcommittee was organized and its chairman appointed by Rep. F. Edward Hebert, Louisiana Democrat, chairman of the parent committee.

Serving with Nedzi will be the two ranking Democrats and Republicans of the Armed Services Committee — Democratic Reps. Melvin Price of Illinois, and O. C. Fisher, of Texas, and Republican Reps. Alvin E. O'Konski, of Wisconsin, and William G. Bray, of Indiana.

"WE KNOW we are spending billions in the field of intelligence," Nedzi said in an interview after his appointment, "but no one really knows how much. The budgets for the various agencies are not a matter of public knowledge.

"I want to review their physical operations and determine the scope of their activity. And I think it is appropriate to inquire whether we need all that intelligence."

The veteran Detroit legislator said he is certain there is duplication of effort among the CIA, DIA and the intelligence arms of the military services.

As a member of the subcommittee that investigated the Jan. 23, 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo by the North Koreans, Nedzi said it was apparent from facts uncovered then that there was much duplication of effort.

"The information gained by the Pueblo never reached the people it should have reached," Nedzi said.

The congressman feels the intelligence sub-

committee in Congress in that it must "reconcile national security with basic constitutional rights."

Military intelligence activities came under Senate scrutiny earlier this year when John M. O'Brien, a former Army intelligence agent, said in a letter to Senator Sam Ervin, North Carolina Democrat, that the Army had kept several political figures under surveillance for alleged anti-war activities.

AMONG THOSE mentioned by O'Brien were Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III, Illinois Democrat, who was Illinois state treasurer at the time, and Rep. Abner J. Mikva, Illinois Democrat.

The Army denied the charges but Ervin conducted Senate hearings on the whole question of military surveillance.

The extent of the surveillance was underscored by a former Air Force intelligence sergeant who testified that of the 119 persons attending an anti-war demonstration on Sept. 1, 1969, outside Carson, Colo., 53 were intelligence agents or members of the press.

Assistant Defense Secretary Robert J. Froehke told the committee that the DIA had cards on 25 million "personalities" and on 760,000 organizations and incidents.

The new subcommittee, Nedzi said, is required to make periodic inquiries into all aspects of intelligence activities and, when appropriate, make legislative recommendations.

The subcommittee also will look into the whole problem of classification of official documents, Nedzi said.

"WE WANT to find out what is required from a national security standpoint in the way of classification," Nedzi said. "It may be that more information can be given to the public without jeopardizing national security."

Document classification became a national issue with the publication of the Pentagon papers.

This is the first subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that Nedzi has chaired. The Detroit congressman fell out of favor with the former committee chairman, L. Mendel Rivers, for repeatedly opposing the autocratic chairman on military bills.

When Rivers, who died earlier this year, was committee chairman, he personally headed what was then known as the CIA subcommittee. Its activities then were limited and secret. When Hebert ascended to the chairmanship, he disbanded the old CIA committee.

He re-formed it yesterday, however, but at the same time gave it a much broader scope.

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How the Pentagon papers battle shielded Nixon plan for China trip

"Pentagon papers 'delay also saved CIA agents' lives, helped allied regimes, safeguarded key emissaries."

By J. F. TER-MORST

Chief of Our Washington Bureau
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WASHINGTON -- One prime reason why the government went into court to try to stop publication of the Pentagon papers was a fear that certain disclosures might wreck the secret planning then under way for President Nixon's anticipated trip to Communist China.

In going to court, the government's top lawyers believe they also saved the lives of several Americans, headed off some grave security leaks and preserved the machinery of some of today's most delicate and secret peace moves involving many countries of the East and West.

The Washington-Peking thaw is one of them. Mr. Nixon, it can be said on high authority, shares this view.

So even though the Supreme Court ruled, 6-3, that the New York Times and Washington Post could resume printing material from the top-secret Pentagon study of U.S. involvement in Indochina, the government feels it won more than it lost.

Two factors are vital in the government's reasoning.

One was the two-week period, June 15 to July 1, during which the administration's court tactics kept the Times, Post and some other newspapers from publishing the documents.

The second factor, now in the Supreme Court's vault, is a single-spaced typewritten list of "10 items" contained in the Pentagon study. The government contends these items would cause "grave international

These two elements--the two-week time span and the 10-item list--are interlocking.

Together they constitute the heart of the government's contention that it went into court, not to prevent embarrassment to previous administrations or to thwart the First Amendment, but to head off "irreparable injury" to the global security of the United States.

(Daniel Ellsberg, the former Pentagon staffer and Rand Corp. employee, has said repeatedly that he was the conduit to the New York Times, the Post and other newspapers.)

As proof of the government's success in this respect, the official cited the nature of stories in the Times and Post after the Supreme Court gave them permission to resume publication of the Pentagon papers.

"They haven't surfaced any of the ultra sensitive stuff on the 10-item list," he said.

What the government feels it gained from its lawsuits, in spite of the Supreme Court verdict:

• The two-week injunction period gave the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sufficient time to "extract" key agents from dangerous assignments abroad.

These agents "almost certainly would have been killed," one source said, had several Pentagon documents been printed or described in detail.

"By going into court we gained enough time to get them the hell out," he said.

Removal of these agents--six in particular--appears to have been accomplished "without blowing anybody's cover," to use the phrase of one intelligence official. In other words, the agents may be able to resume their assignments later, without tipping off unfriendly governments.

• The lawsuits gave the government an opportunity, beneath the formal umbrella of the federal courts, to use in-chambers sessions to acquaint the judges and Times and Post editors with the highly sensitive nature of some portions of the 44-volume Pentagon study.

"It might have appeared to be only ancient history," one source said, "but to us and other governments affected, it was an acute and current matter of highest priority. Disclosure certainly would have been a disaster."

tries, especially behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains."

In other words, since the newspapers involved had not availed themselves of the government's declassifying process for the Pentagon papers, the government used the courts as a mechanism to "get the message across."

U.S. Attorney Whitney North Seymour first submitted a 22-page "special appendix" before the federal Appellate Court in New York in the New York Times case, citing items in the Pentagon study which the government believed would cause grave national danger if disclosed. When the case moved to the Supreme Court, Solicitor General Irwin H. Griswold summarized these matters in his 10-item list given to the justices in a sealed envelope for in-chambers perusal.

What the government believes it has been successful in preventing is the publication of details of certain Pentagon papers on that list, obtained by this reporter. The contents are summarized here only in general terms so as not to violate security.

The News has been assured that the following points, without further amplification, do not offer any security breach or threat to the people involved.

• The Pentagon study included precise documentation of American reconnaissance and intelligence activities involving certain Asian countries supporting Hanoi's side in the Vietnam war.

These activities were known to be taking place by the spied-upon countries but they were technically unable to stop it and so had said nothing publicly.

But publication of official U.S. documents from the Pentagon papers, detailing specifics of the reconnaissance activity, undoubtedly would have required these countries to respond publicly against the United States "in a most bellicose fashion" to quote American officials.

The ensuing diplomatic crisis, they believe, would have undercut current U.S. efforts to improve relations with these countries.

One can assume that among initiatives that would have been jeopardized, if not destroyed, is Mr. Nixon's scheduled trip to mainland China before next May and his administration's efforts to normalize relations with that diplomatically-unrecognized country of 800 million persons.

At the height of the Pentagon papers controversy last month, American and some key foreign diplomats were secretly arranging with Peking for a 10-day visit by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

11 JUN 1977

Inside Washington



Cheaper and Better Intelligence Sought



Robert S. Allen and John A. Goldsmith

WASHINGTON — Without fanfare the prestigious Senate Appropriations Committee is taking a long, hard look at the agencies which conduct the Pentagon's far-flung and costly intelligence activities.

Last year, at the committee's urging Congress imposed a flat manpower ceiling — 138,000 employees — on those activities. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, recognizing the problems in his department's sprawling intelligence complex assigned Assistant Secretary Robert F. Froehle as coordinator.

Now the Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on defense is scheduling a couple of days of closed-door hearings to explore further economies. Congressional experts believe Froehle has at least been able to identify expenses assignable to gathering defense intelligence.

Major targets of the committee's interest are two little-known Defense Department agencies which together spend far

more than the often publicized Central Intelligence Agency. They are the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, and the National Security Agency, NSA.

NSA is the government's electronic spy-agency, specializing and cracking codes. Congressional critics wonder whether NSA has carried its activities to a point where much of the product is no longer worth the cost.

The Defense Intelligence Agency was originally established to coordinate intelligence activities of the separate military services. Critics claim that the coordinating agency has itself become a center of military bureaucracy.

BILLIONS AT STAKE — Overlapping responsibilities of CIA, Defense, and the State Department's intelligence bureau have periodically come under congressional criticism. That is one of the issues involved this time.

The Appropriations Committee is primarily interested, however, in the very large sums expended and the quality of the product not just in the possible duplications involved. The inquiry is being undertaken in connection with the committee's review of the annual defense appropriations bill.

The costs of many intelligence operations are classified, of course. For defense intelligence cost estimates, even when declassified, may be misleading because military personnel ostensibly assigned to other duties may actually be full or part-time intelligence operatives.

The costs of many intelligence operations have been more or less officially estimated at slightly under \$3 billion annually. That is substantially more than the \$500 million estimate which is usually used for the per year expenses of CIA.

The Senate committee is, therefore, hunting for economies in the agencies where most of the nation's intelligence dollars are spent.

with a concern in the White House over the cost and operations of the intelligence community. President Nixon is reported to be considering a reorganization of intelligence activities.

The President and, more frequently, national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger are said to be dissatisfied with the quality of the intelligence which reaches them. They would like to improve the product, clarify the lines of responsibility, and cut costs.

They are said to be increasingly concerned that the career director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, who doubles as boss of CIA, has no real power to coordinate all activities in his agency, Defense and State, though that was the concept when his job was created.

Helms himself, the first career man to head the Central Intelligence Agency, is highly regarded by the President. Even the critics of CIA in Congress applaud Helms for keeping his agency out of foreign policy decision making.

However, there has been increasing criticism of intelligence preparation for such operations as the empty-handed raid on the prison camp at Son Tay. More recently Kissinger was reported critical of the intelligence which let the South Vietnamese be quickly outnumbered and over-matched on their invasion of Laos.

As the United States seeks accommodation with the Soviet Union (and, perhaps, China) on limiting strategic arms, and amid the continuing controversy over NATO and Warsaw Pact troop levels in Europe, the gathering of reliable intelligence can have a tremendous bearing on the making of wise national security judgments.

So, while they may lack the headline potential of a cloak-and-dagger spy story, there is real interest here in the efforts by Congress and the White House to produce better intelligence at lower cost.

Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440000



CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 541,086
S - 697,966

MAY 30 1974

KUP'S COLUMN

THE WASHINGTON WHIRL: The flap last week over conflicting intelligence reports from the Defense Department and CIA on Russian missiles wound up as a tempest in a teapot. But President Nixon now is giving thought to putting the intelligence agencies of the Defense Department, CIA and National Security Council under one management to avoid similar harum-scarum incidents. . . . Sen. Ed Muskie (D-Me.) has decided on a September date to announce he's officially a presidential candidate.

KUPCINET

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Special Report

Helms, the Man At CIA Helms, Is 'Top Secret'

By Newsweek Feature Service

WASHINGTON -- In a recent edition of "Who's Who in America," the official biography for one Richard McGarrath Helms is less than an inch long. It identifies him simply as a "govt. ofcl.," lists prosaic things like his education



HELMS

credentials (B.A. Williams Coll. 1935), his clubs (Chevy Chase, City Tavern Assn.) and his office address: Central Intelligence Agy., Washington, 20505.

What the brief sketch doesn't mention, however, is that in the colorful career of the tall, handsome Helms, the U.S.'s chief intelligence officer, there is enough intrigue and derring-do to fill a dozen spy novels.

Take, for instance, the time in 1956 just after Nikita Khrushchev had delivered his secret "de-Stalinization" speech to the Communist party Congress in Moscow.

As deputy chief of the CIA's Clandestine Services, Helms directed the agents who dummed up a copy of the speech with 32 derogatory inserts about neutral nations and their leaders. They then circulated it abroad -- and caused the Russians some severe embarrassment.

ON TAKE THE TIME HELMS supervised an operation that involved the digging of a tunnel under 500 yards of East and West German soil to allow CIA agents to tap Moscow's phone conversations with the East German government, its own secret police agents in Germany and its own army command.

In all probability, most of Helms's career will remain classified "top secret" until long after his death -- which is exactly as he would have it. As he told a recent meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) in Washington, "... it is axiomatic that an intelligence service -- whatever type of government it serves -- must wrap itself in as much secrecy as possible in order to operate effectively..."

The speech, Helms's first public address since he was named Director of the CIA in 1966, was encouraged by the Nixon Administration which had become disturbed by critics charging that an intelligence network is incompatible with a democratic society.

AFTER COUNTING several criticisms with cool grace, Helms said, "The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service..."

In all official circles, Helms is already regarded not only as honorable but also as dedicated, talented and -- the supreme accolade in a capital that has its share of high-level dilettantes -- immensely professional.

Where once it was thought that Richard Nixon would replace Helms with a Republican appointee, the current consensus is that when and if the President reorganizes the sprawling intelligence community he will solidify, rather than diminish, Helms's authority.

Helms already has three separate roles: CIA Director; overall Director of Central Intelligence (which means that he is chief intelligence adviser to the White House and Congress); and chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board (which comprises all the other governmental intelligence outfits).

BUT HE HAS NO real authority over any group but the CIA. Under a reorganization, it is possible that Helms would either be given direct control of all intelligence operations or relocated in a special White House capacity.

Helms's quick mind, his remarkable grasp of complex issues, his insistence on staying out of the policy-making field and, above all, his forthrightness have earned him the respect of many of the Administration's severest congressional critics.

"Helms is great with Congress," says one Senate staffer. "He admits when he doesn't know something. He never lies."

He is also one of the most sought-after dinner guests in Washington -- charming, witty, debonair, completely removed from the popular image of the nation's super-spook.

THE 53-YEAR-OLD Helms learned his social graces in Europe, where he spent two years in fashionable schools. After graduating from Williams, he went back to Europe as a wire service reporter. Utilizing his fluency in German (he also speaks almost flawless French), he managed to wangle an exclusive interview with one of the Continent's rising radical politicians, Adolf Hitler.

Financial and personal problems forced him to abandon reporting and join the business side of a newspaper in Indiana. Then, during World War II, he worked for the Office of Strategic Services, and as soon as the CIA was created in 1947, he signed on.

Through the years, he served in most of the agency's branches, so that when the time came for President Johnson to pick a new director in 1966, Helms was the logical choice even though no career man had ever headed the agency before.

HELM'S LIVES IN Washington with his second wife, Cynthia, whom he married in 1969. Between them they have five grown children.

He keeps in shape by playing a creditable game of tennis and, if rumors are to be believed, one of his favorite pastimes is a kind of busman's holiday: reading spy novels.

But mostly Helms devotes himself to his work -- work that he believes, as he told the ASNE, "is necessary to permit this country to grow on in a fearsome world, and to find its way into a better and more peaceful one."

Newsweek Feature Service

STATINTL

Letters To The Editor

The Role Of CIA

Editor the Star::

Mr. Welles, in the New York Times Service article carried in the Star May 11, is not specific as to the type of executive order Mr. Nixon might issue to define and strengthen the role of CIA, in the projected foreign intelligence reshuffle.

As a former denizen of Washington, with over 25 years association with foreign intelligence, I shall venture a few comments on Mr. Welles' article.

First of all, I hope that the idea of establishing a Department of Intelligence is junked. Effective handling of foreign intelligence does not require another monolithic structure in Washington. Bigness is no substitute for effectively delegated authority, clearly understood procedures and objectives, and professional competence. Mr. Welles notes that as an alternative to a new department, the authority and responsibilities of CIA might be realigned and strengthened. I believe that this would be the correct action to take.

In the years since 1947, when CIA came into existence, the foreign intelligence effort of the United States has grown tremendously in sophistication and effectiveness, and CIA has been at the center of all this development. There have, of course, been growing pains and problems. If there had not been Mr. Nixon would not now be looking for reorganization.

If it is fair to single out a whipping boy we must pick on the intelligence effort of the military services. The conceptually sound idea of establishing the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and charging it with the responsibility for making coherent sense out of the gallimaufry created by G-2, ONI, and A-2 foundered on a technical loophole and entrenched greed.

The technical loophole was that, in addition to each service contributing to the foreign intelligence effort of DIA, each was also permitted to develop, for itself, "Departmental Intelligence": information necessary for each to develop and use its own weaponry to maximum advantage. Unfortunately, as competition for money and individual recognition has grown, so has the predilection of the services, encouraged too often by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to pay more attention to their own needs than to the central effort represented by DIA.

It appears that at this juncture DIA hasn't the muscle to battle the Joint Chiefs, and so long as there are so many military officers in DIA, with their fitness reports being written by their own services, no amount of paper work will make this different. The practical alternative is to turn over to CIA most of the functions assigned to DIA, accompanied by a very firm presidential charter as to the authority vested in its director and the level of cooperation expected from others in the foreign intelligence field.

I am sure that there is not space here to describe what some of these functions are, but they are quite simple and could be effectively carried out by an organization with the experience and professional competence of CIA. The alternative, a Department of Intelligence, would be subject to such a variety of conflicting ideas and growing pains that it would all too probably, unwittingly, recreate some of the mistakes we are now trying to get away from.

HAYDEN CHANNING
5150 N. Campbell Ave.

STATINTL



Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden

Intelligence Boss Is Needed



THE TROUBLE with the intelligence service of the United States is that it has no commander. This is the point perceived by President Nixon during a recent secret White House briefing at which the President literally threw up his hands in a display of impatience at the vast, expensive and complicated bureaucracy which had been described.

The President had asked for the briefing because of three recent and irritating intelligence failures.

The first was at Sontay, in North Vietnam, where the Army mounted a dangerous operation to recover prisoners who weren't there.

Second was the failure to learn that the North Vietnamese were using the Port of Sihanoukville in Cambodia as a vast supply center—a fact discovered only after we barged into Cambodia thinking the supply center was somewhere else.

Third was the failure of the U.S. command in South Vietnam to forecast the speed with which the North Vietnamese could send reinforcements into Laos, and the Army's failure to estimate how many South Vietnamese ground troops and American airmen would be needed to do the job.

ALL THESE failures caused the President to ask for a clear explanation of how our intelligence system

works—and why it sometimes doesn't work. What he received was an accurate account of confusion.

The first point Mr. Nixon learned is that the \$2 billion-a-year intelligence effort is not commanded but coordinated. Richard Helms, a careful objective analyst, commands CIA but not the Defense Department's intelligence arm, which is headed by Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett. General Bennett, in turn, doesn't really command his own forces because he is often dealing with intelligence requests from officers who outrank him and whose wishes must be regarded as orders.

Thus compromise frequently substitutes for decision in determining Defense Department intelligence priorities. Bennett must try to satisfy an admiral who insists that developments in submarine detection must come first, a general who is more interested in the thickness of Soviet armor, and an Air Force man who insists on priority for new developments in the Soviet SAM. Helms must balance all this with the importance of finding out what the Russians are putting in their ICBM bases and why.

Nobody is boss. Nominally, Helms is "coordinator" of the intelligence effort, but since most of the

money for intelligence comes through the Department of Defense, there is a natural inclination to tell the coordinator how the money should be spent.

PRESIDENT NIXON would like to bring Helms into the White House. That is usually the first thought of the boss who wants a clear picture of what he may have to deal with, and one man to whom he can turn to get it. But if Helms makes this move, he will have to give up running the Central Intelligence Agency, where he first made his mark as a master of spy networks and into which he has brought both order and a healthy sense of restraint. (It was not Helms' wish to involve the CIA in Laos.)

With Helms in the White House, the intelligence effort would soon be domi-

nated by the Defense Department. On the basis of recent performance, this would be a disaster. Former CIA Director John McCone, who was also asked to move to the White House, argued that he would become merely a go-between while the agency he commanded withered into an anachronism, much as the State Department has withered with the advent of resident foreign affairs aides.

One compromise open to the President is to give Lt. Gen. Bennett another star, thus putting him on an equal footing with those who are asking him to make their priorities his own. But if this President—or any other—really wants a better intelligence system, he will eventually have to put somebody in charge.

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CIA 7.02 Defense

Washington Whispers®

[Items appearing on this page are being talked about in Washington or other news centers]

LBJ's Biggest Error: an Inside View . . . High Marks for CIA's Helms . . . No Probe of FBI

President Nixon is getting more loyalty from his Cabinet and top White House aides than did President Johnson, according to a high-ranking official who served under both Presidents. This same man is of the opinion that "one of the biggest mistakes President Johnson made was in not getting rid of the [Kennedy] holdovers when he moved into the White House. They weren't on his side."

★ ★ ★

The Soviet Union hasn't abandoned its efforts to line up help from U.S. industry to build and operate a plant for producing heavy-duty trucks in Russia. Although it has attracted little or no public attention, a Soviet delegation has been visiting truck manufacturers in this country, trying to make a deal. Their goal is to get a factory in Russia capable of turning out 150,000 vehicles a year.

★ ★ ★

Despite some public clamor for a congressional probe of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by Senator Sam Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, veterans on Capitol Hill say it isn't going to happen. One of the Senator's closest friends puts it this way: "Sam says he hasn't heard anything illegal yet about any FBI action, so what is there to investigate?"

★ ★ ★

Plans for Cuba's Fidel Castro to visit his Marxist friend, President Salvador Allende of Chile, apparently were canceled abruptly a few weeks ago. Before the trip was called off, 60 of Castro's personal guards arrived in Chile's capital city of Santiago to make security arrangements for the protection of their boss.

After a shaky start with the Nixon Administration, Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, is now regarded as being in solid in that job, although he is not an intimate member of the "Nixon team."

★ ★ ★



John P. Roche

U.S. Intelligence A Failure in Asia

STATINTL

THERE IS A good deal of talk here about President Nixon's plans to reorganize our foreign intelligence services. According to one account, the President was infuriated by the Defense Intelligence Agency's misreading of Hanoi's probable response to the Laotian incursion. "Hanoi threw 35,000 men of four divisions against the 17,000 in ARVN," an intelligence source told the Times' Benjamin Welles. "They stripped North Vietnam of troops, gambling that the United States wouldn't invade the North—and they were right. Their estimates were better than ours."

This allegation, if verified, should not only lead to the reorganization of our intelligence structure, but should generate the instant dismissal of everyone in the DIA who had a hand in preparing the estimate. The notion that Hanoi was going to hold back its strategic reserve to counter a possible invasion was simply preposterous. It could only have been made by men without the slightest understanding of, or respect for, the intelligence of the enemy.

Indeed, this has been one of the curses of the war. From the outset, military strategy was formulated on an appalling underestimation of Hanoi's determination and capacity. While they would, of course, deny it today, Washington was in 1964-65 full of optimistic technocrats who were certain that Ho Chi Minh would collapse with fright the first time an F-105 buzzed Hanoi. The strategy of bombing North Vietnam was thought of as a way of preventing a war, as a technique of searing the North off South Vietnam.

WHEN ONE CRITIC opposed the bombing strategy in an article in The Washington Post in the spring of 1965, he was informed on a

background basis by high State Department and Pentagon figures that his somber pessimism was unjustified. He was told that he simply didn't appreciate the virtues of air power. When he argued that Ho Chi Minh was not the chief of a primitive hill tribe, but a totalitarian genius dedicated to conquering all of former French Indochina, at whatever cost, these briefers obviously wrote him off as an ideological nut. He was informed that the "intelligence community" (which presumably excluded ideological nuts) was in full agreement that the North Vietnamese response to the bombing would be "defensive."

In 1971 the same crew seems to be calling the shots. Let us look for a minute at the view from Hanoi of the Laotian incursion. Hanoi has political experts who follow American opinion (in fact, one of their best men holds a Ph.D. in political science from a distinguished American university). Suppose you put the question to Hanoi's American desk: "How would the Americans react to an invasion of North Vietnam?" After the Cambodian convulsion, it would hardly take a Ph.D. in political science to answer that one.

SO THEN YOU go down the hall to the military intelligence division and ask its members: "Do the Americans and South Vietnamese have the assets for an invasion of North Vietnam?" Since they can count, they can make an extremely accurate assessment of our order of battle. Taking into consideration the rapid decrease in American combat troops, the ARVN operations in Cambodia, and other facts about the state of combat readiness of various ARVN divisions, it is not hard to guess their reply: "The use of crack

troops for the Laotian incursion has eliminated any possibility of a diversionary maneuver into the North."

Of course, in a rather pathetic exercise in psychological warfare, President Thieu in Saigon made noises about invading the North. However, far from influencing Hanoi, all that Thieu did was to arouse the doves in the United States. In the event what Gen. Giap did was to strip North Vietnam of its strategic reserve and throw the whole force into containing ARVN in Laos. It probably cost him a good deal in manpower—he had to bunch his forces where our planes could get at them—but in political terms it was probably worth it. Laos got billed as an American defeat, as a failure of Vietnamization. In fact, it was an inexcusable failure in American intelligence.

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BUFFALO, N.Y.
NEWS

E - 281,982

MAY 19 1971

Helms of CIA: Secret Intriguer and Public Figure

Special to Buffalo Evening News

WASHINGTON, May 19 — In a recent edition of "Who's Who in America," the official biography for Richard McGarrah Helms is less than an inch long. It identifies him simply as "govt. ofcl." lists prosaic things like his educational credentials. (B. A. Williams Coll. 1935), his clubs (Chevy Chase, City Tavern Assn.) and his office address: Central Intelligence Agy., Washington, 20505.

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Take, for instance, the time in 1956 just after Nikita Khrushchev had delivered his secret "de-Stalinization" speech to the Communist Party Congress in Moscow.

As deputy chief of the CIA's clandestine services, Mr. Helms directed the agents who dummed up a copy of the speech with 32 derogatory inserts about neutral nations and their leaders. They then circulated it abroad — and caused the Russians some severe embarrassment.

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After countering several criticisms with cool grace, Mr. Helms said: "The nation must, to a degree, take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service..."

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RICHARD HELMS
U. S. Intelligence Head

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But he has no real authority over any group but the CIA. Under a reorganization, it is possible that Mr. Helms either would be given direct control of all intelligence operations or relocated in a special White House capacity.

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H - 141,086
L - 697,966

MAY 16 1971

Charles Bartlett's notes

Nixon on blacks': deadline

WASHINGTON — President Nixon is making it a point to meet the deadline set by the 13 black legislators for an answer to their demands for more help to the urban poor. On Monday he will respond, item by item, to the 60 proposals advanced by the Black Caucus. He will not turn them all down, but he can't promise much because the cost of the blacks' program is estimated by budget officials at between \$87.5 million and \$105 million. The President is, however, eager to convince the Rockefeller wing of the GOP that he is sympathetic to the problems of the black minority.

Image remakers

THE WHITE HOUSE is still seeking solutions to what it regards as the President's image problem. A new assistant is being sought to serve as the domestic equivalent to John Scali, who is advising the President on how to improve his public relations in the foreign-policy area. Meanwhile, Charles Colson, a high-ranking aide, is collecting ideas on how to improve Mr. Nixon's projection on television.

Fly in ointment

THE PRESIDENT has been cautious in responding to solicitations from former President Lyndon B. Johnson for official participation in the Johnson Library dedication on May 22. Mr. Johnson asked him to fly some 500 of his guests down to Austin in Air Force jets, but the President, apprised that the cost of each plane would be \$8,000 out of his contingency fund, has so far balked. He is afraid there will be an adverse public reaction. So one group of 100 Johnson associates has chartered a Braniff Airlines plane, and others will go on regularly scheduled carriers.

Bees' needs

NATURE NOTES: The House just passed, without dissent, an administration proposal that beekeepers be awarded \$3.5 million in indemnity payments for damage done to their honey and bees by insecticides . . . White House gardeners, who developed a colorful array of flowering plants for table decorations in the Johnson era, are restrained now by Mrs. Nixon's taste. She has a strong preference for using only red flowers.

Pollution standards abroad

U.S. officials are working hard to impose U.S. pollution and safety standards on foreign countries so that U.S. manufacturers will not face a competitive disadvantage in foreign trade. A total of 11 U.S. ecology specialists flew to Prague last week for a conference on European pollution problems. Identical air-monitoring systems have been set up in St. Louis, Ankara and Frankfurt as part of a health study. The Japanese public's sudden concern with pollution promises that manufacturers there will not escape the added costs.

Bigger role for Helms?

Mr. Nixon has not decided how much of a reorganization he wants in the intelligence community, but it seems likely that he will give Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency director, some co-ordinating authority over budgets that pay for intelligence activities in the Defense Department. The President's agreement to have Helms address the editors convention here in April is taken as a sign that he means to move Helms into a more prominent role.

PROVIDENCE, R.I.

JOURNAL

MAY 14 1971

M - 66,673

S - 209,501

A Single Agency

A major reorganization of the nation's overseas intelligence services is under consideration at the White House, and the sooner the job is done, the better for the country. The precise outlines of the overhaul are not yet clear, but it is obvious that Mr. Nixon is determined to improve intelligence services while cutting high operational costs.

The Central Intelligence Agency is the most prominent of the federal agencies which collect and analyze foreign intelligence. But there are five other agencies involved in similar work. The total annual bill for all six agencies runs to about five billion dollars; about 200,000 persons are involved, mostly in the armed services.

A study made for the President includes a recommendation for the creation of a Cabinet-level intelligence department; it also includes provisions for tightening CIA's oversight of intelligence work done for the ~~armed services~~ in the Defense Department. It is plain that any reorganization will run squarely into operation of long-established vested interests.

There is a superficial attraction to the idea of creating a Secretary of Intelligence, but does the task of correlating overseas intelligence work rate a Cabinet post? It would seem that such a service is intended to provide information to all major agencies of government and, as such, might more properly be made a White House staff function.

Assigning the CIA primacy among the intelligence agencies is certain to run into opposition, particularly from military service agencies. But somehow, the goal of cooperation must be fixed and enforced in place of what must often be almost cutthroat competition among the six agencies for money, staff, and authority.

Congressional opposition or suspicion of a presidential effort to centralize the overseas intelligence services might be blunted if Mr. Nixon accompanied his executive order with a proposal for appointment of a joint congressional committee, such as the Atomic Energy Committee, to oversee the intelligence gathering services for the legislative branch.

Mr. Nixon will not have an easy time in the proposed reorganization, no matter what may be the precise nature of administrative reforms. But reforms are needed; in fact, they have long been overdue. A single agency, coordinating all intelligence work overseas effectively for the President and his Cabinet, is essential to the national security.

SALEM, ORE.
STATESMAN

M - 34,977 MAY 14 1971
S - 35,572

The high cost of intelligence

The U.S. government spends an estimated \$5 billion annually gathering intelligence all over the world.

President Nixon has serious doubts about whether we are getting our money's worth, reports The New York Times. He is considering various ideas to reorganize our various global information collection efforts.

The Central Intelligence Agency, a civilian organization, is our prime means of gathering strategic information throughout the world. But much of the intelligence effort is carried out through the Defense Intelligence Agency and 150,000 men assigned to intelligence branches of the various armed services.

The \$5 billion cost figure is only a very rough estimate. The government never reveals intelligence spending publicly, in order to deny this information to potential enemies. As a result, only a handful of our congressmen and hardly any ordinary citizens know much about our intelligence activities.

The President reportedly is concerned about the quality of our intelligence effort as well as its cost. The Times says he wasn't happy about two recent intelligence failures, which probably is an understatement. One was the

work that preceded that abortive prisoner camp raid deep into North Vietnam last November, when the raiders discovered the prisoners hadn't been in the camp for some time. The other was the great underestimate of North Vietnam's ability to counter that South Vietnamese move into Laos.

Good foreign intelligence is of extreme importance to the U.S. It can mean the difference between preventing and blundering into a war. It can prevent serious mistakes our government otherwise might make on a long list of subjects — everything up to and including the question of what new weapons systems we should be developing to protect our country from which potential threats. It's a prerequisite to meaningful arms control, for example, which if achieved might save us several times the cost of all intelligence work.

So if it takes \$5 billion per year to keep our government well informed about scads of actions taking place all over the globe, we'll not complain.

But both the size of the price tag and some of the recent fumbles make us suspect that the President's critical review is very much in order.

SCRANTON, PA.
 TRIBUNE
 M - 34,458
 SCRANTONIAN
 S - 47,518
 MAY 12 1971

Our Intelligence Agencies

All Presidents have been misled at one time or another by faulty intelligence reports. President Nixon has been irritated in recent months by two examples of shoddy intelligence work.

Last November, inferior intelligence resulted in the abortive prison camp raid at Son Tay, North Vietnam. The staging of the raid was an example of fine planning, but the raiders found no American prisoners to rescue. The prisoners had been shifted elsewhere and our intelligence sources failed to report the move.

The incursion into Laos earlier this year by the South Vietnamese Army met massive resistance, all because our intelligence sources failed to pick up Hanoi's moves to implement forces in the field in Laos.

President Nixon is now said to be considering a major reorganization of the nation's foreign intelligence activities to improve output and cut costs. There are several options the President can follow. One is creation of a Cabinet-level department of intelligence. Another is strengthening the authority of the director of the Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency over the global operations of the Pentagon and other intelligence agencies.

The United States has a far-flung intelligence network that costs taxpayers about \$5 billion annually to maintain. Many Presidents have bemoaned the fact that intelligence reporting has been rather erratic despite the money pumped into the program.

The Central Intelligence Agency is the largest of the agencies specializing in intelligence activities. But there are other bureaus performing similar services, five of them with overseas ties. At least 200,000 are employed in the intelligence agencies.

Many observers feel the President must take action through an executive order defining the authority of Richard Helms, director of the CIA. The authority of Helms is rather imprecise at this point. The move could strengthen the CIA director's authority over such intelligence-gathering agencies as the Pentagon, State Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation. Whether such a solution is a viable one would remain to be seen.

Nixon Reported Weighing Revamping of Intelligence Services

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 10 — President Nixon is said to be considering a major reorganization of the nation's foreign intelligence activities to improve output and cut costs.

Those familiar with the plan say that the options range from creating a new Cabinet-level department of intelligence to merely strengthening the now-imprecise authority of Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, over the global intelligence operations of the Pentagon and other federal agencies.

The reorganization plan has recently been presented to President Nixon. It covers 30 to 40 typewritten pages and was prepared primarily by James R. Schlesinger, assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, and K. Wayne Smith, a former Pentagon systems analyst now on the National Security Council staff.

The informants say the plan grew from instructions Mr. Nixon gave his staff last autumn, to draft various reorganizational and cost-cutting studies.

Complaints Voiced

Both the President and Henry A. Kissinger, his assistant for national security affairs, have frequently expressed dissatisfaction over the erratic quality of the foreign intelligence

provided them. Some White House officials estimate that at least \$500-million could be cut from the \$5-billion spent annually on national intelligence.

Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have said that while occasionally intelligence of extreme usefulness — such as the incredibly detailed information on Soviet and Chinese Communist missile development obtained from spy satellites — has been produced, the service has frequently failed to forecast such sudden developments as the riots that forced a political reshuffle in Poland last December.

Mr. Nixon is particularly dissatisfied, his associates say, by the cost and size of the Government's global intelligence operations when compared with their results. In addition to the Central Intelligence Agency, five federal agencies are involved in intelligence overseas. At least 200,000 people are involved, 150,000 of these uniformed personnel in the Defense Department.

The President was seriously irritated, aides say, by two recent failures of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, which numbers 3,000 and spends an estimated \$500-million yearly. One was faulty intelligence prior to the abortive prison-camp raid at Son Tay, in North Vietnam, last November. The other was failure to forecast North Vietnamese resistance to the South Vietnamese Army's incursion into Laos Feb. 15 to March 25.

'Their Estimates Were Better'

"Hanoi threw 35,000 men or four divisions against the 17,000 in ARVN," said one qualified source. "They stripped North Vietnam of troops, gambling that the United States wouldn't invade the North — and they were right. Their estimates were better than ours."

The most drastic option open to Mr. Nixon would be the creation of a new department of intelligence to be headed by an official of Cabinet rank. It would combine the Central Intelligence Agency with 15,000 civilian employees; the Defense Department's code-cracking National Security Agency with 100,000 uniformed personnel and its Defense Intelligence Agency with 3,000. The C.I.A. spends about \$500-million yearly; the National Security Agency \$1-billion and the Defense Intelligence Agency \$500-million.

The merit, some experts say, would be to concentrate in one department the collection of foreign intelligence now performed not only by the C.I.A. but also by the Army, Navy, and Air Force separately around the world. However, opposition would be forthcoming from vested interests in the armed services and in Congress. They say, therefore, that Mr. Nixon is unlikely to adopt it.

At the other end of the scale, informants report, Mr. Nixon could merely issue an executive order defining — thus strengthening — the authority of Mr. Helms over the intelligence operations of such powerful federal agencies as the Pentagon, the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Officers Meet Weekly

Their principal intelligence officers meet weekly as members of the United States Intelligence Board. Mr. Helms, as the President's chief intelligence adviser and head of the C.I.A., presides, but his authority is unclear. It derives from a letter written by President Kennedy in 1963 to John A. McCone, one of Mr. Helms's predecessors, and has never been updated.

While Mr. Helms has full control over the C.I.A., the Pentagon's worldwide intelligence, which Robert F. Froehke, an

Assistant Secretary of Defense has estimated costs \$2.9-billion yearly.

"When you have the authority but don't control the resources," a Defense Department official observed, "you tend to walk very softly."

The President is said to regard Mr. Helms as the nation's most competent professional intelligence officer. Last month, informants disclose, Mr. Nixon wrote Mr. Helms congratulating the C.I.A. on its recent annual estimate of Soviet defense capabilities.

To provide control over the huge intelligence system and make it responsive to his needs, Mr. Nixon is likely, his staff associates say, to choose one — or a combination of — the middle options before him that do not require Congressional approval.

Closer Ties Possible

It is likely, officials say, that Mr. Nixon will eventually bring Mr. Helms and a top-level staff of evaluators from C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., closer to the White House, possibly into the National Security Council staff.

Officials concede that under a reorganization Mr. Helms might relinquish to his deputy, Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, of the Marine Corps, some of his responsibility for the C.I.A.'s day-to-day collection operations and concentrate, instead, on intelligence evaluation for the President. One possibility envisaged under the reorganization would be the creation by Mr. Helms of an evaluation staff in the White House drawn from the C.I.A.'s Office of Current Intelligence and its Office of National Estimates. The latter prepares long-range studies in depth of potential trouble spots.

Another would be the creation by Mr. Nixon of a White House intelligence evaluations staff made up of Mr. Helms, General Cushman, Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Ray S. Cline, director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

THE LIFE of the C

By BENJAMIN

WASHINGTON.

CAN tell when he walks in the door what sort of a day it's been," says his wife, Cynthia. "Some days he has on what I call his 'Oriental look'—totally inscrutable. I know better than to ask what's happened. He'll tell when he's ready, not before, but even when he talks he's terribly discreet."

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, apparently brings his problems home from the office like any other husband—at least to hear Cynthia Helms tell it. And these days Helms's job is definitely one of the most problem-ridden in Washington.

Successive budget cuts, balance of payments restrictions, bureaucratic rivalries and press disclosures that have hurt the C.I.A.'s public image have all reduced its operations considerably. President Nixon has recently ordered a fiscal and management investigation into the intelligence "community," a task which may take longer and prove more difficult than even Nixon suspects because of the capacity of the intelligence agencies to hide in the bureaucratic thickets. Both Nixon and his principal foreign affairs adviser,

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Henry Kissinger, are said to regard the community as a mixed blessing: intrinsically important to the United States but far too big and too prone to obscure differences of opinion—or, sometimes, no opinion—behind a screen of words.

Considered a cold-blooded necessity in the Cold War days, the agency now seems to many students, liberal intellectuals and Congressmen, to be undemocratic, conspiratorial, sinister. The revelations in recent years that have made the agency suspect include its activities in Southeast Asia, the Congo, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs; the U-2 flights; its secret funding through "front" foundations of the National Student Association plus private cultural, women's and lawyers' groups, and, finally, two years ago, the Green Berets affair.

The 53-year-old Helms knows all this, better than most. As the first career intelligence officer to reach the

top since the C.I.A. was created in 1947, his goal has been to professionalize the agency and restore it to respectability. In fact, one of his chief preoccupations has been to erase the image of the Director as a man who moves in lavish mystery, jettisoning secretively around the world to make policy with prime ministers, generals and kings, and brushing aside, on the pretext of "security," the public's vague fears and Congress's probing questions. If Helms rules an "invisible empire," as the C.I.A. has sometimes been called, he is a very visible emperor.

While he tries to keep his lunches free for work, for example, he occasionally shows up at a restaurant with a friend for lunch: a light beer, a cold plate, one eye always on the clock. He prefers the Occidental, a tourist-frequented restaurant near the White House where, if he happens to be seen, there is likely to be less gossip than if he were observed entering a private home.

He likes the company of attractive women—young or old—and they find him a charming dinner partner and a good dancer.

"He's interesting—and interested in what you're saying," said Lydia Katzenbach, wife of the former Democratic Attorney General. "He's well-read and he doesn't try to substitute flirting for conversation, that old Princeton '43 routine that some of the columnists around town use."

Some of his critics complain that he is too close to the press—even though most agree that he uses it, with rare finesse, for his own and his agency's ends. Some dislike the frequent mention of Helms and his handsome wife in the gossip columns and society pages of the nation's capital.

Yet, if he gives the appearance of insouciance—he is witty, gregarious, friendly—the reserve is there, like a high-voltage electric barrier, just beneath the surface. Helms is a mass of apparent contradictions: inwardly self-disciplined and outwardly relaxed, absorbed in the essential yet fascinated by the trivial. A former foreign correspondent, he observes much and

can husbands ever note in the first place—what gown each woman wore to a dinner and whose shoulder strap

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Laird to Name Advisory Unit To Oversee Intelligence Role

By JARED STOUT
Newhouse News Service

A high-level review board to oversee military intelligence within the United States is understood to be the chief feature of Defense Department plans to bring such operations under tighter civilian control.

But the board's authority would be limited to an advisory role. Direct control of the military intelligence apparatus will remain with the uniformed services, Defense officials said yesterday.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird will name a board comprised of a member of his staff and the civilian heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force or their designees.

Prevent Spying

The board would be expected to meet monthly to review domestic intelligence operations. It would have the responsibility of preventing the spying episodes that have sparked recent controversy. Former Army agents have revealed how domestic intelligence operatives kept watch and dossiers on thousands of dissident or politically-active Americans.

Officials said the board would provide review of domestic intelligence programs at the Pentagon's highest levels. Previously there was no such check by Defense Department civilians.

In addition, they said Laird's prestige would give the board "the muscle it needs to discipline these programs."

But intelligence experts outside the Defense Department said the proposed board shapes up as lacking in power to bring major changes in the military's operations. It appears as only a

modification of the concept used by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to oversee foreign intelligence through the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Under Kennedy, the FIAB was supposed to judge the sufficiency of U.S. foreign intelligence and recommend ways to improve it. The group largely has been ignored.

Without the staff to conduct independent inquiries and exert control, over operations, some experts believed the Laird review board would suffer the same fate.

Other details of the Laird plan for domestic intelligence are

scheduled for announcement Thursday, nearly three weeks after the Feb. 1 deadline he set for an overhaul of military intelligence.

Plan resisted

Officials said the delay stems from a fight between Laird and the Joint Chiefs of Staff over control of foreign, not domestic, intelligence gathering and analysis.

According to sources, resistance by the joint chiefs has been strong enough to force Laird to abandon his effort to take full control of the foreign operations from the military men.

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with

THE DAILY WORLD

1 Feb 1971

Intelligence Shakeup?

THE PERSONAL security of every American is involved in the duties performed by U.S. agencies dealing with intelligence. It is to their interest that such agencies work efficiently and within the scope of the work assigned them.

PRESIDENT NIXON is pushing a check into intelligence agencies—the CIA and the STATE, JUSTICE and DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS — to see if coordination or consolidation is possible and, as importantly, to find if money can be saved.

Like every man who ever sat in the CHIEF EXECUTIVE's chair, NIXON is having difficulty keeping up with what his intelligence agencies do. He wants to know more about their activities, which he should, and the public, which has no access to such knowledge, needs to have the assurance that somebody is keeping tabs.

U.S. intelligence programs are far more loosely conducted than many imagine. There are 200,000 people employed in the field with expenditures estimated at \$3.5 billion annually. That is a lot of people and a lot of money that very little is known about.

Though Mr. NIXON needs no justification for seeking new ways to achieve more at less cost, the public is not reassured that the *quality* of U.S. intelligence work is as good as it is cracked up to be. In recent years, in fact, intelligence has become a dirty word in most liberal and some moderate circles. But in these days of global suspicion and strife, intelligence is essential; good intelligence is of inestimable value.

The PRESIDENT is to be commended for the effort. He is the first to undertake the drudgery and complex probing required to learn the depth and scope of espionage and domestic security vigilance.

To be sure, what he may find will scarcely be information to be made public. But for the first time, somebody in super-authority in Washington will know *what* is going on, whether it is strictly honest in intent, and how much it is costing.

From there, the PRESIDENT can satisfy his own need or make recommendations that Congress can act upon. Too little is known of U.S. intelligence activities that rightfully belongs in the public sector.

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Unintelligence

Overlapping and duplication of the work of intelligence agencies in the United States government have become so pronounced that it is no wonder President Nixon is dissatisfied. It seems almost incredible that these agencies should be spending an estimated five billion dollars a year and employing the services of 200,000 persons.

What makes the situation more deplorable is the multiplicity of agencies — not only the CIA, which has the over-all responsibility for foreign intelligence, but intelligence agencies in each of the three major military services, the State Department, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the FBI. Many citizens will wonder why a single agency couldn't do the bulk of the work, with the others perhaps doing specialized tasks for their own agencies — but no more.

The rising cost of these activities, like that of all government expenditures, is enough to warrant a thorough investigation of the extent and efficacy of all the intelligence and spy agencies. Informed officials insist that the number of persons and the amount of money involved in real spying are relatively small. The large expenses are incurred in routine gathering of so-called "open" information and also in intercepting and trying to decipher coded messages on world-wide radio transmissions or operation of planes and satellites on surveillance missions.

One trouble with the intelligence organizations, like all bureaucracies, is that they tend to proliferate. Occasionally, they grow almost uncontrollably as did the Army mission of spying on civilians in connection with possible military employment in controlling domestic riots. That is perhaps the greatest danger. All these agencies operate under a cloak of secrecy, with only a handful of civilian officials, legislative and executive, aware of what they are doing. It may be questioned how much any congressman or senator really knows about them.

Another trouble is that any investigation or evaluation must be done with a maximum of secrecy. It certainly can't be handled the way an investigation of welfare expenditures is conducted, with legislators sounding off in all directions. No responsible parties want to hamper the intelligence-gathering process. But no one can be happy, not even the President, with the present situation.

26 JAN 1971

All For Intelligence

President Nixon is said to have difficulty ascertaining what all the federal intelligence agencies do, and with how much money and manpower. And if the President cannot figure out what all the espionage is about, how can Congress, or the public?

Thus Mr. Nixon should have thorough support if he undertakes any real reorganization of the various intelligence arms—the Central Intelligence Agency, along with agencies of the Defense, Justice and State Departments and, at times, the FBI. Mr. Nixon has asked his staff to survey this abundance of intelligence effort and to report back with ideas about cutting spy expenses.

Mr. Nixon is the first President really to attempt to make fiscal or any other kind of sense out of the intelligence apparatus, though had he lived John Kennedy might have tried, considering the CIA blunder in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. One of the worst features of so-called intelligence is that it is not entirely that; it has too often been involved in paramilitary ventures far beyond data gathering.

Most citizens probably thought the CIA was supposed to bring all this together, and then President Eisenhower no doubt thought he was co-ordinating something when he set up the U.S. Intelligence Board, but the various agencies still go their own ways with an estimated 200,000 personnel and a similarly estimated expenditure of 3.5 billion dollars a year.

Aside from saving money, reorganization could result in more competent intelligence. But in this mysterious field governmental reorganization may be more difficult than anywhere else.

Foreign Policy: Disquiet Over Intelligence Setup

Following is the fifth in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 — President Nixon has become dissatisfied with the size, cost and loose coordination of the Government's worldwide intelligence operations.

According to members of his staff, he believes that the intelligence provided to help him formulate foreign policy, while occasionally excellent, is not good enough, day after day, to justify its share of the budget.

Mr. Nixon, it is said, has begun to decide for himself what the intelligence priorities must be and where the money should be spent, instead of leaving it largely to the intelligence community. He has instructed his staff to survey the situation and report back within a year, it is hoped—with recommendations for budget cuts of as much as several hundred million dollars.

Not many years ago the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence bureaus were portrayed as an "invisible empire" controlling foreign policy behind a veil of secrecy. Now the pendulum has swung.

The President and his aides are said to suspect widespread overlapping, duplication and considerable "boondoggling" in the secrecy-shrouded intelligence "community."

In addition to the C.I.A., they include the intelligence arms of the Defense, State and Justice Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. Together they spend \$3.5-billion a year on strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union, Communist China and other countries that might harm the nation's security.

When tactical intelligence in Vietnam and Germany and reconnaissance by overseas commands is included, the annual figure exceeds \$5-billion, experts say. The Department spends more than 80

per cent of the total, or about \$4-billion, about \$2.5-billion of it on the strategic intelligence and the rest on tactical. It contributes at least 150,000 members of the intelligence staffs, which are estimated at 200,000 people.

Overseeing all the activities is the United States Intelligence Board, set up by secret order by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956 to coordinate intelligence exchanges, decide collection priorities, assign collection tasks and help prepare what are known as national intelligence estimates.

The chairman of the board, who is the President's representative, is the Director of Central Intelligence, at present Richard Helms. The other members are Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Ray S. Cline, director of intelligence and research at the State Department; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, head of the National Security Agency; Howard C. Brown Jr., an assistant general manager at the Atomic Energy Commission, and William C. Sullivan, a deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Intelligence men are aware of the President's disquiet, but they say that until now—half-way through his term—he has never seriously sought to comprehend the vast, sprawling conglomeration of agencies. Nor, they say, has he decided how best to use their technical resources and personnel—much of it talented—in formulating policy.

Two Cases in Point

Administration use—albeit, tardy use—of vast resources in spy satellites and reconnaissance planes to help police the Arab-Israeli cease-fire of last August is considered a case in point. Another was poor intelligence coordination before the abortive Sontag prisoner-of-war raid of No. 21, at which time the C.I.A. was virtually shut out of Pentagon planning.

By contrast, the specialists point out, timely intelligence helps in decision-making.

It was Mr. Cline who spotted a Soviet nuclear submarine buildup at Cienfuegos,

Cuba, last September, suspicions, based on the arrival of a mother ship, plus two conspicuous barges of a type used only for storing atomic fuel, alerted the White House. That led to intelligence behind-the-scenes negotiations and the President's rewarning to Moscow not to service nuclear armed submarines "in or from" Cuban bases.

Career officials in the intelligence community resist dealing with reporters, but in views over several months with Federal officials deal daily with intelligence matters, with men retired from intelligence careers with some on active duty indicate that President Nixon and his chief advisers appreciate the need for high-grade intelligence and "consume" eagerly.

The community, for instance, has been providing the President with exact statistics numbers, deployment characteristics of Soviet missiles, nuclear submarines, airpower for the talks with Russians on the limitation of strategic arms.

"We couldn't get off ground at the talks with this extremely sophisticated formation base," an official commented. "We don't give our negotiators round figures—about 300 of this weapon."

We get it down to the '284 here, here and here.' When our people sit down to negotiate with the Russians they know all about the Russian strategic threat to the U.S.—that's the way to negotiate."

Too much intelligence has its drawbacks, some sources say, for it whets the Administration's appetite. Speaking of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national-security affairs, a Cabinet official observed: "Henry's impatient for facts."

Estimates in New Form

In the last year Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have ordered a revision in the national intelligence estimates, which are prepared by the C.I.A. after consultation with the other intelligence agencies. Some on future Soviet strategy have been ordered radically revised by Mr. Kissinger.

"Our knowledge of present Soviet capabilities allows Henry and others to criticize us for some sponginess about predicting future Soviet policy," an informed source conceded. "It's pretty hard to look down the road with the same certainty."

Part of the Administration's dissatisfaction with the present setup and organization of the

Helms Said to Rate High

Sources close to the White House say that Mr. Nixon and his foreign-policy advisers—Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird—respect the professional competence of Mr. Helms, who is 57 and is the first career head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in June, 1966, Mr. Helms has been essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought professional ability to bear in "lowering the profile" of the agency, tightening discipline and divesting it of many fringe activities that have aroused criticism in Congress and among the public. His standing with Congress and among the professionals is high.

According to White House sources, President Nixon, backed by the Congressional leadership, recently offered Mr. Helms added authority to coordinate the activities of the other board members. He is reported to have declined.

A major problem, according to those who know the situation, is that while Mr. Helms is the President's representative on the Intelligence Board, the agency spends only about 10 per cent—\$500-million to

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Shipwreck of State

There was a time in the affairs of the United States when the State Department made foreign policy. That time is quite a way in the past. More and more, as a survey by *The New York Times* has shown, the formulation of foreign policy has been moved to the White House. The State Department, instead of directing other agencies in their dealings with foreign governments, finds itself competing with those agencies for White House attention. Moreover, it frequently finds itself running a poor second to them.

Probably this development should not be surprising. For the past decade, the nation has been conducting or directing a war. In an age of superpowers and superweapons, the military budget of the country has swollen to between 70 and 80 billion dollars. Whoever controls the spending of that amount of money, and the activities of all the people involved in the expenditure, is going to have a potent influence on policy, if not indeed to the point of making the policy.

But personalities are the imponderable in political affairs. A succession of relatively weak secretaries of state has done nothing to offset the trend toward centralization of authority in the White House. It is not simply that Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon have insisted on paying day-to-day attention to foreign policy; they have gradually built up a White House foreign policy staff that rivals the State Department. This build-up has not been accidental, of course. The catapulting of the United States into the position of the most powerful nation has thrust new and magnified responsibilities upon the President.

Still, Harry Truman deferred to Dean Acheson and Dwight Eisenhower deferred to John Foster Dulles. Perhaps a weaker president seeks a more aggressive secretary to formulate the policies and decisions that have to be made—although neither Truman nor Eisenhower was exactly a weak man. Perhaps if Dean Rusk had had a streak of greater decisiveness in him, he could have stemmed the tide. Secretary of State Rogers has impressed no one as a strong personality. He comes across, in press and television, as a likable and kindly person, a man who in the right circumstances might prove to be

a successful peacemaker. Certainly, he has tried to play that role in the Middle East—and not without some success. But if he is not the essence of aggressiveness, that undoubtedly is because President Nixon did not want a high-pressure man heading the State Department. That Mr. Rogers is an old and trusted friend—one of Mr. Nixon's oldest and most confidential advisers — has not prevented his department from being pushed into a secondary position. Other departments with interests and personnel abroad have been quick to ignore or shake off the direction and control that the State Department, through its ambassadors, is supposed to exercise in all overseas situations.

Possibly a different combination of president and secretary of state could put the department back in a position of command. But a reversal apparently will not be easy. The attempt ought to be made—for the State Department does represent civilian control over foreign policy, a control less and less represented by the activities of the huge Defense Department and the mostly undercover CIA.